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This dissertation uses mixed methods to increase academic and managerial understanding of the drivers 
and performance effects of institutional entrepreneurship at micro- and macro-levels of analysis. Study 1 
is a macro-level study containing a review and typology of different streams of institutional theory. Study 
2 is a quantitative macro-level study, examining the conformity between Dutch firms’ internal and external 
regulatory environment (fit), and linking this to firm performance. The U-shaped relationship between 
regulatory mis-fit and substantive performance that is found, suggests that for firms that strive for success, 
deviation rather than conformation may be the key to success. Study 3 examines the framing mechanisms 
used to maintain a cross-sector partnership (XSP). We carry out a qualitative case study focusing on the 
use of different frames by diverse actors in an XSP. We find that collaboration in a partnership does not 
have to result in a unanimous agreement around a single or convergent frame. This implies that resources 
need not be focused on reaching unanimous agreement among all partners on a single mega frame, but 
rather be used to enkindle unity in diversity, where several frames are maintained simultaneously. Study 4 
uses a macro-level quantitative approach to demonstrate that the existence of individual-level institutional 
entrepreneurship initiatives within firms is related to the type of exhibited firm-wide innovative behavior. 
In sum, this dissertation illustrates that the institutions that managers come across in their professional 
environments can be influenced by individual institutional work carried out to create, maintain, transform 
or disrupt these institutions.
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Rotterdam School of Management (RSM), and the Erasmus School of Economics (ESE). ERIM was founded 
in 1999 and is officially accredited by the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences (KNAW). The 
research undertaken by ERIM is focused on the management of the firm in its environment, its intra- and 
interfirm relations, and its business processes in their interdependent connections.
The objective of ERIM is to carry out first rate research in management, and to offer an advanced doctoral 
programme in Research in Management. Within ERIM, over three hundred senior researchers and PhD 
candidates are active in the different research programmes. From a variety of academic backgrounds and 
expertises, the ERIM community is united in striving for excellence and working at the forefront of creating 
new business knowledge.
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
Strategic Renewal through Institutional Entrepreneurship 
Organizations’ simultaneous urge to change as well as to remain stable is a broadly 
studied paradox in management literature (e.g., March, 1991; Leana and Barry, 
2000; Barreto and Baden-Fuller, 2006; Klarner and Raisch, 2013). Organizations 
that are embedded in their institutional environments have stronger survival 
chances than those that are not (Baum and Oliver (1991; 1992). While a desire to 
reduce uncertainty drives resistance to change, change is pursued by actors in 
organizations to achieve or maintain a competitive advantage.  
If actors are subject to processes that make them similar, how are they able 
to devise and carry out new practices? Institutional entrepreneurship literature 
attempts to address this paradox by combining institutional theory with the 
concept of agency, and investigating how new institutions are formed or existing 
ones are transformed (Maguire et al, 2004). Institutional entrepreneurship 
literature often explains institutional entrepreneurship as the result of 
circumstances that allow a company to vary its behavior, either due to network 
position (Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006) or paradigm uncertainty (a.o. Dorado, 
2005; Seo and Creed, 2002). Yet this variation in behavior is also bounded by an 
actor’s embeddedness. Leca and Naccache (2006: p. 628) note that ‘to remain 
coherent with institutional theory, a model of institutional entrepreneurship must 
provide a model of change in which actors can create and change institutions 
without disembedding from the social world.’ A theory that incorporates a firm’s 
embeddedness as well as motivation for change is not yet fully formed.  
Institutional entrepreneurship literature has been criticized for using an 
overly voluntaristic point of view (Battilana, Leca and Boxenbaum, 2009). 
Especially accounts at the organizational level of analysis often portray 
institutional entrepreneurs as a specific class of people (Garud et al. 2002; 
Greenwood et al. 2002; Lounsbury 2002; Maguire et al, 2004). However, as 
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Lounsbury and Crumley (2007: 1007) state ‘a more complete account of 
institutional entrepreneurship (…) would attend not only to the variety of actors 
that contribute to a particular change to be explained, but also to their relation to 
wider meaning systems and theories embedded in cultural elements such as 
categories, conventions, and discourse’. More recent work focuses on macro level, 
where the institutional conditions that frame engagement are taken into account 
(Dorado, 2005). These include technological disruptions (Greenwood & Suddaby, 
2006) and policy and regulatory changes (Kellogg, 2009). In a review of 
institutional entrepreneurship literature, Battilana et al. (2009: p. 90) conclude that 
the levels of analysis used by scholars in this field should be expanded. The 
authors urge future research to include individual and community levels next to 
organizational and organizational field-level research. Dorado (2013: 534) adds 
that ‘a focus on macro-conditions (…) advances our understanding of institutional 
entrepreneurship by explaining why individuals can become institutional 
entrepreneurs, not why they will’. Instead, the author suggests that the group-level 
is most appropriate to analyze institutional entrepreneurship as it expands 
understanding of the conditions under which individuals assume the risks of 
institutional entrepreneurship (Dorado, 2013). These varying views on the 
appropriate level of analysis to study institutional entrepreneurship indicate that, 
although many instances of the phenomenon have been analyzed, there is 
controversy as to the mechanisms that underlie the occurrence as well as the 
success of institutional entrepreneurship. As most scholars focus on one level of 
analysis, studies that attempt to remedy this controversy are sparse. In order to 
address this gap in the literature, the objective of this PhD project is; 
To increase academic and managerial understanding of the drivers and 
performance effects of institutional entrepreneurship at micro- and macro-levels 
of analysis 
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Dissertation overview 
To attain the objective of this dissertation, we investigate institutional 
entrepreneurship at several levels of analysis. To structure our enquiry, we 
formulate a number of research questions that are addressed in four related and 
complementary studies, see Table 1. The four studies in this table together 
constitute the dissertation and are interrelated through their aim to further the 
managerial and academic understanding of institutional entrepreneurship. In 
addition the studies are complementary in that they approach the topic using 
several levels of analysis, various theoretical perspectives and different research 
designs. Table 1.1. Provides and overview of the studies in this dissertation.  
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Table 1.1. Overview of studies in this dissertation 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Level  
of 
analysis
Study # Topic Methodology Key 
references
Contribution
Macro 1. Institutional 
perspectives 
on strategic 
renewal
Literature 
review
Lewin and 
Volberda 
(1999); Meyer 
and Rowan 
(1977); 
Maguire et al. 
(2004)
The paper compares 
and contrasts 4 
institutional 
perspectives on 
strategic renewal
Macro 2. Relation 
between 
regulatory fit 
and 
performance 
Institutional fit 
analysis using  
survey scales for 
institutional fit
Drazin and 
Van de Ven, 
(1985); 
Heugens and 
Lander 
(2009); 
Volberda et 
al., (2012)
The study formulates 
a measurement scale 
for regulatory 
institutional mis-fit 
and investigates the 
two types of 
regulatory mis-fit
Micro 3. Maintenance 
of cross-
sector 
partnerships
Case study Gray, Purdy 
and Ansari, 
2015; Le Ber 
and Branzei 
(2010)
This study outlines 
the framing 
mechanisms used to 
maintain a cross-
sector partnership and 
highlights the process 
of frame deletion
Macro 4. Relationship 
between 
institutional 
work and 
innovative 
behavior
Survey based 
study where a 
scale is 
suggested of 
institutional 
entrepreneurship
Greenwood 
and Suddaby 
(2006); March 
(1991)
The study formulates 
a measurement scale 
for the different types 
of institutional work 
that can be carried 
out to achieve 
institutional 
entrepreneurship
Study 1: Institutional perspectives on strategic renewal 
Abstract 
This study contains a review of institutional theory, which results in a typology of 
different institutional views. The study aims to provide insight into the various 
institutional views of strategic renewal. Institutional theory shows how 
organizational behaviors are responses not solely to market pressures, but also to 
institutional pressures (Greenwood and Hinings, 1996). Institutional theory can be 
separated into at least four different perspectives. These perspectives differ in level 
of analysis and the amount of agency assumed. Strategic renewal is broadly 
defined as the strategic actions a firm undertakes to alter its path dependence 
(Volberda et al. 2001b: 160). This study investigates the different institutional 
views on strategic renewal. Old institutionalists view strategic renewal as a 
reactive process where a firm’s structure and strategy follow from the demands of 
its environment. New institutional theorists direct attention towards isomorphism 
and non-rational aspects of strategic choices. Neo-institutionalists introduce the 
concept of deinstitutionalization and combines this with the idea that individual 
organizations interpret and react to industry pressures differently. Lastly, 
institutional entrepreneurs allow for variation in actors as well as institutionalized 
practices and with that explain how institutionalized phenomena are renewed over 
time. The four theories differ in their assumption of what drives strategic renewal 
and in their unit of analysis.  
Key words 
Strategic renewal, institutional theory, institutional entrepreneurship, agency 
Contribution 
This study aims to provide insight into the various institutional views of strategic 
renewal. Lewin and Volberda (1999) characterize key theoretical frameworks in 
sociology, economics, and strategy and organization theory and indicate the 
implications of each approach for firm strategy and adaptation. The authors 
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describe institutional theory a one of these frameworks and highlight its focus on 
isomorphism and embeddedness. However, this highlights only one of the at least 
four different streams of institutional theory. This study extents the research by 
Lewin and Volberda (1999) by adopting a more detailed level of analysis to study 
how institutional theories relate to adaption and selection. We separate the 
different streams of institutional theory and assess the perspective of each on the 
drivers of strategic renewal. In order to encourage scholars to articulate the 
specific institutional point of view used - and to avoid the ambiguity in 
understanding the theoretical basis of their research-, with this paper we provide 
scholars with an overview of the alternative points of view within institutional 
theory when it comes to strategic renewal,  
Study 2: Being different for a reason: how over- and under-compliance are 
related to higher performance 
Abstract 
Considerable debate exists about the effect of conformity on a firm’s performance. 
Most of the literature on institutional fit and performance uses outcome-based 
imitation to determine institutional fit. However, imitation is only one indicator of 
institutional fit. This study takes a broader approach to the concept and measures it 
not as imitation but as congruence of a firm’s internal environment with its 
external environment. In addition, the research is based on the regulatory 
environment, which is a relatively unexploited area for researching institutional fit. 
We use the conformity between a firm’s internal and external regulatory 
environment to determine fit and link this to firm performance. The U-shaped 
relationship between regulatory mis-fit and substantive performance that is 
hypothesized indicates the importance of institutional entrepreneurship. This 
conjectured relationship suggests that for firms that strive for success, deviation 
may well be a more attractive path than conformation. 
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Key words 
Institutional fit, regulation, institutional entrepreneurship, performance 
Contribution 
Our study has several intended contributions. First, most of the literature on 
institutional fit and performance uses outcome-based imitation to determine 
institutional fit. This is measured as the imitation of organizational design features 
of firms that are considered to be legitimate (Haunchild and Miner, 1997). 
However, institutional fit is defined as ‘the degree of compliance by an 
organization with the organizational form of structures, routines, and systems 
prescribed by institutional norms’ (Kondra and Hining, 1998: p. 750). This 
definition solicits a broader interpretation than imitation only. Therefore, this study 
measures institutional fit not as imitation but as congruence of a firm’s internal 
regulatory environment with its external regulatory environment. The 
restrictiveness and importance of firms’ external regulatory environment is 
compared to its internal regulatory environment in order to determine its degree of 
regulatory (mis-)fit. Using this new measure for institutional fit allows for a more 
balanced view of isomorphism because the focus on imitation is reduced.  
Second, the regulatory environment is a relatively unexploited area for 
researching institutional fit. Heugens and Lander (2009) offered an overview by 
performing a meta-analysis based on conformity and performance, the regulatory 
aspect of institutional fit has largely been disregarded in the literature. 
Lastly, our model combines two levels of analysis. We investigate the 
relationship between a firm’s sector-specific regulatory environment and its 
internal environment. In doing so, we control for sector-specific variation and 
allow for insight into the relationship between a firm’s degree of over- or 
underregulation -its mis-fit with the regulatory environment- and its performance. 
We hypothesize that a larger degree of over- or underregulation will correspond 
with higher performance. The managerial implications of this include that firms 
that consciously choose a certain degree of regulation, which diverts form the 
standard, perform better than those that simply follow the herd (Volberda et al., 
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2001a). The premise of this is that firms that act as institutional entrepreneurs must 
have an (economic) reason for this and will therefore perform better than firms 
that accept the institutional environment as given and adapt to it.  
Study 3: Maintenance of Cross-Sector Partnerships: the Role of Frames in 
Sustained Collaboration 
Abstract 
In this study we examine the framing mechanisms used to maintain a cross-sector 
partnership (XSP). We study eight years of existence of an XSP that aims to create 
a market for recycled phosphorus, a nutrient that is critical to crop growth but 
whose natural reserves have significantly dwindled. Drawing on 27 interviews and 
over 3.000 internal documents, we study the evolution of different frames of 
diverse actors in an XSP. We demonstrate the role of framing in how actors avoid 
common XSP pitfalls such as debilitating conflict, and create sufficient common 
ground to sustain collaboration. As opposed to a commonly held assumption in the 
XSP literature, we find that collaboration in a partnership does not have to result in 
a unanimous agreement around a single or convergent frame regarding an issue. 
Rather, an alternative route to successful collaboration amid diversity is the 
maintenance of a productive tension between different frames through ‘optimal’ 
frame plurality – not excessive frame variety that may inhibit the emergence of 
agreements, but the retention of a select few frames and the deletion of others in 
achieving a narrowing frame bandwidth. One managerial implication is that 
resources need not be focused on reaching a complete or unanimous agreement 
among all partners on a single mega frame, but rather be used to enkindle unity in 
diversity, that allows sufficient common ground to emerge around an issue despite 
the diversity of actors and their positions. 
Key words 
Cross-sector partnership (XSP), framing, frame deletion 
!8
Contributions 
We extend studies focusing on the formation of an XSP and its developmental 
stages (Koschmann et al., 2012; Manning and Roessler, 2014) by providing 
insights into the framing process through which collaboration may be sustained in 
an XSP after its formation.  
Also, our notion of optimal frame plurality while related to Le Ber and 
Branzei’s (2010, p. 164.) concept of ‘frame fusion’ also extends this work. Frame 
fusion – ‘the construction of a new and evolving prognostic frame and that 
motivates and disciplines partner's cross sector interactions while preserving their 
distinct contributions to value creation’, and the process of ‘frame plasticity’, 
where actors in organizations consciously select frames that fit with the 
partnership and the organizational and sector related values. We add further nuance 
to the notion of frame plurality (Gray et al., 2015) but showing that plurality may 
have ‘finite’ bounds as excessive variety may be counterproductive. We suggest 
that the deletion of certain frames, and the retention of a few – a progressively 
‘narrowing frame bandwidth’ – may be necessary for sustaining collaboration in 
XSPs.  This is line with the argument by Patvardhan, Gioia and Hamilton (2015) 
that in complex inter-organizational settings emerging (in this case an international 
consortium of “information schools”), it may be productive to seek and create 
‘coherence’ concerning shared problem domains, mutual interests, and practices, 
rather than absolute consensus through deliberation. 
Third, a rich body of work on hybrid logics and hybridism more broadly 
has addressed how actors manage institutional plurality and complexity amid 
conflicting stakeholder pressures. While this work has addressed both 
organizational and cross sectional settings, the focus is how actors manage 
plurality and collaboration on their own through bridging, segmenting, 
recombining and reconciling frames across divergent stakeholder groups. We add 
to this work by explaining how plurality is jointly generated and collaboration 
achieved by a collective acting together in a cross-sector partnership comprised of 
diverse constituents. It is thus not so much what actors can do on their own to 
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manage conflict, but rather what they can do together that may matter more in an 
XSP.  
Study 4: Creating and disrupting to explore: how different types of institutional 
work by actors relate to different firm wide innovation outcomes 
Abstract 
For Study 4. we use the systematic approach of innovation scholars to measure the 
institutional entrepreneurial behavior of individuals in firms. We then relate this to 
different types of innovative outcomes (exploration or exploitation.  
Our findings demonstrate that the existence of individual-level 
institutional entrepreneurship initiatives within firms is related to the type of firm-
wide innovative behavior that is exhibited. We make the case that individual 
institutional work within firms that is more radical is related to exploratory 
innovation, while institutional work to transform institutions more gradually is 
related to exploitation-based innovation. We find that there is a positive 
relationship between individual-level institutional work carried out to create 
institutions individual-level institutional work carried out to disrupt institutions 
and exploratory innovation at firm level. Also, we find a significant positive 
relationship between institutional work aimed at transforming institutions and 
exploitation-based innovation. These findings signify that the institutional 
entrepreneurial behavior of individuals within the firm effects the innovative 
outcomes at firm level.  
Key words 
Institutional work, institutional entrepreneurship, innovation, exploration, 
exploitation 
Contributions 
With this study, we use the systematic approach of innovation scholars to measure 
the very root of innovative behavior. We measure the institutional entrepreneurial 
!10
behavior of individuals in firms and relate it to different types of innovative 
outcomes (exploration or exploitation).  
This study creates a link between the separate literatures of institutional 
entrepreneurship and innovation studies. This benefits each of the literatures. 
Institutional work literature is known for explaining the delicate balance between 
economical explanations for behavior, and more socially controlled behaviors. 
This in-depth look at behavior is used in this study to explain through which 
process different types of innovation (exploration and exploitation) materialize at 
firm level. In turn, the innovation literature explaining the process and the 
outcome of innovation is extensive. As opposed to institutional research -which is 
sometimes criticized for being too descriptive in nature, and relying heavily on 
qualitative work – innovation research has used a wide variety of methods, from 
surveys to brain imaging, to define and measure the processes and outcomes of 
innovation.  
Second, we use this study to solidify the understanding of the concept of 
institutional entrepreneurship. Though the concept has been well defined and 
studied in many different contexts, this study pioneers a quantitative measure of 
the different types of institutional entrepreneurship. Though the measures can 
always use enhancements or changes, we offer at least a start to making visible the 
small, individual initiatives that are connected to different types of firm-level 
innovation (exploration or exploitation).  
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Chapter 2 
Study 1. Institutional perspectives on strategic 
renewal 
Introduction 
One of the great debates in social sciences is whether the world should be viewed 
through a Kantian lens of objectivity, or opposingly that we should see actors as 
acting upon their individual subjective experience of reality (Suddaby, Foster and 
Mills, 2014).  Institutional theory is recognized as providing an explanation for 
when organizational behavior is different than would be expected looking at 
market pressures. It “is an approach to understanding organizations and 
management practices as the product of social rather than economic pressures. 
Relative to resource dependence theory, institutional theory has tended to 
deemphasize both the ability of organizations to dominate or defy external 
demands and the usefulness of pursuing such strategies (Oliver, 1991, p. 150). 
Institutional theory has become a popular perspective within management theory 
because of its ability to explain organizational behaviors that defy economic 
rationality” (Suddaby, 2013, p. 379). This study aims to structure the terminology 
and the diverse definitions used in studies that apply (parts of) the broad spectrum 
of ‘institutional theory’ that exists. The purpose is to outline overlap and 
differences between the different sub-streams of institutional theory. We provide 
scholars with an overview of the alternative points of view in order to encourage 
them to articulate this point of view and avoid the ambiguity in understanding the 
theoretical basis of their research.  
Institutional theory is concerned with how ‘organizational behaviors are responses 
not solely to market pressures, but also to institutional pressures’ (Greenwood and 
Hinings, 1996, p. 1025). Such institutional pressures occur in a firm’s 
environment.  The definition of the institutional environment depends on the 
perspective but can broadly be defined as the positions, policies, programs, and 
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procedures around people and organizations which function as ‘highly rationalized 
myths’ (Meyer & Rowan 1977: p. 343). These myths define and enforce socially 
acceptable economic behavior (Oliver, 1997: p. 698). 
Over time, scholars have adopted various institutional views. These views 
differ in their level of analysis and in the amount of agency assumed. Table 2.1 
outlines the four perspectives that we distinguish within institutional theory and 
their main characteristics. Institutional theory is rooted in classical or old 
institutional theory (Clark, 1972; Selznick 1957). The early institutionalists looked 
at bureaucracy and institutionalization at firm level. New institutional theory then 
shifted the level of analysis to the industry in the 1970’s (Meyer and Rowan, 
1977). Later still, in the 1990’s neo-institutionalists combined the two views by 
focusing on organizations within a category or a network (Greenwood and 
Hinings, 1996). In the new millennium the institutional entrepreneurship view 
developed. This perspective reintroduces agency, interests and power into 
institutional analyses of organizations (Garud et al., 2007). A little later still, the 
concept of institutional work originated (Lawerence et al., 2009). This perspective 
reintroduces agency and power into institutional analyses of organizations (Garud 
et al., 2007). 
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Table 2.1. Different perspectives in institutional theory 
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Old 
Institutional 
Theory
New 
Institutional 
Theory
Neo-
institutional 
Theory
Institutional 
Entrepreneur-
ship
Period 1950 1970 1990 2000
Unit of 
Analysis
Firm Industry Firm and industry Firm and industry
Key 
Concepts
Politics, power, 
coalitions, 
adaptation, inertia
Isomorphism, 
regulative, nor-
mative, and 
cognitive 
institutional forces
Institutional forces 
vs institutional 
change
Agency, interests, 
power, 
collaboration vs 
contestation
Key 
Authors
Selznick (1949; 
1957)
Meyer and Rowan 
(1977), 
DiMaggio and 
Powell (1983)
Greenwood and 
Hinings (1996)
Maguire et al. 
(2004),  
Garud et al. 
(2007)
Outcomes Institutionali-
zation happens 
over time, it is a 
means of instilling 
value through 
individual actors 
who transmit what 
is socially defined  
as real
Isomorphic 
processes 
motivate 
conformity, which 
increases chances 
of acceptance and 
survival but often 
conflicts sharply 
with efficiency 
criteria
The interaction of 
organizational 
context and  
organizational 
action is 
responsible for 
organizational 
changes
Actors are 
knowledgeable 
agents with a 
capacity to reflect 
and act in ways 
other than those 
prescribed by 
institutionalized 
rules
Defining institutionalization 
Depending on which institutional perspective the author applies, the description of 
the process of institutionalization changes. Old institutionalists look at 
institutionalization as a micro-level process that results in the emergence of 
orderly, stable, socially integrating patterns within organizations (Broom and 
Selznick, 1955). New institutionalists add to this that social processes, obligations, 
or actualities come to take on a rule-like status in social thought and action within 
organizational fields (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). Important is that they add the 
conception that bureaucratization and other forms of organizational change occur 
as the result of processes that make organizations more similar without necessarily 
making them more efficient (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Both neo-
institutionalists and entrepreneurial institutionalists use the definition of 
institutionalization as proposed by earlier authors, although the latter emphasize 
the ongoing patterns of interaction between (groups of) organizations and 
institutions (Maguire et al., 2004).   
Since the development of institutional theory, a portion of research has 
been directed towards the effects of institutionalization. Meyer and Rowan (1977) 
found that institutionalized rules often conflict with efficiency criteria and that 
organizations therefore loosely couple formal structures and actual procedures. 
Tolbert and Zucker (1983) add that organizations are often pressured into 
incorporating institutionalized elements into their formal structures. Baum and 
Oliver (1991, 1992) underline this statement with their finding that organizations 
that are embedded in their institutional environments have stronger survival 
chances than those that are not.  
Institutional entrepreneurship  
Institutional entrepreneurship theory studies ‘the activities of actors who have an 
interest in particular institutional arrangements and who leverage resources to 
create new institutions or to transform existing ones’ (Maguire et al, 2004: 657). 
This branch of institutional theory offers options for ‘the paradox of embedded 
agency’ (Clemens and Cook, 1999; Seo and Creed, 2002) by offering 
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circumstances under which actors may be able to envision and carry out 
institutional changes (Sewell, 1992; Seo and Creed, 2002). Combining the 
isomorphism notion of new institutionalism with the agency notion of institutional 
entrepreneurship could provide useful insights into the drivers of institutional 
change. 
Institutional entrepreneurship literature has been criticized with reference 
to various issues. To begin with, it has been criticized for using an overly 
voluntaristic point of view (Battilana et al., 2009). Especially accounts at the 
organizational level of analysis often portray institutional entrepreneurs as a 
specific class of people (Garud et al. 2002; Greenwood et al. 2002; Lounsbury 
2002; Maguire et al, 2004). The approach had been criticized for its rational and 
‘heroic’ view of institutional entrepreneurs. It has been criticized as ‘Deus Ex 
Machina’ (Delmestri, 2006: 1536-1537) where some actors are able to defy 
institutional forces despite being embedded themselves (Lawrence, Suddaby and 
Leca, 2009: 5). Battilana et al. (2009:88) offer and alternative option, in which 
institutional change ‘might be occasioned by unintended actions of ordinary actors 
who break with institutionalized practices without being aware of doing so.’ The 
authors conclude from this that ‘future empirical research should pay more 
attention to the diversity of actors who coalesce around an institutional project.’ In 
addition, Leca and Naccache (2006: 628) note that ‘to remain coherent with 
institutional theory, a model of institutional entrepreneurship must provide a model 
of change in which actors can create and change institutions without disembedding 
from the social world.’ 
Next to the voluntaristic point of view, there has been criticism of the 
levels of analysis often used in institutional entrepreneurship studies. In a review 
of institutional entrepreneurship literature, Battilana et al. (2009: 90) conclude that 
the levels of analysis used by scholars in this field should be expanded. The 
authors urge future research to include individual and community levels next to 
organizational and organizational field-level research. Dorado (2013: 534) adds 
that ‘a focus on macro-conditions (…) advances our understanding of institutional 
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entrepreneurship by explaining why individuals can become institutional 
entrepreneurs, not why they will’. Instead, she suggests that the group-level is 
most appropriate to analyze institutional entrepreneurship as it expands 
understanding of the conditions under which individuals assume the risks of 
institutional entrepreneurship (Dorado, 2013). 
Lastly, there are concerns about the implied assumption that institutional 
entrepreneurship is a linearly progressing process. Zietsma and McKnight (2009: 
143-144) for example argue that most of the well-known institutional 
entrepreneurship work ‘has tended to focus retrospectively on the path of a single 
institutional innovation as it gained support in an emerging or existing field, often 
displacing an existing set of institutional arrangements (e.g. Greenwood, Suddaby 
& Hining, 2002; Maguire, Hardy & Lawrence, 2004; Munir, 2005)’. In contrast, 
the authors reason that the deinstitutionalization of an existing arrangement and 
institutionalization of a new accepted system is not a simple replacement process. 
Instead, they argue that ‘disruptive activities’, decreasing legitimacy of existing 
institutional arrangements, can be initiated by some actors while an alternative is 
not (yet) offered (Zietsma and McKnight, 2009: p. 244). Zilber (2007: p. 150) 
refers to the process of institutional entrepreneurship as ‘more polyphonic’ than is 
often accounted for in the literature. He argues that actors may work on several 
initiatives simultaneously. They may work together and against each other and 
they may be maintaining the institutional order at the same time as trying to 
disrupt it. The process of institutional change may involve several groups engaging 
in parallel institutional work, and finding that they are competing against, and 
impacted by, other actors sponsoring different arrangements (Zietsma and 
McKnight, 2009: p. 244). An interesting question is whether we can refer to all of 
these groups as institutional entrepreneurs. Battilana et al. (2009: p. 88) support 
the point of view of distributed agency, considering institutional processes as 
‘political and non-deterministic’ with outcomes that are uncertain because they are 
‘dependent on the actions and reactions of multiple actors’. Lounsbury and 
Crumley (2007: p. 1007) also refer to these uncertainties by pointing out that ‘a 
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more complete account of institutional entrepreneurship (…) would attend not 
only to the variety of actors that contribute to a particular change to be explained, 
but also to their relation to wider meaning systems and theories embedded in 
cultural elements such as categories, conventions, and discourse’. 
Institutional work 
According to Lawrence, Suddaby and Leca (2009: p. 1), the study of institutional 
work connects and extends the work on institutional entrepreneurship, institutional 
change and innovation. The authors emphasize that one of the aims of institutional 
work scholars is to ‘establish a broader vision of agency in relationship to 
institutions’ (Lawrence et al., 2009:1) that does not under- or overemphasize the 
power of actors.  
The argument here is that after establishing an institution, continuous work is 
required to keep it in place (Lawrence, Winn and Jennings, 2001). Authors who 
study and define institutional work investigate the ‘physical or mental effort aimed 
at affecting an institution or set of institutions’ Lawrence, Suddaby and Leca, 
2011, p. 53). This is often divided into three parts; the ‘work of actors to create, 
transform, or disrupt institutions’ (Lawrence, 2008, p. 171).  
Institutional maintenance is defined as the “supporting, repairing, and 
recreating” of institutions (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006: 230). Maintenance work 
often takes place in response to changes, such as the evolution of the environment 
and the entrance of new players (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006: 234). Institutional 
work undertaken to maintain institutions involves both more comprehensible work 
such as policing and deterring and less comprehensible work like the creating of 
routines and myths (Lawrence and Suddaby, 2006, p. 234). This definition clearly 
includes work by actors who are ‘aware of its purpose and influence’ (Lawrence 
and Suddaby, 2006, p. 234). Yet Maguire and Hardy (2009) further delineate the 
boundaries of what constitutes ‘maintenance’ by distinguishing it from ‘defensive 
institutional work’, which is a more conscious and strategic response to disruptive 
work. Lefsrud and Meyer (2012) combine institutional theory with the framing 
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literature to provide insight into ‘defensive institutional work’ in the form of 
climate change resistance. 
Strategic renewal 
Companies face competing forces of change and stability. Firm strategy is ‘the 
direction and scope of an organization over the long run which achieves advantage 
for the organization through its configuration of resources within a changing 
environment to meet the needs of markets and to fulfill stakeholder expectations 
(Johnson and Scholes, 1997:10). Volberda et al., 2001b) describe how new 
technologies, new competition and globalization drive change while short-term 
competitive forces demand stability. On the one hand a company should avoid 
core capabilities becoming core rigidities (Leonard-Barton, 1992) but on the other 
hand it should also avoid the ‘renewal trap’ (Levitt & March, 1988; Levinthal & 
March, 1993) in which too much change leads to chaos, loss of cultural glue and 
organizational breakdown (Volberda, 1996). 
Strategic renewal is used by firms to balance the forces of change and 
stability. It is broadly defined as the strategic actions a firm undertakes to alter its 
path dependence (Volberda et al. 2001b: 160) and align organizational 
competencies with the environment to in order to increase competitive advantage 
(Flier et al. 2003: 2168). More specifically, strategic renewal includes the process, 
content, and outcome of refreshment or replacement of attributes of an 
organization that have the potential to substantially affect its long-term prospects’ 
Agarwal and Helfat (2009: 282). 
Three dimensions of strategic renewal can be distinguished (Volberda et al., 
2001a); content, context and process. The content dimension distinguishes 
exploitation and exploration actions, where the former are aimed at increasing 
efficiency and the latter at entering new markets and innovation. The context 
dimension signifies the interaction between the environment and strategy, 
distinguishing between whether strategic actions are based on internal or external 
resources. Here, a distinction is made between internal- and external growth 
(Kwee et al., 2008; Capron and Mitchell, 2009; Flier et al., 2003). Internal growth 
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includes restructuring, internal corporate venturing, launching new products, and 
closing product lines or offices. On the other hand, external growth includes 
mergers, acquisitions, alliances and joint ventures (Kwee et al., 2008: 5). Thirdly, 
the process dimension of strategic renewal is concerned with the speed of the 
process. 
Scholars from different streams of institutional theory have varying 
conceptualizations of the where strategic renewal is initiated and at which level it 
should be studied. Table 2.2. provides an overview of the attitude towards strategic 
renewal as well as the unit of analysis for each of the four institutional 
perspectives. 
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Table 2.2. Four institutional perspectives classified according to unit of 
analysis and view of potential for strategic renewal 
Old institutionalists maintain that a firm’s structure and strategy follow from the 
demands of its environment. Selznick (1957) argues that the organization reacts to 
the characteristics of participants as well as to influences and constraints form the 
external environment. This view allows for little agency and therefore supposes 
low firm potential for strategic renewal. This process is studied at firm level, 
where the organization and its members are analyzed (DiMaggio and Powell, 
1991). New institutional theorists shift the level of analysis to the industry and 
direct attention towards isomorphism and non-rational aspects of strategic choices. 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) argue that isomorphism causes managers to respond 
similarly to institutional processes. The use of the concept of isomorphism 
indicates the low level of agency assumed in new institutional theory. Neo-
institutionalists introduce the concept of deinstitutionalization and combine this 
with the idea that individual organizations interpret and react to industry pressures 
differently. Greenwood and Hinings (1996: 1041) explain that neo-institutional 
theory attempts to explain how individual organizations ‘adopt and discard 
templates for organizing, given the institutionalized nature of organizational 
Unit of 
analysis
Potential for strategic 
renewal
Low High
Firm Old Institutional Theory 
(Selznick, 1957)
Institutional entrepreneurship 
(Lounsbury and Crumley, 
2007)
Industry New Institutional Theory 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 
1983) (Meyer and Rowan, 
1977) 
Neo-Institutional Theory 
(Greenwood and Hinings, 
1996) 
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fields’. This indicates space for agency. Lastly, institutional entrepreneurs differ 
from neo-institutionalists in that they specifically allow for individual variation in 
strategic behavior. Lounsbury and Crumley (2007: p. 996) explain the notion of 
‘performativity’, which assumes that practices can be altered due to variations in 
the individual behavior displayed during enactment of the practice. Maguire et al 
(2004: p. 659) argue that ‘uncertainty in the institutional order’ provides the 
opportunity for institutional entrepreneurs to act. Table 2.2. indicates that the 
views on strategic renewal concerning both its origin as its level of analysis differ 
for each branch of institutional theory. This paper indicates that institutional theory 
has developed into a variety of perspectives with very different premises. 
Therefore, scholars taking an institutional viewpoint should take care to consider 
and identify which institutional perspective they use, as this determines the 
theoretical basis of their approach. 
Discussion 
This study aims to provide insight into the various institutional views of strategic 
renewal. Lewin and Volberda (1999) characterize key theoretical frameworks in 
sociology, economics, and strategy and organization theory and indicate the 
implications of each approach for firm strategy and adaptation. The authors 
describe institutional theory a one of these frameworks and highlight its focus on 
isomorphism and embeddedness. However, this highlights only one of the at least 
four different streams of institutional theory. This study extents the research by 
Lewin and Volberda (1999) by adopting a more detailed level of analysis to study 
how institutional theories relate to adaption and selection. We separate the 
different streams of institutional theory and assess the perspective of each on the 
drivers of strategic renewal. 
We provide scholars with an overview of the alternative points of view in 
order to encourage them to articulate the approach selected and avoid the 
ambiguity for the audience in understanding the theoretical basis of the research. 
We aim to provide insight into the variation between institutional views when it 
comes to the drivers and the potential for strategic renewal, in order to make 
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visible the underlying assumptions of the theoretical lens used by the authors. We 
find that institutional entrepreneurship theory, when compared to other 
institutional theories, allows considerable space for strategic renewal tot take place 
within firms. Though reflecting major hallmarks of institutional theory such as the 
power of isomorphism and actors’ drive for legitimacy, institutional 
entrepreneurship theory also emphasizes that –keeping in mind or even using these 
principles- the agency of embedded actors can be a driver of institutional change. 
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Chapter 3 
Study 2. Being different for a reason: how over- and 
under-compliance are related to higher performance 
Abstract 
We aim to contribute to the institutional fit literature by investigating the 
relationship between the fit of a firm with its regulatory environment and firm 
performance. We offer a framework that allows for further analysis of what 
constitutes lack of (institutional) fit. We distinguish two categories of lack of 
regulatory fit and explain the difference between their occurrences. Firms can 
either deviate by keeping lower internal regulatory standards compared to what is 
externally enforced (under-compliance) or conversely by enforcing more stringent 
regulations than their industry prescribes (over-compliance). In order to create a 
continuous scale of regulatory fit, the latter is termed negative under-compliance. 
We hypothesize that there is a U-shaped relationship between the level of under-
compliance and substantive performance such that firms that either over-comply or 
under-comply perform better than firms that operate at regulatory fit. Using survey 
data from 550 Dutch companies we indeed find that the two types of lack of 
regulatory fit are related to higher relative substantive performance than regulatory 
fit. Our results suggest that succumbing to regulatory institutional pressures may 
not be the best strategy to attain maximum performance. Firm regulatory 
structures may be most beneficial to a company when based on firm-specific 
requirements rather than on the industry standard.  
Keywords: 
Institutional theory, regulation, fit, performance  
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Introduction 
Several internationally successful firms have demonstrated that a lack of 
compliance with institutionalized rules or even regulations can be very lucrative. 
California-based Uber is uprooting the taxi market on a global scale by using a 
smartphone app to connect passengers with luxury cars for hire, at rates that rival- 
and often undercut- conventional taxi companies. Operating in this manner, Uber 
is disrupting the archaic taxi system. Governments in several countries struggle 
with Uber’s business model in connection to local regulations. In Germany the 
luxury car service was first issued an immediate cease and desist order (August 28, 
2014) but within a month this preliminary injunction was revoked (September 16, 
2014) by a higher court. Uber has an audacious approach, continuing to roll out its 
business model despite the bureaucratic opposition that it faces. In July 2015 the 
company was valued at 51 billion US dollars after raising close to 1 billion US 
dollars in a new round of funding (MacMillan and Demos, 2015). The company is 
not alone in its selective lack of compliance with regulations. Another example of 
a successful rule-breaker is Airbnb. This home-sharing website was valued at 25,5 
billion US dollars in June 2015 (O’Brien, 2015), despite being challenged by 
legislators in cities such as New York and Amsterdam. Is bending the rules 
something to aspire to or something to avoid? This study suggests that for 
companies in institutionalized environments, simply playing by the rules may not 
result in the best possible firm performance. 
The relationship between regulation and firm behavior has evolved over 
time, becoming more interactive rather than uni-directional. Both economic- and 
social regulation have gained in prominence since the twentieth century 
(Schneiberg and Bartley, 2008).  Traditionally, regulation was top-down and 
carried out at a state or nation level. Research about social control tends to focus 
on negative reinforcement -such as policing- rather than positive reinforcement- 
such as stimulation measures- (Grabosky, 1995) yet researchers are noticing shifts 
in the way regulation is structured.  Schneiberg and Bartley (2008) find that new 
forms of regulation, such as competition and standard setting, as well as 
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alternative actors are taking over the role of traditional state regulation. Van 
Gossem, Arts and Verheyen (2009) also find that the importance of ‘surrogate 
regulators’ is growing. Schneiberg and Bartley (2008) study the relation between 
organizations and regulation from the nineteenth to twenty-first century and 
condense that the institutional environment influences regulatory processes. The 
authors highlight ‘the power of controversy and legitimacy crises to disrupt power 
relations and render entrenched interests vulnerable to challenge’ (Schneiberg and 
Bartley, 2008, p. 35). We pose that non-complying companies such as Airbnb and 
Uber are not exceptions but rather examples of how consciously interacting with 
rules and regulations, rather than simply complying, can be lucrative. We use 
institutional theory and fit research to argue that lack of fit with the regulatory 
standard is related to higher firm performance.  
The paradoxical relationship between institutionalized practices and firm 
performance is a long-standing theme of institutional theory. Meyer and Rowan 
(1977, p. 340) explained that although fit with institutional standards may increase 
the chances of a firm’s survival, it often ‘conflicts sharply with efficiency criteria’. 
The connection between institutional fit and firm performance has consistently 
received research attention (Baretto and Baden-Fuller, 2006; Heugens and 
Lander’s, 2009; Volberda et al., 2012). We aim to contribute to this branch of 
literature by broadening the understanding of regulatory fit, an underemphasized 
aspect of institutional fit. Regulatory fit is easily taken for granted. At first glance 
it appears self-evident that not complying with rules and regulations leads to 
legitimacy problems which in turn will lead to negative performance effects. We 
reason that this assumption deserves testing.  
Institutional fit and isomorphism in many studies are used as synonyms, 
while the founders of institutional theory clearly distinguish three levels of 
institutional forces; coercive, normative, and mimetic (DiMaggio and Powell’s, 
1983). Consistent with this, a distinction is made between regulatory, normative 
and cognitive pillars (Scott, 2001). Conformity to the normative and cognitive 
pillars of institutions (Scott, 2001) has consistently received more attention in the 
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debate about fit and firm performance than compliance to the regulatory pillar has. 
We investigate regulatory fit, a slightly taken-for-granted part of institutional fit.  
The influence of regulatory forces is of interest in this study. The 
regulatory pillar concerns the establishment of rules and sanctions. Regulatory fit 
refers to correspondence of a firm’s regulative (or legal) features to the 
institutional standard (Hoffman, 1999: 353). We look at the relationship between 
compliance to regulatory standards and firm performance. We pose that the 
implicit assumption that that the highest compliance to rules and regulations would 
result in the highest relative firm performance should be tested.  
Studies that focus on the performance effect of adaptation to institutional 
guidelines have often used isomorphic behavior as independent variable. This 
means that actors are being compared to each other but not to an external standard. 
Heugens and Lander (2009, p. 68) use a meta-study to address several debates in 
institutional theory. The data used in their study demonstrates the lack of attention 
for the regulative aspect of fit. The authors use DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) 
distinction between coercive, normative, and mimetic forces. Although the meta-
study finds a reasonable 101 usable effect sizes of coercive pressures (compared to 
131 mimetic and 66 normative), only 24 of these concern the imposition of rules 
and procedures through government mandates. The others measure resource 
dependence. In order to strengthen the body or research on regulatory fit, we 
emphasize the performance effect of how organizations deal with external 
institutions that exert regulatory pressure. 
It is remarkable that among the studies that have investigated the 
relationship between institutional fit and firm performance, consensus is lacking as 
to the effects of this on firm performance. We pose that some of the variation can 
be explained by further delineating the concept of lack of fit.  In the existing 
literature, a distinction is only made between fit and lack of it. When looking at the 
regulatory aspect of institutional fit, we distinguish between two different types of 
lack of regulatory fit. We theorize that lack of fit is not necessarily synonymous 
with lack of compliance. We offer a framework that allows for further distinction 
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between different types of lack of (institutional) fit. We distinguish between two 
categories of lack of regulatory fit. The first occurs when a company enforces rules 
and regulations that are less strict than the industry standard, which could be 
characterized as a lack of compliance. On the other hand however, we argue that 
firms that use more stringent regulations than the industry standard also lack 
regulatory fit, even though they comply with the prescribed regulations. We pose 
that differentiating between the two allows for an explanation as to the costs and 
benefits of each type of lack of regulatory fit. In many studies only a degree of fit 
is measured, which inaccurately pairs together two very different strategic 
directions a firm can take with regard to compliance to regulations. Besides simply 
complying, a firm can either apply more stringent or less stringent regulations than 
what is externally enforced. 
We are interested in the performance effects of a firm’s degree of 
regulatory fit. The definition of performance varies depending on ‘whose 
viewpoint is taken (e.g., customers or stockholders), the time period observed, 
criteria used, and so on.’ (Snow and Hrebiniak, 1980, p. 319). However it is 
evident that, irrespective of the precise definition, an organization's behavior is 
largely directed at achieving satisfactory performance. We follow Heugens and 
Lander (2009, p. 64) by dividing performance into a symbolic and a substantive 
branch. Symbolic performance is defined as the extent to which an organization 
commands legitimacy, status and reputation. Substantive performance, on the other 
hand, refers to a company’s ability to generate accounting-based profits or increase 
overall market value (Heugens and Lander, 2009, p. 64). We propose that both 
types of performance are affected by a firm’s regulatory fit, yet the direction of 
this depends on the degree of regulatory fit. 
Literature review  
Institutional fit 
Fit is a concept that is used across different areas of business research (Drazin and 
Van de Ven, 1985, Zajac et al., 2000, Volberda et al., 2012). Donaldson (2008) on 
one end of the spectrum distinguishes contingency theorists, who maintain that the 
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optimal organizational design is fit with contingencies, which maximizes internal 
effectiveness. On the other end he positions institutional theorists who assert that 
optimal (monetary) results are achieved when an organization fits with the 
institutional environment so that it maximizes legitimacy.  
Drazin and Van de Ven (1985: p. 514) summarize the early conception of 
fit in contingency theories in management research, which assume that ‘context 
and structure must somehow fit together if the organization is to perform well’. 
Zajac et al. (2000) still use contingency theory but move away from environment-
structure fit and instead focus on environment-strategy fit. They find that 
organizations that deviate from the prediction of strategic fit experience negative 
performance consequences.  
Institutional theory explains that that institutional requirements are often 
the reason that firm structure and strategy do not fit the contingencies (DiMaggio 
and Powell, 1983). Legitimacy enhances both stability and credibility of an 
organization, building on a common agreement that an organizations actions are 
‘desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of 
norms, values, beliefs and definitions’ (Suchman, 1995: p. 574). For an 
organization to be able to function effectively, its use of resources should be 
accepted by the larger social system (Parsons, 1960).  
Kondra and Hinings (1998, p. 75) conceptualize institutional fit as an 
organization’s degree of compliance with ‘the organizational form of structures, 
routines and systems prescribed by institutional norms’. The authors offer a 
comprehensive model of different categories in which organizations can be placed 
when comparing performance to institutional fit and focus on how the institutional 
field responses to each type. They use a main assumption in institutional theory; 
that organizations with high institutional fit cannot perform outside institutional 
norms. Moreover they discriminate between Dogs -organizations with low 
institutional fit and performance lower than the institutionalized level-, 
Equifinalists – those that operate outside institutional constraints but perform 
within the institutionalized range- and Renegades –firms that operate outside 
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institutional norms and perform above the institutionalized level. In the Renegade 
category, the authors focus on firms that internally hold lower standards than their 
institutional environment enforces. They explain that the reaction of actors in the 
environment to such Renegades is often the use of coercive power to enforce 
compliance. However they indicate that an alternative reaction can be mimetic 
behavior by actors to incorporate the alternative routines used by Renegades to 
also achieve higher performance. Renegades in the latter categories gain 
legitimacy and may eventually dictate the new, changed institutional standard.  
Kondra and Hinings (1998: p. 755) specifically allow for the possibility of 
deviation from legal and economic institutions. Institutions are the ’rules, norms, 
and beliefs that describe reality for the organization’ (Hoffman, 1999: 351). 
Institutions do not remain constant over time. They change as a result of external 
processes of deinstitutionalization in industries combined with ‘the internal 
dynamics of interpretation, adoption, and rejection by the individual 
organization.’ (Greenwood and Hinings, 1996: 1041).  Ansari, Fiss and Zajac 
(2010) further explore this change process by studying practice diffusion. Next to 
technical fit, and cultural fit they identify political fit as influencer of company 
adaptation. Political fit is characterized as the compatibility of a diffusing practice 
with the interests of potential adaptors. The authors offer ‘enforcement pressures’ 
–the policing of a practice- as an important mechanism for influencing adaptation. 
They argue that as a practice diffuses, scrutiny of enforcement pressures wanes 
and deviation or lack of compliance becomes easier. This suggests that later 
adaptors will be less forced to comply with a practice. This may be a good 
opportunity for firms not to comply in order to achieve performance benefits.  
Of the three institutional pillars as described by Scott (2001), normative 
and cognitive fit may (in less extreme situations) be difficult to observe. 
Conversely, non-compliance to the third pillar, the regulatory standard, is hard to 
conceal. It is interesting to separate lack of fit with rules and regulations from lack 
of normative and mimetic fit, for which the institutional wiggle room is 
characterized by a less clear line. It is intuitive to assume that in order to achieve 
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legitimacy, firms may be disinclined to break with the rules. However, given that 
institutional change also happens in rules and regulations, it can be established that 
variation and non-compliance also occur at the regulatory level.  
Regulatory fit 
We offer the term regulatory fit to signify the aspect of institutional fit that 
concerns correspondence between the stringency of a firm’s rules and regulations 
and that of its environment. The term regulatory fit is used in decision making 
theory to define the degree to which an individual’s (assigned) activities are 
congruent with an individual’s regulatory focus (Stam et al., 2010, Avnet & 
Higgins, 2006; Cesario, Grant, & Higgins, 2004). We extend the term to the firm 
level of analysis to signify correspondence of a firm’s regulative (or legal) 
stringency to the institutional standard (Hoffman, 1999: p. 353).  
Heugens and Lander’s (2009) use an extensive meta-study to synthesize 
the work on conformity and performance. Their analysis demonstrates that the 
regulative aspect of institutional fit had not received a great deal of attention. Only 
24 of a total of 298 effect sizes studied concern the imposition of rules and 
procedures through government mandates. The others refer to mimetic, normative 
pressures and resource dependence. Wade et al. (1998: p. 905) explain why a 
firm’s regulatory environment is important to consider. First, it influences the other 
institutional pillars: norms and cultural values. In addition, regulations influence 
‘resource flows by creating opportunities and constraints for different kinds of 
organizations within an organizational population’. Regulations are 
characteristically created as a response to perceived market failure in terms of 
efficiency or equity (Reynolds, 1981). This means that regulatory forces are often 
codifications of shared principles in society (d’Aunno et al., 2000: p. 682). Firms 
face a trade-off in complying with regulations. On the one hand, society associates 
compliance to regulations with reliability and legitimacy of an organization. 
Conforming to existing institutional systems is a strategy for gaining legitimacy 
(Suchman, 1995). ‘A legitimate firm obtains resources of higher quality and at 
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more f avo rab l e t e rms t han does a f i rm whose l eg i t imacy i s 
challenged’ (Deephouse, 1991: p. 152). 
On the other hand, regulations can be seen as creating routines that lead to 
inertia (Hannan and Freeman, 1984). Inertia is defined as ‘inadequate or slow 
adaptation to change or resistance to fundamental changes in conducting 
business’ (Hendricks and Singhal, 2001: p. 271). This has been found to have 
slight positive substantive performance effects in the short run but competitive 
diversity in the long run diminishes this effect (Miller and Chen, 1994).  
An organization that does not comply with regulations can be seen as a 
change from the institutional standard. A central assumption in institutional theory 
is that organizations tend towards stability rather than change (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983). However, Greenwood and Hinings (1996) propose that market- and 
institutional context as well as intraorganizational dynamics such as the degree of 
dissatisfaction and power dependencies influence whether organizational change 
can occur. Regulations are part of an organization’s context. D’Aunno et al. (2000) 
find that anti-competitive regulation reduces firm motivation towards divergent 
organizational change. In addition, they find that legislation that provides use of 
alternative templates promotes organizations to initiate change.  
We have explained how we define regulatory fit as an aspect of 
institutional fit and that organizations are capable of organizational change to 
move away from such fit. We will now link different degrees of regulatory fit to 
performance.  
Regulatory fit occurs when a firm applies the same regulatory stringency 
as the industry average. A firm can exhibit a lack of regulatory fit in two ways; it 
can either employ more stringent regulations – over-compliance – or conversely it 
can apply less rigorous principles than the industry norm – under-compliance. 
Table 3.1 demonstrates the spectrum of regulatory fit on which firms can be 
positioned.  
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Over-compliance and substantive performance 
We define the imposition of more stringent internal regulations than industry 
regulations as over-compliance. There is no value assessment incorporated in the 
term, it merely signifies that the regulatory structure goes beyond what is required 
by external regulations.  
An example of company that exhibits over-compliance is Bentley Motors’ 
achievement of becoming the first motor vehicle manufacturer in Europe to 
receive the International Organization of Standards (ISO) 50001 certification at its 
main plant in Pyms Lane, Crewe, United Kingdom in late 2011. ISO 50001 is a 
voluntary standard that specifies the requirements for implementing a safe and 
efficient energy management system. As a result of the improvements made, waste 
recovery and recycling efforts increased to 77% and water usage was reduced by 
half. In the end, Bentley lowered energy use by two-thirds for each car produced 
and by 14% overall for the entire plant, delivering savings of 230 GWh of energy 
– enough to power 11,500 houses for a year.  
This example demonstrates that there are two advantages to over-
compliance. To begin with, over-compliance can help a firm achieve consistency 
and standardization which can improve learning outcomes (Levinthal and 
March, 1993) and reduce costs. Additionally, a firm that over-complies is ahead of 
coercive forces such as national regulations but also customer requirements. Self-
imposing standards such as ISO will differentiate a firm from its competitors. 
Customers who prefer a certain standard will choose to provide resources to the 
supplier that adheres to this standard. Also, a firm that over-complies is ahead of 
industry regulation. This means that when the latter are made more rigorous, the 
overregulating firm will not have to incur the extra costs of adapting to the 
changed standard. Given that it is expected to result in lower (adaptation) costs, we 
expect that firms that over-comply realize higher relative substantive performance; 
H1a) At negative levels of under-compliance (i.e. over-compliance) we 
expect higher substantive performance than the industry average 
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Regulatory fit and substantive performance 
Regulatory fit exists when the stringency of a firm’s regulatory environment is 
equal to that of the average firm in the industry. New institutional theorists argue 
that although isomorphic forces push firms to become similar, this interferes with 
the demands of their individual work environments (Meyer and Rowan, 1977, p. 
341). Several scholars have demonstrated the efficiency-reducing effects of firm 
adaptation to industry standards. Deephouse (1999) establishes that actions 
directed at similarity reduce firms’ abilities to differentiate themselves from the 
competition. Westphal et al. (1997) investigate the consequences of this and find 
that conformity to Total Quality Management adoption is negatively associated 
with organizational efficiency benefits. Moreover, Barretto and Baden-Fuller 
(2006) demonstrate that adaptation makes firm managers take sub-optimal 
decisions on resource acquisition. They study how Portuguese banks choose where 
to build branches and demonstrate the occurrence of mimetic branching, which 
negatively affects financial performance. These studies show that fit is often 
realized for symbolic reasons, while it is negatively associated with substantive 
performance. We argue that regulatory fit, like other forms of conformity, is 
negatively associated with substantive performance because actors are likely to be 
motivated by ‘normative rationality’ rather than ‘economic rationality’ (Oliver, 
1997). 
H1b) At regulatory fit we expect lower substantive performance than the 
industry average  
Under-compliance and substantive performance 
We define the imposition of internal regulations that are less stringent than 
industry regulations as under-compliance. Beckert (1999: p. 783) argues that 
institutional theory should reserve a central space for interest-driven behavior of 
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actors. He proposes that ‘strategic action that violates existing institutional rules 
can be expected in situations characterized by high degrees of certainty within an 
institutional field’ because companies can then estimate the consequences of their 
actions. Under-compliance allows a firm to incur lower costs of adaptation to 
regulation. Like over-compliance, under-compliance may be the initiation of 
institutional change. An example of under-compliance as an act of institutional 
change involves the American investment bank Goldman Sachs. The bank has 
found a way to work around the Volcker rule, a part of the USA’s Dodd-Frank 
financial reform package. The Volcker rule is aimed at limiting what banks can 
invest in private equity funds, in order to avoid them taking too many risks with 
their own money. Although the rule has not yet been implemented, regulators were 
in the final stages of writing it at the end of 2013, and many banks are preparing 
for it by restructuring their activities. Goldman Sachs, on the other hand, is 
working around the regulation by raising client money, bank capital and partner 
money in separate accounts and investing as a syndicate. This method is different 
from using a traditional private equity fund and therefore falls outside the Volcker 
rule. Although private equity investments are risky, their returns can be very high. 
Goldman is exercising agency by using this under-compliance strategy. We expect 
that this strategy is related to higher relative substantive performance. 
H1c) At positive levels of under-compliance we expect higher substantive 
performance than the industry average 
Overall, we have argued that companies that either under- or over-comply 
are associated with higher relative substantive performance than companies that 
display regulatory fit. In order to create a continuous variable, we will express 
over-compliance as negative under-compliance and regulatory fit as zero under-
compliance. Combining hypotheses 1a, b and c we expect a U-shaped relationship 
between under-compliance and substantive performance; 
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Hypothesis 1: There is a U-shaped relationship between the level of under-
compliance and substantive performance such that: 
a) at negative levels of under-compliance (i.e. over-compliance) we expect 
higher substantive performance than the industry average 
b) at regulatory fit we expect lower substantive performance than the 
industry average  
c) at positive levels of under-compliance we expect higher substantive 
performance than the industry average 
Regulatory fit and symbolic performance  
Creating a lack of regulatory fit – either by over-compliance or under-compliance 
– can distinguish a firm from its competition. However, institutional theorists 
would argue that the examples of lack of fit affect symbolic performance in 
opposite directions. 
A common view among institutional theorists is that conformity to 
isomorphic templates is positively related to symbolic performance (Heugens and 
Lander, 2009, p. 64). Isomorphism is ‘a constraining process that forces one unit in 
a population to resemble other units that face the same set of environmental 
conditions’ (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983, p. 146). Institutional theory scholars 
suggest that institutional embeddedness is associated with advantages such as 
‘increased stability, social support, legitimacy, access to resources, and 
invulnerability to questioning’ (Baum and Oliver, 1991, p. 231). Suchman (1995, 
p. 574) explains that the motivation to be legitimate leads to organizations that are 
‘almost self-replicating’ because resources are more likely to be provided to 
organizations that are deemed appropriate and with that trustworthy. Deephouse 
(1996) tests whether organizational isomorphism leads to legitimacy and finds 
support for this proposition. Legitimacy is defined here as ‘the acceptance of an 
organization by its external environment’ (Deephouse, 1996, p. 1024). Zimmerman 
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and Zeitz (2002, p. 419) investigate the impact of legitimacy on new venture 
growth and distinguish three types of legitimacy, based on Scott’s (1995) 
institutional pillars. In terms of regulative legitimacy the authors argue that new 
ventures can gain legitimacy by ‘visibly conforming to regulations, rules, 
standards, and expectations created by governments, credentialing associations, 
professional bodies, and even powerful organizations’.  
The legitimacy literature suggests that firms are motivated to display 
isomorphic behavior in keeping up with industry standards in order to increase 
symbolic performance. In the case of regulation, this means that diverging from 
the standard is anticipated to result in lower symbolic performance than regulatory 
fit. Under-compliance is one possibility for such divergence.  
Under-compliance involves a discrepancy with the industry standard. This 
suggests a lack of isomorphic behavior, which triggers concerns about legitimacy. 
Many examples of the symbolic performance effects of under-compliance can be 
found in the petrochemical industry. Royal Dutch Shell, for example, was fined in 
2013 for violating the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Clean Air Act 
permits it received for arctic oil and gas exploration drilling off the North Slope of 
Alaska. As a result of many such incidents, Shell does not always have the 
unequivocal support of all of its stakeholders, despite its profitability; some will 
have concerns about the legitimacy of the company’s actions. Given that 
legitimacy is a component of symbolic performance, firm under-compliance is 
expected to have a negative effect on symbolic performance. 
Though it is understandable that keeping up with industry regulatory 
standards has positive effects on symbolic performance, the effect of over-
compliance is more controversial. Strictly applying the concept of isomorphism 
would lead to the prediction that over-compliance is a deviation from the industry 
standard and would therefore lead to lower symbolic performance. However, there 
is a strong argument to be made for the expectation that firms that over-comply by 
applying voluntary standards receive positive symbolic performance benefits 
(Buchanan, 1965; Potoski and Prakash, 2005). This argument is based on the 
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concept of ‘club goods’ (Buchanan, 1965), which provide exclusive benefits, 
especially in terms of reputation, to members of the club. A firm that chooses to 
over-comply is likely to do so using voluntary programs such as ISO standards. 
Although the firm incurs costs by conforming to stringent guidelines, it is 
rewarded in terms of symbolic performance. Visibly being a club member reduces 
transaction costs for external stakeholders in terms of distinguishing between 
members and non-members (Potoski and Prakash, 2005). For example, when a 
firm has an ISO 50001 certificate, customers can see at a glance that it employs 
efficient and safe energy management procedures. Over-compliance by means of 
voluntary standards thus allows a firm to demonstrate its environmental efforts, 
which results in more favorable evaluations by stakeholders such as customers and 
suppliers.  
Consequently we expect that higher levels of firm regulation will 
correspond to higher symbolic performance. Considering that over-compliance can 
also be expressed as negative under-compliance, we expect a negative relationship 
between the degree of under-compliance and symbolic performance: 
Hypothesis 2: There is a negative relationship between the level of under-
compliance and symbolic performance  
Methods 
Research setting and data collection 
In order to test the proposed relationships empirically, we used a random sample of 
4,300 Dutch companies of different sizes. Requests to participate in the survey 
were sent to management team members. As our data concerns information about 
the regulatory standards in the organizational field, management team members 
were approached because they were expected to be in the best position to provide 
this knowledge. Survey data were collected in 2011.  
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A total of 4,300 invitations were sent to managers of Dutch companies by 
post; in addition digital databases and social media were used to reach a wider 
public. 550 respondents completed the questionnaire, a response rate of 
approximately 12%. Apart from the category “others” (39%), the most important 
sectors represented were business-to-business services (23%), construction 
industry (14%), other manufacturing industry and mining (8%), logistics (7%), 
high-performance materials and systems (5%) and agrifood (4%).  
Construct measurement 
A list of questionnaire items was generated based on the operationalization of the 
constructs as outlined in Table 3.2.  
The questions about regulations were answered by respondents using a 
seven-point Likert scale to measure the strength of a participant’s agreement. 
External regulation was measured with a five-item measure (α = 0,786), including 
one reverse-scored item. Internal regulation was also determined using a five-item 
measure (α = 0,852). In addition to questions about internal and external 
regulation, questions about company performance were included. These were also 
answered using a Likert scale, where a score of 1 represented a strong decrease in 
performance and 7 represented a strong increase. In order to decrease the 
likelihood of multicollinearity of interaction terms, the independent variables were 
mean-centered before the interaction terms were constructed (Aiken and West, 
1991).  
Substantive performance is measured on annual change in profit. 
Symbolic performance is defined as the degree of positive evaluation of a 
company (Deephouse and Suchman, 2008). Using this definition, we created a 
three-item measure consisting of the perceived market share, customer satisfaction 
and employee satisfaction (α = 0,809). It should be noted that we assumed, in line 
with the institutional view (Heugens and Lander, 2009), that substantive and 
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symbolic performance are independent of each other and can therefore move in 
opposite directions.  
Lack of regulatory fit is conceptualized as the degree of under-
compliance, by taking the difference between the Likert-scale value that each 
respondent provided for the stringency of the external regulatory environment and 
the value assigned for the internal regulatory environment. This means that the 
more positive the value for this measure, the more under-compliance there is 
within a company, and the more negative the value, the more over-compliance a 
company maintains. We do not take an absolute value for the difference between 
firm regulation and industry regulation because we assume that over-compliance 
results in different market positions to those of under-compliance. A full list of 
questionnaire items can be found in Appendix 1.  
We used several control variables in our model; these include firm size 
and industry effects. Organizational size, measured as the log of the number or 
organization members, has a widely recognized moderating influence on the 
relationship between strategy and performance (Smith et al., 1989; Carroll, 2003). 
In addition, because service-providing firms differ fundamentally from non-
service firms, we included dummy variables for these two types of firms. Also, the 
degree of trust within an organization affects people’s perceptions and was 
therefore included as a control variable. Furthermore, we controlled for 
environmental dynamism and complexity. Dess and Beard (1984) derived these 
concepts from Aldrich’s (1979) six environmental dimensions that influence firms. 
We included them as two separate control variables. 
Reliability and validity  
A survey method allows for the collection of data from individuals about 
themselves or about the social units to which they belong (Rossi et al., 1983). This 
method has an advantage over archival data in explaining managerial behavior. 
However, the disadvantage is that the resulting data is perceptual. In order to 
assess the problem of potential bias, data collected for one of the dependent 
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variables, substantive performance, was triangulated using archival data. In 
addition, for 113 companies second respondent data is available, which allowed us 
to examine inter-rater reliability. For the substantive performance measure, the 
correlation between the first and second respondent was 0.978. This outcome 
allows for more confidence in the measure, as a value over 0.6 is necessary to 
justify the use of an aggregated perceptual measure (Glick, 1985). 
 In order to test for non-response bias, we examined differences between 
early and late respondents (those who started the questionnaire in the first three 
months versus those who started it in the final three months) for our main study 
variables. These comparisons did not reveal any significant differences (p < 0.01), 
indicating that non-response bias was not a problem in this study. 
 To reduce the risk of common method bias, during the administration of 
the survey we assured respondent confidentiality. This should reduce respondent 
tendency towards providing socially desirable answers. After receiving the data we 
performed several statistical analysis to assess common method bias. First, we 
performed Harman’s single-factor test. All variables were loaded into an 
exploratory factor analysis to assess whether one general factor would account for 
the majority of the covariance among the measures (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee 
and Podsakoff, 2003). This was not the case.  
  
Results 
This section first presents the findings of our univariate analysis. On average, 
respondents indicate lower pressure from internal regulation (3.83) than from 
external regulation (4.82). The standard deviation for under-compliance was 1.43. 
Sector-specific data for internal and external regulation can be found in Appendix 
2.  
Table 3.3 indicates the correlation matrix for the variables used in this 
study. The table indicates that internal and external regulation are strongly 
correlated. In addition, the variables dynamism, complexity and trust correlate 
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significantly with at least one of the dependent variables. This supports our 
decision to control the analysis for these effects.  
We used regression analysis to investigate hypotheses 1 and 2. Models 1 
and 2 are used to explain substantive performance and Models 3 and 4 are used to 
explain symbolic performance. The models are presented in Table 3.4. 
Model 1 in Table 3.4 explains the combined effect of control variables on 
substantive performance. Model 2 explains the effect of under-compliance on 
substantive performance. Model 3 explains the combined effect of control 
variables on symbolic performance, and Model 4 outlines the effect of under-
compliance on symbolic performance. The variance inflation factor (VIF) 
indicates whether a predictor has a strong linear relationship with the other 
predictor(s) (Field, 2000). All of the variables in the models have VIF scores 
below 2.5, which indicates that multicollinearity is not a problem in this analysis. 
The Durbin-Watson score of 1.929 indicates no autocorrelation. 
We used the results from Model 2 to test hypothesis 1. First, we find a 
significant negative relationship between under-compliance and substantive 
performance. In addition, we find a significant positive relationship between the 
square of under-compliance and substantive performance. As under-compliance 
increases and moves towards institutional fit, substantive performance initially 
decreases. However, after a low point at a moderate amount of under-compliance, 
substantive performance begins to increase. This means that we do indeed find a 
U-shaped relationship between under-compliance and substantive performance. 
However, it should be noted that not all elements of hypothesis 1 are confirmed. 
Hypothesis 1a is confirmed; negative levels of under-compliance – that is, over-
compliance – are related to higher substantive performance than the industry 
average. Hypothesis 1b is partly confirmed; relative substantive performance is 
low at regulatory fit but it is not the lowest point of the curve. For this reason 
hypothesis 1c cannot be confirmed completely. Substantive performance that is 
higher than the industry average is found at high levels of under-compliance; 
however, the lowest substantive performance is found at low levels of under-
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compliance. Although the expected U-shaped relationship is found, the minimum 
of the curve is found at a different degree of under-compliance than expected. 
Figure 1 outlines the relationship that was found between the level of under-
compliance and relative substantive performance. 
Using Model 4, we find no support for hypothesis 2 as no significant 
relationship between under-compliance and symbolic performance is found.  
Discussion 
Theoretical implications 
This study contributes to the discussion about the performance effects of 
institutional fit by focusing specifically on the regulatory environment. This allows 
for an assessment of the performance levels related to different degrees of (lack of) 
regulatory fit.  
Regulatory fit and substantive performance 
The U-shaped relationship found between under-compliance and substantive 
performance supports those scholars who argue that fit is negatively related to 
substantive performance (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Deephouse, 1999; Baretto and 
Baden-Fuller, 2006). 
An interesting finding is that the lowest point for substantive performance 
is not at zero under-compliance. A low level of under-compliance (0-1.5) results in 
lower substantive performance than both perfect fit and high levels of under-
compliance. Our results suggest that slight under-compliance has more negative 
effects on profit than is evident with perfect institutional fit. This finding suggests 
that firms that are close but do not meet regulatory standards are related to the 
lowest substantive performance levels. This is in line with the ‘dogs’ category 
distinguished by Kondra and Hinings (1998, p.751), defined as organizations with 
low institutional fit and performance lower than the institutionalized level. The 
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authors explain this category includes organizations that have knowingly or 
unknowingly deviated from the norm and those that have failed to adapt to 
changing institutions. These are at risk of being selected out (Hannan and 
Freeman, 1977) and other organizations have no reason to mimic their behavior.  
Higher levels of under-compliance are related to higher substantive 
performance. This could be interpreted as new practice creation by actors. These 
actors who differentiate themselves from the crowd by using a lower level of 
internal regulation than external regulation are apparently successful in this. This 
coincides with Kondra and Hinings’s (1998, p. 753) category of Renegades which 
includes organizations that operate based on active agency rather than institutional 
rules. Oliver (1991) termed this category of response to institutional processes 
‘defiance’. She identifies three tactics of defiance; dismissing or ignoring 
institutional rules, challenging, or outright attacking them. According to the author 
the strategy of defiance when organizations believe they have little to lose or when 
they believe they can demonstrate the rationality of their behavior. Our results 
indicate that a portion of the companies that apply a defiance approach is correct 
in these beliefs and becomes successful. These companies, such as Uber and 
Airbnb, sidestep the costs of adapting to institutions and can therefore operate 
more efficiently (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). 
 On the other side of the spectrum higher levels of over-compliance are 
also related to higher substantive performance. Kollman and Prakash (2002, p. 48) 
state that voluntary environmental standards like ISO 14001 can be thought of as 
examples of club goods because ‘it is impossible to price the discrete units of 
goodwill benefits that they generate’. The authors list several reasons for firms to 
become a member of such a club. First, they can voluntarily adopt a standard 
along with several other industry players in order to influence regulators and 
actively shape their institutional environment. In addition, joining a club may 
allow a company to decrease research costs and increase competitive advantage 
(Barney, 1991). Cost savings can be achieved due to the minimization of waste in 
the production process. Also, some stakeholders such as banks and insurance 
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companies may offer companies that comply with voluntary standards better rates 
than their competition (Kollman and Prakash, 2002, p. 48). Our results indicate 
that firms maintaining higher internal regulatory standards than the external 
industry standards are associated with higher substantive performance.  
  
Regulatory fit and symbolic performance 
Our second hypothesis – that under-compliance has a negative relationship with 
symbolic performance – is not supported by our results. The negative coefficient 
found is not significant. A potential explanation for this is that over-compliance 
involves non-isomorphic behavior, which may also be a cause for concerns over 
legitimacy (Deephouse, 1996). Heugens and Lander (2009) explain the difference 
between two types of isomorphism: competitive and institutional. The former 
concerns organizations becoming similar over time as market conditions select out 
inefficient structures and strategies (Scott, 2001). The latter involves firms actively 
selecting strategies in which they conform to the competition in order to gain 
legitimacy (Deephouse and Suchman, 2008). In our analysis, we have assumed 
active agency and therefore we have used the definition of institutional 
isomorphism, which is reinforced by the support for hypothesis 1.  Using 
institutional isomorphism theory, the lack of increase in symbolic performance for 
over-compliance can be explained by the fact that it involves behavior that is 
different from the industry standard and therefore not directly considered 
legitimate.  
Managerial implications 
The results of this study underline the body of research that finds that closer 
institutional fit is related to lower performance (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; 
Deephouse, 1999; Baretto and Baden-Fuller, 2006). Managers who find reason to 
defy the industry regulatory standard can infer from our findings that this may be a 
way towards achieving better substantive performance. We show that a firm’s lack 
of regulatory fit is correlated with higher substantive performance. The rationale of 
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institutional theory is that although fit with institutional standards may increase the 
likelihood of firm survival, it often clashes with efficiency criteria (Meyer and 
Rowan, 1977). Managers can infer from this that internal practice creation may 
lead to higher substantive performance if based on firm-specific requirements 
rather than on the industry standard.  
Our findings show that higher substantive performance is achieved both 
by firms that over-comply (negative under-compliance) and by firms that under-
comply beyond a certain point. Low levels of under-compliance are correlated 
with the lowest substantive performance compared to the industry average. This 
suggests that to achieve higher substantive performance, managers should follow a 
well-structured approach of under-compliance. Slight under-compliance, 
conceivably due to failing to comply with industry standards, is correlated to the 
lowest levels of substantive performance. An interesting finding is that a certain 
degree of over-compliance is correlated with higher substantive performance 
benefits than the same amount of under-compliance. This suggests that the 
managers who are proactive in imposing high standards on their firms are likely to 
see returns from this in terms of substantive performance.  
On a policy level, a question that arises is whether the firms in an industry 
should be expected to respond to regulation in a one-way direction or whether 
more interaction between firm behavior and regulation should be made possible. 
Ayres and Braithwaite (1992) suggest that the behavior of firms in an industry 
should determine the degree and type of government involvement. They argue for 
a concept of ‘responsive regulation’ where regulators first evaluate the 
effectiveness of private regulation before imposing governmental regulation. Our 
findings suggest that situations exist where firms have an incentive to over-
comply, or self-impose high safety- or environmental standards. Following Ayres 
and Braithwaite (1992) policy-makers practicing responsive regulation would in 
such situations let the market self-regulate, resulting in efficient but still effective 
industry regulation. 
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Limitations and directions for future research 
Although our study provides important insights into the substantive performance 
effects of regulatory misfit, it also raises several suggestions for further research. 
To begin with, one finding of our study that would be interesting to investigate 
further is the fact that the sides of the U-shaped curve that is found between under-
compliance and substantive performance reach to different heights. According to 
our results, each degree of over-compliance is correlated with higher substantive 
performance levels than is the case for the same degree of under-compliance. One 
potential explanation for the high performance found in over-complying firms is 
the concept of ‘club goods’ (Buchanan, 1965). This concept explains that firms 
may participate in voluntary regulation programs in order to benefit from 
advantages available only to club members. Future research could examine the 
different motivations for over- and under-compliance and study whether they 
differ in relationship to performance. Although we find positive performance 
effects for both types of lack of regulatory fit, future research can investigate other 
parameters of each type of lack of regulatory fit and further delineate what 
characterizes each.  
Although our cross-sectional study provides a first step in measuring the 
relationship between regulatory fit and performance, it would be interesting to 
study this relationship over a longer period of time. This would enable us to 
determine how changes in regulatory fit affect performance. In addition, internal- 
and external regulatory stringency in this research are measured through mangers’ 
perception. This could potentially have led to a bias, especially in the evaluation of 
external regulation, as the stringency of these may be perceived as higher than the 
actual value.  
Conclusion 
Institutional scholars emphasize that complying with industry standards is 
important for symbolic performance, although it may not be the route to achieving 
the highest substantive performance (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). We have argued 
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that defiance of the industry regulatory standards, either in the form of over- or 
under-compliance, is related to higher substantive performance than simple 
compliance to these norms. Our empirical results indeed show a U-shaped 
relationship between under-compliance and substantive performance. This study 
adds to the fit research by highlighting the features of regulatory fit specifically – 
an aspect that has been slightly underemphasized in the fit research. By dissecting 
the term institutional fit, we allow for a more comprehensive discussion of what it 
entails and its effects on performance. We propose a theory of active agency, 
where firms that see opportunities to profit from diverging from the industry 
standard will seize them, resulting in higher substantive performance than is likely 
to be achieved by firms that simply comply to the standards. We also find that that 
a certain degree of over-compliance is correlated with higher substantive 
performance benefits than the same amount of under-compliance. This suggests 
that substantive performance benefits are likely to be enjoyed by managers who 
are proactive in imposing high standards on their firms. 
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Tables and diagrams 
Table 3.1. Spectrum of regulatory fit 
Table 3.2. Operationalization of constructs  
Type of regulatory fit Definition
Over-compliance Stringency firm external 
regulation
> Industry average regulation 
stringency
Regulatory fit Stringency firm external 
regulation 
= Industry average regulation 
stringency
Under-compliance Stringency firm external regulation 
< Industry average regulation 
stringency
Construct Operationalization
Internal regulation Perceived rigorousness of firms’ internal regulatory environment
External regulation Perceived rigorousness of firms’ external regulatory environment. 
Under-compliance Calculated difference between perceived rigorousness external 
regulation and internal regulation
Symbolic 
performance
Average of perceived growth in market share, customer 
satisfaction and employee satisfaction for the company between 
2010 and 2011
Substantive 
performance
Perceived profit growth for the company between 2010 and 2011
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Table 3.3 Correlation matrix 
1-tailed test * p < 0.05 ** p < 0.01; Cronbach’s alpha’s on diagonal 
Study Variable Mean s.d. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Main study 
variables
00. Under-
compliance
0.9601 1.43
373
01. Internal 
regulation 
3.8305 1.29
429
-0.6
5**
0.85
2
02. External 
regulation
4.8182 1.14
312 
0.52
7**
0.30
3**
0.78
6
03. Substantive 
Performance
4.86 1.29 -0.9
3
0.11
3
0.00
8
04. Symbolic 
performance
4.9643 0.99
833
-0.0
26
0.05
7
0.03 0.69
1**
0.80
9
Control Variables
05. Dynamism 4.3504 1.08
508
0.04
3
0.14
7*
0.21
8**
-0.0
23
0.14
2*
0.73
2
06. Complexity 4.9946 1.15
924
0.13
*
0.14
7*
0.32
6**
0.00
2
0.18
0**
0.48
5**
0.8
76
07. Trust 5.6490 0.90
817 
0.02
4
0.00
2
0.08
2
0.31
0**
0.36
3**
0.13
3*
0.1
45*
0.91
2
08. Amount of 
Employees
1.9745 0.93
642 
0.21
2*
0.09
2
0.18
9**
-0.0
33
-0.1
06
0.04
4
0.1
05
0.20
3**
09. Sector 0.3246 0.46
878
-0.0
02
0.06
9
0.07
3
-0.0
85
-0.0
84
0.08
8
0.0
54
-0.0
17
-0.0
43
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Table 3.4. Linear regression results predicting substantive and symbolic 
performance 
* p < 0.05 ** p < 0.01 
Variable Substantive Performance Symbolic Performance
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Intercept 4.837 4.681 4.856 4.881
Control variables
Dynamism -0.07 -0.43 0.029 0.030
Complexity -0.005 -0.04 0.109 0.112
Trust 0.477** 0.467** 0.357** 0.358**
Log amount of 
Employees
0.006 0.032 -0.061 -0.058
Sector 
Independent variables
Under-compliance -0.221** -0.023
Under-compliance2 0.067* 
R2 0.154 0.180 0.188 0.189
Adjusted R2 0.09 0.114 0.129 0.127
Durbin Watson 1.828 1.677
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Figure 3.1. The U-shaped relationship between under-compliance and substantive 
performance 
 
!  
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External regulation – internal regulation
Appendices 
Appendix 1. List of questionnaire items  
Variable Question
Internal regulation1 Employees in our organization always act according to formal 
rules 
Internal regulation2 Managers are responsible for protocols in order to improve the 
efficiency of employees. 
Internal regulation3 Rules and procedures are always followed within our 
organization 
Internal regulation4 Rules, regulations and sanctions have a central place within our 
organization 
Internal regulation5 Within our organization there are sanctions upon breaking the 
rules 
External regulation1 The influence of rules and laws is evident within our market 
External regulation2 Regulatory and legislative bodies play an important role 
External regulation3 Many aspects of our work are influenced by legislation 
External regulation4 Our market is characterized by numerous restrictions as a result 
of legislation 
External regulation5 The degree of regulation is decreasing within our market 
External regulation6 The performance of organizations in our market is being watched 
closely
Substantive 
Performance1 
Growth in profit
Symbolic 
Performance 1
Market share
Symbolic 
Performance 2
Customer satisfaction 
Symbolic 
Performance 2
Employee satisfaction
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Appendix 2. Sector-specific descriptive data for internal and external regulation  
Sector Internal Regulation External regulation
Mean s.d Mean s.d
Agrifood 4.03 1.30 5.53 1.00
Horticulture 3.64 1.51 5.71 1.19
High tech 3.33 1.05 4.47 1.38
Energy 3.76 1.27 5.06 1.02
Logistics 4.50 1.31 4.91 1.04
Creative industry 2.37 0.63 2.83 0.59
Life sciences 4.1 0.55 5.83 0.68
Chemicals 4.8 1.78 3.92 0.12
Water 3.53 0.31 5.11 0.84
Construction 3.50 1.27 5.09 0.97
Other manufacturing & 
mining
4.26 1.12 4.44 0.86
Finance 3.60 0.63 5.33 1.13
Other services 3.78 1.49 4.91 1.20
Other 3.87 1.20 4.54 1.15
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Chapter 4 
Study 3. Maintenance of Cross-Sector Partnerships: 
the Role of Frames in Sustained Collaboration 
Abstract 
We examine the framing mechanisms used to maintain a cross-sector partnership 
(XSP) that was created to address a complex long-term social issue. We study the 
first eight years of existence of an XSP that aims to create a market for recycled 
phosphorus, a nutrient that is critical to crop growth but whose natural reserves 
have dwindled significantly. Drawing on 27 interviews and over 3,000 internal 
documents, we study the evolution of different frames used by diverse actors in an 
XSP. We demonstrate the role of framing in helping actors to avoid some of the 
common pitfalls for an XSP, such as debilitating conflict, and in creating sufficient 
common ground to sustain collaboration. As opposed to a commonly held 
assumption in the XSP literature, we find that collaboration in a partnership does 
not have to result in a unanimous agreement around a single or convergent frame 
regarding a contentious issue. Rather, successful collaboration between diverse 
partners can also be achieved by maintaining a productive tension between 
different frames through ‘optimal’ frame plurality – not excessive frame variety 
that may prevent agreements from emerging, but the retention of a select few 
frames and the deletion of others towards achieving a narrowing frame bandwidth. 
One managerial implication is that resources need not be focussed on reaching a 
unanimous agreement among all partners on a single mega-frame vis-à-vis a 
contentious issue, but can instead be used to kindle a sense of unity in diversity 
that allows sufficient common ground to emerge, despite the variety of actors and 
their positions. 
Key words: Cross-Sector Partnership, frames, framing, mechanism, collaboration, 
maintenance 
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Introduction 
“All the human and animal manure which the world wastes, if returned to the land, 
instead of being thrown into the sea, would suffice to nourish the world.” (Victor 
Hugo, Les Misérables)  
Most of us are not aware that the world’s food supply is seriously threatened by an 
approaching shortage of phosphorus reserves. This nutrient is a key ingredient in 
crop fertilizer that fuels high-yielding crops needed to feed the growing world 
population. Although scientists have sounded alarm bells about the impending 
phosphorus shortage in major news outlets such as Nature (Gilbert, 2009; 
Kochian, 2012) and The Times (Lewis, 2008), this threat has not been given the 
attention it deserves. Several grassroots initiatives are, however, now trying to 
address this issue and raise awareness of it. In tandem, techniques are being 
developed to recycle phosphorus, rather than to mine it. Waste such as household 
trash and animal- or even human manure can be used as input for phosphorus 
recycling. The Dutch Nutrient Platform is one of the initiatives aiming to address 
the “phosphorus challenge”, and takes the form of a cross-sector partnership 
(XSP), sometimes referred to as a CSSP (cross-sector social partnership). Within 
this platform, more than thirty partners are working together to create a market for 
recycled phosphorus. Yet initiatives such as this one are impeded by several 
technical and regulatory difficulties, as well as by extreme diversity among 
stakeholders. Despite these challenging conditions, the Nutrient Platform has 
nevertheless been able to coordinate the involvement of its diverse constituents 
and achieve significant regulatory reform. The platform took three years to 
establish, but has now been in full operation for the past six years, demonstrating 
its “capacity to create value” (Koschman, Kuhn, Pfarrer, 2012). This is a long time 
compared to the duration of many other similar XSPs. Indeed, being temporary in 
nature (Manning and Roessler, 2014, p. 529), XSPs are vulnerable to derailment, 
failure or ineffectiveness (Le Ber and Branzei, 2010; Poncelet, 2001; Turcotte and 
Pasquero, 2001). The Nutrient Platform has avoided this fate and continues to 
address the phosphorus challenge.  
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As an XSP, the Nutrient Platform is a collaborative initiative involving entities 
from different societal sectors – NGOs, government and private business – and is 
aimed at resolving the complex global environmental threat of an increasing 
shortage of phosphorus. While no one party is responsible for addressing the 
phosphorus challenge, if it remains unresolved, food security in the future will be 
in jeopardy. Taking on a complex challenge of this scale and scope requires 
collaboration across multiple organizations (Selsky and Parker, 2005) and the 
development of “new organizational forms to accommodate the diversity of 
organizational activity taking place to address to social problems” (Crane, 2010, p. 
19). Cross-sector partnerships are one form in which such collaborations occur. 
We aim to contribute to the literature on XSPs by examining the dynamics 
underlying sustained collaboration. It is widely recognized that there are different 
stages of XSP development (Gray, 1985; 1989): formation, implementation and 
outcomes (Selsky and Parker, 2005). While many studies focus on the formation 
of XSPs (Koschmann, Kuhn and Pfarrer, 2012; Manning and Roessler, 2014), and 
their outcomes (Clarke and Fuller, 2010; Clarke and MacDonald, 2016), few 
studies examine how collaboration is sustained to allow XSPs to continue (e.g., Le 
Ber and Branzei, 2010).  
We examine how the various participants in the XSP both create an understanding 
of the issue in contention and negotiate conflicts between divergent interests. 
Responding to a call for more “longitudinal studies to investigate how XSPs 
evolve” (Selsky and Parker, 2005, p. 86), we study how the framing work carried 
out by actors changes as a cross-sector partnership moves through different stages 
of evolution – variation, selection, deletion and retention (Campbell, 1965; Lewin 
and Volberda, 2003).  
We take a micro-level framing approach to examining sustained collaboration in 
an XSP because “it is only at the micro level that the effects of institutions can be 
‘directly’ observed” (Dacin, Munir, Tracey, 2010, p. 1393). We draw on work on 
the micro-processes and mechanisms of framing, including the conceptual 
framework developed by Gray, Purdy and Ansari (2015), and identify specific 
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mechanisms and tools used by cross-sector partners to sustain an effective 
collaboration. Whereas existing models of framing in collaboration often focus on 
convergence towards a single frame – through frame alignment, for example – our 
analysis suggests that maintaining optimal “frame plurality” (Gray, Purdy and 
Ansari, 2015) may provide a valuable way of understanding how agreements 
emerge. Maintaining optimal frame plurality requires parties to manage or tolerate 
multiple overlapping, conflicting, interstitial, or even unrelated meanings drawn 
from different sectors in the interest of getting work done (Gray et al., 2015; 
Kraatz and Block, 2008). Our findings indicate that sustained collaboration can be 
achieved by creating a “productive tension” (Murray, 2010) between different 
frames and maintaining ‘optimal’ frame plurality – i.e., not using an excessive 
variety of frames but ret and recombining a few select frames and deletion others. 
We observed that frames evolve within a narrowing bandwidth as the collaboration 
progresses, and previous frames that have lost traction or no longer fit the 
discussion are discarded. This dramatically reduces the number of possible 
combinations, gets parties focused on the final aim, and allows agreements to 
emerge. Furthermore, our data suggests that this frame evolution “occurs in a 
politicized social context and is inherently bi-directional” (Gray et al., 2015, p. 
115), where changes in power arrangements arising from shifts in the partnership 
composition (such as more businesses entering the XSP) shape which frames are 
selected, discarded, or retained. 
By studying how collaboration may be sustained in an XSP, we contribute to the 
literature in three ways. First, studies have focused mostly on the formation of 
XSPs (Koschmann, Kuhn and Pfarrer, 2012; Manning and Roessler, 2014), their 
outcomes (Clarke and Fuller, 2010; Clarke and MacDonald, 2016), and different 
stages in their development (Gray, 1989; Selsky and Parker, 2005). We build on 
this work by shedding light on the process of XSP evolution, providing insights 
into some of the challenges that occur in XSPs after their formation, and 
explaining how collaboration may be continued by sustaining optimal frame 
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plurality amid the diversity of constituents and their differing positions regarding 
the issue at hand. 
Second, our notion of optimal frame plurality extends related work that focuses on 
XSP dyads such as “frame fusion” (Le Ber and Branzei, 2010) by examining how 
this complicated process takes place among a vast array of diverse partners from 
different sectors in an XSP which changes in composition over time. Also, while 
the concept of frame plurality has been theorized in previous studies (Gray et al., 
2015; c.f., Murray, 2010), our notion of optimal frame plurality suggests that 
plurality may have its limits and excessive variety may thwart sustained 
collaboration. We argue that the deletion of certain frames and the retention of a 
few may be necessary for generating optimal frame plurality and sustaining 
collaboration over time. 
Third, while an impressive body of work on hybrid logics and hybridization has 
explained how plurality is managed in both organizational and inter-organizational 
settings by segmenting, bridging and recombining fragments of conflicting logics 
(e.g., Battilana and Dorado, 2010; Battilana and Lee, 2014; Pache and Santos, 
2013; Smets, Jarzabkowski, Burke and Spree, 2015; York, O’Neil and Sarasvathy, 
2016), we show how actors manage this process of dealing with conflicting 
pressures together with other parties as a collective endeavor.  
Next, we present a literature review on cross-sector partnerships, introduce our 
research context and case data, and report our findings. We then derive a model for 
sustained collaboration and finally discuss some implications for future research. 
Most of us are not aware that the world’s food supply is seriously threatened by an 
approaching shortage of phosphorous reserves. This nutrient is a key ingredient for 
crop fertilizer that fuels high-yielding crops necessary for feeding the growing 
world population. Although scientists have raised alarm bells about the impending 
phosphorous shortage in major news outlets such as Nature (Gilbert, 2009; 
Cochin, 2012) and The Times (Lewis, 2008), the threat remains underemphasized. 
Several grassroots initiatives however have taken up the issue and are trying to 
raise awareness. In tandem, techniques are being developed to recycle 
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phosphorous, as an alternative to mining. Waste such as household trash but also 
animal or even human manure can be used as input for phosphorous recycling. The 
Dutch Nutrient Platform is one of the initiatives that aim to address the 
“phosphorus challenge”. In this cross-sector partnership (XSP) more than thirty 
partners work together to create a market for recycled phosphorous. Yet initiatives 
such as this one are impeded by several technical and regulatory difficulties, as 
well as extreme stakeholder diversity. Under these challenging conditions, the 
Nutrient Platform has been able to continually coordinate the involvement of its 
diverse constituents and achieve significant (regulatory) changes. The platform has 
been in operation and maintained its ‘capacity to create value’ (Coachman, Kuhn, 
Pfarrer, 2012) for six years, which is long compared to many other similar XSPs. 
Indeed, being temporary in nature (Manning and Roessler, 2014, p. 529), XSPs are 
vulnerable to derailment, failure or ineffectiveness (Le Ber and Branzei, 2010; 
Poncelet, 2001; Turcotte and Pasquero, 2001). The Nutrient Platform has avoided 
such a fate and continued to address the phosphorous challenge.  
The Nutrient Platform as a cross-sector partnership (XSP) is a collaborative 
initiative between entities from different societal sectors; NGOs, government and 
private business that is aimed at resolving the complex global environmental threat 
of an increasing phosphorous shortage. While no one party is responsible for 
addressing the phosphorous challenge, if it remains unsolved, food safety in the 
future is in jeopardy. Taking on a complex challenge of this scale and scope 
requires collaboration across multiple organizations (Selsky and Parker, 2005) and 
the development of ‘new organizational forms to accommodate the diversity of 
organizational activity taking place to address to social problems’ (Crane, 2010, p. 
19). Cross-sector partnerships are one form in which such collaborations occur. 
We aim to contribute to the literature on XSPs by examining the dynamics 
underlying sustained collaboration. The existence of different stages of XSP 
development is widely recognized (Gray, 1985; 1989); formation, implementation 
and outcomes (Selsky and Parker, 2005). While many studies focus on the 
formation of XSPs (Koschmann, Kuhn and Pfarrer, 2012; Manning and Roessler, 
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2014), and their outcomes (Clarke and Fuller, 2010; Clarke and MacDonald, 
2016), few studies examine how collaboration is sustained to allow for XSPs to 
continue (e.g., Le Ber and Branzei, 2010).  
We examine how multiple participants in the XSP both create an 
understanding of the issue in contention and negotiate conflicts between divergent 
interests. Responding to a call for ‘more longitudinal research to capture the 
evolution’ of XSPs (Selsky and Parker, 2005, p. 86), we study how framing work 
performed by actors, changes as a cross-sector partnership moves through different 
stages of evolution – variation, selection, deletion and retention (Campbell, 1965; 
Lewin and Volberda, 2003).  
We take a micro-level framing approach to examining sustained collaboration 
in an XSP because ‘it is only at the micro level that the effects of institutions can 
be ‘directly’ observed’ (Dacin, Munir, Tracey, 2010, p. 1393). Our analysis 
suggests maintaining optimal ‘frame plurality’ (Gray, Purdy and Ansari, 2015) as 
an alternative to existing models about framing in collaborations, which indicate a 
trend of convergence toward a single frame such as through frame alignment 
(Snow et al., 1986) to explain how agreements emerge. This mechanism involves 
parties managing or tolerating multiple overlapping, conflicting, interstitial, or 
even unrelated meanings drawn from different sectors in the interest of getting 
work done (Gray et al., 2015; Kraatz and Block, 2008). Our findings indicate that 
sustained collaboration can be achieved by creating a ‘productive 
tension’ (Murray, 2010) among different logics and frames and maintaining 
‘optimal’ frame plurality – not excessive frame variety but the retention and 
recombination of a few select frames and the deletion of others. We observed that 
frames evolve within a narrowing bandwidth as the collaboration progresses, and 
previous frames that lose traction or no longer fit are discarded. This dramatically 
reduces the number of possible combinations, gets parties focused on the final aim 
and allow for agreements to emerge. Furthermore, our data suggests that this frame 
evolution ‘occurs in a in a politicized social context and is inherently bi-
directional’ Gray et al. (2015, p. 115), where changes in power arrangements 
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arising from shifting partnership composition (such as more businesses entering 
the XSP) shape which frames are selected, taken off the agenda or retained. 
By studying how collaboration may be sustained in an XSP, we contribute in 
three ways. First, studies have mostly focused on the formation of XSPs 
(Koschmann, Kuhn and Pfarrer, 2012; Manning and Roessler, 2014), their 
outcomes (Clarke and Fuller, 2010; Clarke and MacDonald, 2016), and different 
stages of XSP development (Gray, 1989; Selsky and Parker, 2005). We build on 
this work by shedding light on the process of XSP evolution, providing insights 
into some of the challenges that occur in XSPs after their formation, and 
explaining how collaboration may continue through sustaining optimal frame 
plurality amid the diversity of constituents and their divergent positions with 
regards to the issue at hand. 
Second, our notion of optimal frame plurality extends related work focusing 
on XSP dyads such as ‘frame fusion’ (Le Ber and Branzei, 2010) by examining 
how this complicated process takes place among a vast array of diverse partners 
from different sectors in a changing XSP composition over time. Also, while the 
concept of frame plurality has been theorized in previous studies (Gray et al, 2015; 
cf., Murray, 2010), our notion of ‘optimal’ frame plurality explains how the degree 
of plurality may have limits and how excessive variety may thwart sustained 
collaboration. We argue that the deletion of certain frames and the retention of a 
few may be necessary for sustaining optimal frame plurality and collaboration 
over time. 
Third, while an impressive body of work on hybrid logics and hybridization 
has explained how plurality is managed in both organizational and inter-
organizational settings, such as through segmenting, bridging and recombining 
fragments of conflicting logics (e.g., Battilana and Dorado, 2010; Battilana and 
Lee, 2014; Pache and Santos, 2013; Smets, Jarzabkowski, Burke and Spee, 2015; 
York, O’Neil and Sarasvathy, 2016), we show how actors manage this process of 
dealing with conflicting pressures not only on their own but together as a 
collective.  
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In the next sections, we begin with a literature review on cross-sector 
partnerships, introduce our research context and case data, and report our findings. 
We then derive a model for sustained collaboration and finally discuss some 
implications for future research. 
Cross-Sector Partnerships and Collaborations  
Society faces a range of complex social problems, or wicked problems (Rittel and 
Webber, 1973) “defined by their circular causality, persistence, absence of well-
structured alternative solutions, relative lack of room for trial and error 
learning” (Dorado and Ventresca, 2013: p. 69; Reinecke and Ansari, 2016). “The 
wickedness of the problem reflects the diversity of those involved in the 
issue” (Lach, Rayner and Ingram, 2005: p. 7). Addressing wicked problems 
requires collaboration between multiple organizations across sectors (Selsky and 
Parker, 2005). Gray (1985, p. 912) defines collaboration as the pooling of 
resources, by two or more stakeholders, “to solve a set of problems which neither 
can solve individually”. This pooling occurs when problems are “complex, wide in 
scope, and beyond the scope of single organizations” (Westley and Vredenburg, 
1991: p. 67).  
Though a collaborative multi-party effort is often necessary to address complex 
issues, the cooperation required can be very difficult, given the plurality and 
diversity of the actors involved. Indeed, fostering agreement among diverse parties 
over a contentious issue is highly challenging and fraught with obstacles. The new 
collaborative arrangement may include “formal or informal institutional 
arrangements of overlapping sectoral segments and/or combinations of governance 
mechanisms” (Seibel, 2015, p. 697). While institutional pluralism has been 
recognized as a phenomenon at the field level, it can also occur at the 
organizational level (Kraatz and Block, 2008), and entails “the co-existence of 
alternative, legitimate and potentially competing strategies within a single 
organization” (Jarzabkowski, Matthiesen and Van de Ven, 2009, p. 285). Murray 
(2010, p. 379) examines pluralism at the level of individual exchanges among 
actors and explains “the productive tension at the institutional boundary and the 
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hybrids that emerge from it”. In her study of the patenting of a mouse engineered 
to study cancer, she explained how the differences between disparate parties do not 
necessarily dissolve for a collaborative arrangement to emerge, but rather may co-
exist productively. Similarly, work on hybrid organizations as “embodiments or 
incarnations of multiple logics” (Kraatz and Block, 2008, p. 244) has provided rich 
insights into how organizations combine elements from different stakeholder 
domains and balance prescriptions from conflicting logics (e.g., Battilana and Lee, 
2014). Managing such diversity may be critical to sustaining XSPs. 
Types of cross-sector partnerships (XSPs) 
While collaboration across sectors is of interest to research in both public 
management (Bryson, Crosby and Stone, 2015) and private management (Selsky 
and Parker, 2005), the terminology used can vary. Waddell and Brown (1997: p. 1) 
use the term “intersectoral partnerships” to refer to collaboration between 
“organizations based in three sectors: the state (government), the market 
(business), and civil society (NGOs, non-profits, etc.)”. Selsky and Parker (2005) 
discuss cross-sector social-oriented partnerships (CSSP) in which organizations 
from different sectors jointly address challenges. The main activities of XSPs 
include mutual problem-solving, information sharing and resource allocation. 
In some ways, XSPs resemble alliances. Some scholars argue that the rationale for 
entering into a cross-sector collaboration is one of resource dependence (Selsky 
and Parker, 2015, p. 851), where partners combine resources and skills to attain 
mutual benefits (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). From this perspective, “partnerships 
present the opportunity to create a formidable, mutually reinforcing system which 
combines the unique capabilities and resources of each party to deliver outcomes 
beyond those of any one sector acting in isolation” (Googins and Rochlin, 2000: p. 
128). Studies using this approach tend to derive ideas from the more general 
alliance literature (Manning and Roessler, 2013, p. 527). As in alliances, a 
common “interaction space” can ease communication and reduce uncertainty in 
XSPs (Ostanello and Tsoukas, 1993). XSPs are formed in situations where 
!78
“individual firms are one among many stakeholders whose activities are truly 
interdependent” (Gray, 1985, p. 915). Collaboration thus involves “a cooperative, 
interorganizational relationship that is negotiated in an ongoing communicative 
process, and which relies on neither market nor hierarchical mechanisms of 
control” (Hardy, Phillips and Lawrence, 2003, p. 323).  
However, XSPs also differ from alliances in that cooperation to address wicked 
problems is often the key focus. As these problems are often deemed too large for 
a single organization or a sector to deal with, multi-party collaboration across 
sectors is often necessary (Westley and Vredenburg, 1991). Hence XSPs are 
distinguished from ‘regular’ alliances in that partner motivations are “a blend of 
self-interest and altruism” (Selsky and Parker, 2005, p. 863). While XSPs are often 
designed as temporary projects, their aim is, however, to bring about long-term 
change (Manning and Roessler, 2013, p. 528). While many studies of XSP 
formation assume that the mechanisms for general alliances also hold for XSPs, 
the boundary-spanning and project-based nature of XSPs distinguish them from 
alliances (Manning and Roessler, 2013). In addition, cross-sector partnerships face 
higher levels of complexity, due to the diversity of partners involved. Although 
some XSPs contain only two parties, these often come from different sectors and 
have conflicting core values (Nicholls and Huybrechts, 2014), and unlike most 
alliances many XSPs are composed of multi-sectoral partners. These factors make 
XSP collaborations very complex to manage. As XSPs are often held together 
merely by the conviction of dissimilar actors about the key issue at hand (Selsky 
and Parker, 2005, p. 863), they remain vulnerable to derailment or even 
dissolution. 
XSP life cycle 
Studies have looked at the life cycle of XSP evolution. Selsky and Parker (2005) 
distinguish between studies that focus on either XSP formation, implementation or 
outcomes. Waddell and Brown (1997) recognise five stages of XSP development; 
(1) identifying preconditions for XSPs, (2) convening actors and defining 
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problems, (3) establishing a shared sense of direction, (4) implementing joint 
action strategies, and (5) expanding and institutionalizing success. Research on 
XSPs often involves explaining one or more stages of the life cycle, particularly 
the formation stage. Le Ber and Branzei (2010, p. 184) take a framing approach to 
describe the formation of four XSPs. They conclude that collaborations move 
towards “frame fusion” and once this is achieved, the new frame can be leveraged 
to address new emergent conflicts and problems. Koschmann, Kuhn and Pfarrer 
(2012) use a communication perspective to address XSP formation and propose a 
framework for the development of an “authoritative text” designed to create 
maximum value. With respect to outcomes, at least three broad categories are 
discussed in the literature: plan, process and partner outcomes (Clarke and Fuller, 
2010). In their study of how four Canadian community sustainability plans were 
implemented, Clarke and MacDonald (2016) draw on the resource-based view to 
situate XSP outcomes as collective resources that members gain from their 
involvement in these multi-stakeholder partnerships.  
Despite the work that has been done on the formation and outcomes of XSPs, less 
attention has been given to the process by which they are sustained – even though 
maintaining collaboration between the various parties is a major challenge for 
partnerships of this kind. Once an XSP has been formed, it is of course hardly a 
given that it will attain its goals (Gray, 1989; Huxham, 1996), and many end in 
failure or become ineffective. Poncelet (2001) describes how in the EU Partnership 
for Environmental Cooperation (EUPEC), conflict between capitalist arguments 
and environmental concerns stifled progress and led to the maintenance of the 
status quo. The author concludes that a “nonconfrontation practice” can stop a 
collaboration from “turning a critical eye toward some of the deeper, structural 
sources of current environmental dilemmas” (Poncelet, 2001, p. 22) and prevent 
an XSP from bringing innovative solutions to complex social problems.  
Turcotte and Pasquero (2001, p. 459) describe the case of waste management in 
Big City, where the diversity of partners meant that only objectives that were 
ambiguous could be agreed upon. The partnership thus “failed to produce what it 
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had been designed for – a specific blueprint for an ecological waste management 
plan at the regional level.” Le Ber and Branzei (2010, p. 172) studied four cross-
sector partnerships that sought to create social value. Although three of these 
collaborations were successful, one case – a partnership for minimally invasive 
surgery – was marked by continual conflict. Although the partnership contract was 
fulfilled in the end, the for-profit partner regarded the collaboration as a failure 
because little if any social value was created. Indeed, it is often a challenge for 
actors involved in XSPs to sustain collaboration and remain relevant and effective 
after an XSP has been formed. As many XSPs turn into ‘paper tigers’ (e.g., 
Poncelet, 2001; Turcotte and Pasquero, 2001), it is important to examine what 
makes XSPs survive for longer periods of time and what will improve their 
chances of achieving their goals. Language and discourse, which have been 
identified as being important during the formation stage of XSPs (Westley and 
Vredenburg, 1991; Wesley and Vredenburg, 1997; Koschmann et al., 2012), may 
also matter for collaborative partners in terms of helping them to maintain a 
collaboration beyond the formation stage. A key role is that of frames and framing. 
The role of framing in sustaining collaboration 
The XSP literature suggests that it is hardly a given that members of an XSP will 
continue to collaborate and sustain the partnership after its formation. While 
several factors influence XSP continuity, including the power configurations 
among the actors involved (Gray et al., 2015), one key communicative aspect of 
sustaining collaboration is framing – how actors skilfully use a variety of frames 
and rhetorical strategies to argue for their viewpoints and interests, as well as 
frames that emerge from their interactions. We follow Koschmann et al. (2012: p. 
333–334) in considering collaboration within an XSP to be the outcome of a 
“communication process (…) distinct from market or hierarchical mechanisms of 
control.” How issues are framed by different participants is central to this 
communication process.  
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Framing highlights certain aspects of a perceived reality in order to stimulate a 
particular understanding (Entman, 1993: p. 52). Frames are “schemata of 
interpretation” that enable individuals “to locate, perceive, identify, and label” 
what happens in the world around them (Goffman, 1974: p. 21). Frames define 
which actors are engaged, what kinds of problems are discussed, how these 
problems are defined, and what kinds of solutions are considered appropriate 
(Hoffman, 1999; Lefsrud and Meyer, 2012; Reinecke and Ansari, 2016). Social 
movement scholars have shown how activists use collective action frames to 
“mobilize potential adherents and constituents, to garner bystander support, and to 
demobilize antagonists” (Snow and Benford, 1988: p. 198). These collective 
action frames can involve “diagnostic framing” (problem identification and 
attributions), “prognostic framing” (possible solutions) and “motivational 
framing” (for collective action) (Snow and Benford, 1988).  
Other studies focus on the continuous negotiation that takes place, through 
ongoing interactions, to “reaffirm or challenge the frame repertoires 
available” (Gray et al., 2015: 116) in pursuing institutional maintenance and 
change. While a cognitive framing approach considers frames to be 
representations stored in memory, an interactional approach regards framing as 
“the dynamic enactment and shaping of meaning in ongoing interactions (and 
frames are transient communication structures)” (Dewulf et al., 2009, p. 162; Gray 
et al., 2015). Human behavior is thought to result from people drawing both on 
their existing frame repertoires and on frames that emerge during their interactions 
with others, as they use language and other symbols to create meaning in 
interactions (Cornelissen and Werner, 2014).  
While agreements may arise from the development of convergent positions among 
actors with different interpretations of the ‘truth’, they can also be reached by 
allowing a plurality of interpretations to coexist, and relying on “equifinal” 
meaning (Donnellon, Gray and Bougon, 1986). This refers to agreeing about what 
action to take (e.g., collaboration) on a complex issue, despite disagreement 
between the different parties over why they may be doing this. For example, Reay 
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and Hinings (2009) showed how different actors in healthcare teams used 
“pragmatic collaboration” to accomplish their work when faced with multiple and 
seemingly irreconcilable logics.  
While frame plurality may explain the emergence of agreements in some cases, 
excessive variety in frames might arguably thwart these agreements and result in a 
failure to construct sufficient common ground to reach an agreement. At the same 
time, attempts to homogenize the frames of multiple and often disparate actors 
around a single convergent position may also breed conflict and lead to a failure to 
reach an agreement. Thus, both too much variety and too little variety may be 
unhelpful in achieving sustained collaboration. It is thus worthwhile to examine 
the evolutionary process through which certain frames are discarded or fall into 
disuse in an XSP, while others evolve, recombine and persist over time. To use 
evolutionary language (Campbell, 1965; Lewin and Volberda, 2003; Nelson and 
Winter, 1982), it would be productive to examine the continuous cycle of 
variation, selection, retention and deletion of different frames over time in a multi-
party partnership which spans sectors with differing organizational forms 
(businesses, government agencies and NGOs) and which seeks to address a 
complex global issue. This provides the main motivation for our research question: 
How do different frames used by multiple actors evolve over time and how might 
this sustain collaboration in a cross-sector partnership to address a complex global 
issue?  
Research context, design and methods  
To address the research question, we investigate how members of a Dutch XSP 
(Nutrient Platform) deployed framing to maintain the collaboration after the 
formation phase.  
Research context 
Phosphorus (P) is a chemical element, typically used as a main component of 
fertilizer. It is used to produce high-yielding crops deemed necessary to feed the 
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growing world population (Kochian, 2012). It is a non-renewable, non-
substitutable resource (Lewis, 2008) that organisms need as a component of DNA. 
In both humans and animals, phosphate is excreted through the digestive tract. It is 
thus present in human and animal manure, which can be used as a natural 
fertilizer. However, to create artificial fertilizers phosphorus is predominantly 
mined from mineral resources. These resources are finite and may not be sufficient 
for the world’s long-term needs (De Ridder et al., 2012). For the few countries 
where phosphate rock is found, it is fast becoming a strategic resource (Lewis, 
2008). Used phosphorus flows mainly into surface waters and poses a major threat 
to the environment. Phosphorus recycling is seen as the most promising way of 
addressing these issues (Gilbert, 2009). 
The Nutrient Platform (NP) is a Dutch multi-stakeholder group whose members 
“share a common concern for the global impact of phosphorus depletion and the 
way society is dealing with nutrients in general” (Nutrient Platform, 2014). The 
Netherlands is one of very few countries with a phosphorus surplus. The reason for 
this is the large livestock sector. On 1 April 2008, the initial five members of the 
XSP had their first exploratory meeting. The aim was to create a market for 
recycled phosphorus. In 2009 and 2010, several key documents were published 
that catalyzed the growth in partnership membership. After more members had 
joined and an authoritative text had been drawn up’ (Koschmann et al., 2012), an 
official covenant was signed by 21 cross-sector partners and the Nutrient Platform 
was officially launched in 2011. In the covenant, each member noted their 
ambitions for the platform and pledged their (monetary or in kind) contribution to 
this shared purpose for an initial period of two years. After two years, this 
agreement was evaluated. The members then decided to continue the partnership 
to work towards further achievement of the goals set out in the initial agreement 
(see Figure 1).  
On 1, January 2015, the collaborative efforts resulted in a change in Dutch law, 
which allowed the previously prohibited trade of recycled phosphorus. By that 
time, the platform consisted of 35 diverse organizations, ranging from NGOs to 
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engineering firms, government agencies, producers of (artificial) fertilizer, and 
semi-public organizations. Though this significant achievement has taken the 
collaboration a step closer to its main goal, even in 2017 the partners are 
continuing to collaborate because their joint effort is still necessary to realize the 
ambitions that were outlined in the original covenant. The collective aim of the 
Nutrient Platform is to “close” the phosphorus cycle by recovering rather than 
discarding it after use. Nevertheless, individual organizational motivations for this 
goal range from social to financial. Some member organizations aim to achieve 
environmental sustainability, while others seek to make profits from recycling 
surplus phosphorus (from waste) into a valuable product that can be traded on the 
global market.  
Methods  
We draw on this case to understand a more general phenomenon, namely the use 
of framing to maintain collaboration in XSPs (Stake, 1995). The case of the 
Nutrient Platform provides a fertile opportunity to study the maintenance of XSPs. 
With the signing of the 2011 covenant, the collaboration has successfully 
completed the formation stage in terms of agreeing on an authoritative text 
(Koschmann et al., 2012). Even though the initial covenant was for a period of two 
years, the partners still value the collaboration that has continued as new members 
join. The platform represents an example of a complicated cross-sector partnership 
with a relatively large number of partners, from all three sectors. The consensus in 
the XSP literature is that when the partners are more numerous, and less 
homogeneous in their organizational characteristics, it will likely be more difficult 
for “values to converge” across actors and organizations than when the 
stakeholders are fewer and more homogeneous (Selsky and Parker, 2005, p. 864). 
This, in turn, may require more maintenance work to sustain the XSP. 
In their work on strategy formulation and implementation in cross-sector 
partnerships, Clarke and Fuller (2010, p. 99) argue that more research should be 
conducted to investigate exactly how the number of partners changes the 
complexity of interactions within an XSP, and how this collaboration is 
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implemented at the organizational level. We chose this particular platform because 
it enabled us to collect and analyze rich data and gave us access to the largely 
uncategorized archives relating to the collaboration. These provided a useful and 
relatively unbiased source of information, as the material they contained was in the 
main not geared to promoting the platform. 
Data collection 
This paper is based on data collected from the Nutrient Platform. Primarily, it 
draws on 27 interviews with members of the platform. This data is triangulated 
with over 3,000 internal documents created within the platform during the period 
2008–2015. These documents range from meeting agendas to strategic documents 
and marketing materials. Most of the documents are internally focused, though 
some – such as marketing materials and official communication materials – are 
aimed specifically at external audiences. The internal documents are especially 
insightful for examining conflicting views, while the externally aimed documents 
provide insights into some of the outcomes of these conflicts. We have 
reconstructed in detail the collaboration’s timeline from its inception in 2008 
through to 2015. This data is supplemented by publicly available information 
about specific platform-related developments as well as broader socio-economic 
developments that have affected the collaboration during the period from 2015 to 
2017.  
To define the platform and determine who the key actors were, two preliminary 
interviews were conducted with the current secretary [coordinator] of the Nutrient 
Platform as well as with the previous postholder. These two key informants were 
asked to describe which individuals and entities were either currently or previously 
involved in developing the platform. The interviews included all the actors who 
were characterized as ‘significant’ or ‘long-term’ players by the key informants 
and other interviewees. These included all the initial member organizations of the 
platform, including those who had since left, as well as their successors. The vast 
majority of representatives of organizations that continued to remain members for 
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several years were also interviewed. Given their level of involvement, these 
significant players were expected to have the best recollection of past events. 
Nevertheless, all of their accounts were also cross-checked against each other and 
against the available internal documents. To avoid elite bias, in addition some 
individuals who were described by other interviewees as ‘new’, ‘former’ or 
‘inactive’ members were also interviewed. ‘New’ members were typically those 
who joined after 2011, when the initial agreement had already been signed. Former 
members were those who terminated their membership after 2011. ‘Inactive’ 
members were official members of the platform who had no active involvement in 
the platform’s activities, other than attending (some) meetings. Only two people 
did not agree to be interviewed. One was a new member of the platform, and an 
interview was conducted instead with another new member. Another was a 
university researcher whose predecessor was interviewed instead.  
To ensure comparability, the interviews were semi-structured. This allowed us to 
“obtain both retrospective and real-time accounts by those people experiencing the 
phenomenon of theoretical interest” (Gioia, Corley and Hamilton, 2012, p. 19). 
The questions focused on whether the interviewees agreed that there was a 
“phosphorus problem”, why they thought the platform existed, and whether the 
platform should be considered a success. A non-exhaustive list of questions asked 
during the interviews can be found in Table 1. The average length of the interviews 
was 45 minutes, with some lasting 1.5 hours and others 20 minutes. All interviews 
were audio-recorded and transcribed verbatim.  
Archival data are used to complement the interview data and gain insights into the 
planning and execution of XSP activities. These data included internal documents 
from the Nutrient Platform – meeting agendas, minutes, strategic plans, memos, 
presentations, agreement signed when the platform was founded and evaluations 
of agreed upon targets. In addition, we observed member meetings of the Nutrient 
Platform and of the Steering Committee. Finally, for a period of three months, 
during which data collection took place, there was bi-weekly information 
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exchange with the platform’s secretariat. Table 2 summarizes the different types of 
data collected. The table includes the number of interviewees per sector.  
Data analysis 
We first coded our data into incidents and categorized these into several event 
tracks (Van de Ven and Poole, 1990). Figure 4. 1 provides a summary of main 
events. 
We derived coding categories based partly on theoretical concepts such as framing 
mechanisms (Gray et al., 2015). We also coded for different frames used by 
platform actors. Using NVivo10 software, these codes were further refined and 
detailed as we engaged with the data. The data points assigned to the theoretical 
coding categories were also coded as per the organization and individual where 
they originated to distinguish between frames and framing mechanisms used by 
actors from different sectors. Table 4.3 presents our resulting coding categories 
and verbatim examples of selected frames. 
In addition, the frames identified were coded according to when they occurred in 
order to account for the possibility that frames would differ over time. Throughout 
our analysis, we identified three distinct phases of the XSP’s development. As per 
the existing literature we demarcated a formation phase (Selsky and Parker, 2005), 
during which the goals and organizing principles were being negotiated among the 
partners. This phase ended when an “authoritative text” was agreed upon 
(Koschmann et al., 2012). A two-year period of mandated maintenance followed, 
during which an agreement of cooperation was signed by all parties involved in 
the XSP. We categorize as open maintenance a third phase that occurred after the 
agreed period had ended but when partners continued to cooperate. Although 
partners still referred to the original agreement, they were no longer bound by it in 
this phase. By cross-referencing the different frames that were employed by actors 
involved in the Nutrient Platform over time, we assessed frame evolution. Our 
analysis suggested an evolutionary process of variation, selection, retention and 
!88
deletion when it comes to frames in active use. We then identified various 
mechanisms that enable this process.  
Findings  
A key finding of our study of the Nutrient Platform is that multiple frames were 
used in all life-cycle stages of the XSP. We also found that in our three different 
stages of the platform life cycle (formation, mandated maintenance and open 
maintenance), different frames were used. Some frames were introduced after the 
collaboration had been in operation for several years, while one frame was 
selected out in the later stages (see Figure 4.2.)  
When we examined this process, we identified factors that influence frame 
evolution. We found a wide variety of frames at the beginning but only a limited 
number of frames (and their recombinations) survived over time (see Figure 2.)  
Multiple frame sources and frame variation 
The frames used by those within the XSP vary because they originate from 
different sources. The difference is based on whether a frame was already present 
among members of the XSP, or whether it was later internalized. In the first 
category are frames that reflect the existing aims of XSP members. For example, 
the frame that views phosphorus availability as an economic opportunity for Dutch 
business (frame 6) has become a frame of the Nutrient Platform but was already in 
use in some of its member organizations: 
“I always said that transporting it [manure] from point A to point B within the 
Netherlands does not solve the problem of oversupply. We need to have less, 
Germany needs more, and Belgium needs more. There are other countries 
facing shortages.” (VP for business development at a fertilizer company) 
The alternative to frames that originate from internal members are frames that 
emerged based on the publication of information external to individual members. 
For example, one XSP member who is introducing a recycling alternative to mined 
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phosphorus uses scientific information to support his argument that the current 
method of mining phosphorus is unsustainable:  
“The impurity of phosphorus is very important It contains uranium and 
cadmium. So, the phosphorus that is mined is strongly contaminated. This 
means that more radioactivity is brought on to the land when you use artificial 
fertilizer” (CEO of a sludge-processing company) 
This suggests that the environmental impact of mining (frame 2) is being used to 
underline that arguments for switching to phosphorus recycling are broader than 
simply a business case.  
Frame selection 
We found that of a very large number of frames resulting from frame variation, 
only a limited number were selected for active and repeated use by members of the 
platform. As a manager from industry noted: “Organization A through Z 
contributed arguments numbered one through infinity, and only some of these have 
succeeded.” We identified seven diagnostic frames in the data, and also three 
mechanisms which correlate with the micro-processes of framing (Gray et al., 
(2015): frame merging, importing a master frame, and maintaining frame plurality. 
We now describe each of the frames found in the case of the Nutrient Platform, 
and also track how these frames were used throughout the three phases of the 
XSP’s development.  
Frame 1: Environmental impact of phosphorus use 
This frame highlights the negative environmental impact of the current mode of 
using phosphorus and the damage that the nutrients in fertilizer cause to the 
environment.  
“Phosphorus goes in at one end and comes out at the other. And that will be a 
place where actually you don’t want to have it. It causes all kinds of problems. 
Eutrophication and waste, so that you will have to deal with that next.” (Senior 
manager of a research institute) 
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Eutrophication is an issue highlighted in this frame. It refers to the extreme growth 
of plants and algae, especially in surface waters, that reduces water quality and 
biodiversity because other plants are crowded out: “The fertilizer ends up in the 
soil and then flushes out to the surface water. This causes an oversupply of 
nutrients, which in turn causes biodiversity to decrease. This means it is an 
environmental issue” (Second Secretary [coordinator] of Nutrient Platform). When 
frame 1 is used, merging is often used by platform members. Merging frames is 
defined as the construction of “a new frame from existing ones, yielding a wider, 
more-encompassing frame that supplants the original ones” (Gray et al., 2015, p. 
129). Combining frame 1 with frame 2 highlights the negative environmental 
impact of acquiring phosphorus. This aids the “amplification” of the frame – that 
is, frames generated at the micro level move to the meso and macro levels and 
become more diffused (Gray et al., 2015, p. 120). 
Frame 2: Environmental impact of phosphorus mining 
This frame refers to the harmful environmental effects of mining phosphorus to 
create artificial fertilizer: “Currently contaminated phosphorus is coming to the 
Netherlands, even in the products” (Agricultural business manager). Uranium and 
cadmium are the source of this contamination. “More radioactivity is brought to 
the soil if you scatter with artificial fertilizer on it” (CEO, waste-processing 
sector). In a joint platform communication, frame 2 is often merged with frame 1 
to create a framing category of environmental concerns about how phosphorus is 
extracted and used: “Pollution should be decreased (contamination of phosphorous 
rock) and sustainability is important” (Source: Internal agenda). 
Frame 3: Scarcity  
The focus in this frame is on the impending shortage of phosphorus as a natural 
resource. This argument has two parts. On the one hand, the use of phosphorus is 
increasing: “The entire world market will only grow due to an increasing 
population and changing diets. So, more and more phosphorus is necessary for 
raising agricultural productivity” (Senior government manager). On the other 
hand, the reserves of phosphate rock are declining:  
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“Phosphate deposits however are finite with limited duration. Cordell (2008) 
mentions between 50-100 years. Steen (1998) estimated that at the time 
economically exploitable reserves could be depleted within 60-130 
years” (NWP, 2010).  
This frame is often maintained together with other frames – i.e., there is frame 
plurality. Frame plurality “involves interactants managing or tolerating multiple 
meanings drawn from overlapping, conflicting, interstitial, or otherwise unrelated 
field spaces in the interest of getting work done” (Gray et al., 2015, p. 130). This 
occurs, for example, when in documents created by the platform the scarcity frame 
is combined with frame 4 (Lack of security of supply): “With the growing world 
population and ensuing demand for food there is a growing need for phosphorus to 
produce artificial fertilizer. Phosphorus reserves however are only found in a few 
places, mostly in Morocco/the Western Sahara and China” (Nutrient Platform, 
2012). Maintaining frame plurality creates a certain ambiguity that “allows 
adherents of each frame to retain their preferred approach in the presence of the 
other” (Gray et al., 2015, p. 130).  
Frame 4: Lack of security of supply  
The lack of security of supply of phosphorus is emphasized in this frame:  
“Raw phosphorus is found in natural reserves in only a few countries 
(Morocco, US, China, Russia, etc.). The EU imports large quantities of raw 
phosphorus materials and has (almost) no reserves. The US has used up nearly 
all its reserves and has stopped exporting phosphate rock, while China has 
effectively stopped export by introducing a 200% export tax. As a result, 
Europe is to a large extent dependent on phosphorus from Morocco.” (Source: 
Internal report on European Conference)  
Within this frame, a parallel is sometimes drawn with the fossil fuel situation: 
“Comparable to fossil fuel also for phosphorus control of the resources is in 
the hands of a limited number of countries. Most of the known reserves are in 
Morocco, the VS and China. China however has put an export tariff on 
phosphate recently.” (Netherlands Water Partnership, 2010). 
Here, a master frame is imported. This occurs when actors strive to achieve 
legitimacy by linking their frames to those of successful social movements. By 
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likening the lack of security over access to phosphorus to that of fossil fuel 
scarcity, actors aim to emphasize the dangers of lacking control over a crucial 
resource for everyday life. Platform members recognize that people may be more 
familiar with fossil fuel reserves than with phosphorus reserves, and so import this 
master frame to increase the legitimacy of frame 4.  
Frame 5: Sanitation in developing countries 
The sanitation frame focuses on the advantages of reusing human excreta directly 
in agriculture, especially in areas where the soil is low in phosphorus: “Especially 
for developing countries it is interesting to create self-sustaining areas in terms of 
energy and food security. For example, by connecting cities (human excreta) to 
arable land for P-recycling” (Source: Internal minutes). When extended, this frame 
also suggests that recycling in the form of “reuse of P in human excreta would 
decrease more and more if the current sanitation technology of the western world 
were to be adopted by developing countries” (Smit et al., 2009). In the formation 
stage of the XSP this frame was strongly emphasized by XSP partners: “At this 
moment the phosphate issue has no real relevance here in the Netherlands, but in 
the developing world it certainly does and needs to be put high on the 
agenda” (Internal memo). Within this frame, we later observed frame merging, as 
it connects to frame 1: “More households connected to a sewer system will lead to 
increased losses towards the oceans sediments” (Smit et al., 2009). The sanitation 
frame also merged with frame 6: “Recovering (and selling) of nutrients will turn 
sanitation into a financially sustainable business” (Source: Internal minutes). The 
mechanism of importing a master frame was also used as actors related this frame 
to the popular trend of ecological thinking: “Ecological sanitation has to do with 
ecology and thinking in cycles and recovering waste” (manager of an NGO). The 
aim is to achieve legitimacy for the sanitation frame by relating it to a more 
general, popular frame. 
Frame 6: Availability of Dutch phosphorus (P)  
In this frame, the opportunities for Dutch companies related to recycling 
phosphorus are highlighted: “The NP seeks to create policies and market 
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conditions that stimulate sustainable nutrient use. It will build on the special 
position of the Netherlands, having nutrient surpluses at their disposal in a (future) 
world of shortage” (source: internal strategic plan). The argument here is that the 
Dutch surplus in phosphorus can be traded:  
“Since we have realized that a large shortage of phosphorus is developing in 
the world, opportunities have sprung up for companies and the government: to 
turn an expensive waste problem (food waste, manure, sewage water) into a 
profitable export product and to that end to connect different waste streams 
and return phosphorus to the cycle.” (Source: Internal memo)  
This frame is often merged with frame 7 to create a more general frame of 
opportunity:  
“The economic value added is not yet completely clear, but the expectation is 
that over the entire cycle partners can reduce costs by valorizing waste 
streams. In addition, this can create new jobs and increase exports (not only in 
terms of nutrients, but also in terms of knowledge, technology, etc.)” (Source: 
Internal memo) 
Frame 7: Dutch strengths in governance and innovation 
Like frame 6, this frame highlights the opportunities for Dutch actors that arise 
from phosphorus shortage, but it focusses more on applying current strengths. 
These include research skills in the water sector: “Knowledge institutes really 
want to give the Netherlands an important position as a country of knowledge. So, 
they want to pursue fundamental knowledge development” (CEO of a sludge-
processing company). The opportunity to apply governance strengths is also 
highlighted: “Sustainability and a cycle approach are central in the Dutch 
governance and strategic developments. In national and regional governments, 
companies and NGO’s as well as knowledge institutes” (Source: Internal memo). 
As mentioned earlier, this frame is often merged with frame 6.  
Other frame selection mechanisms 
In addition, the merging of frames takes place on a more aggregated level when 
frames 1–5 are grouped together as “crisis frames” and frames 6 (Dutch P 
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Availability) and 7 (Dutch governance/innovative strengths) as “opportunity 
frames”. Actors in the platform appear to be consciously aware of the effects of 
framing. For example, several respondents emphasize that the opportunities 
presented by recycling phosphorus will be more fruitful than focussing on crisis: 
“[We as a society] should look at it [the need for phosphorus recycling] more as an 
opportunity (from the viewpoint of society, participation, economic environment) 
than as a threat” (Source: internal agenda). “The slogan ‘No P, No Life’ is too 
negative. (…)The project should be more focussed on the opportunities and the 
trade possibilities. Currently the approach is too much based on the 
threats” (Source: Internal minutes).  
What is noticeable is that the seven different frames and their recombinations 
used by actors involved in the Nutrient Platform are maintained in juxtaposition. 
However, some evolution can be seen in the use of different frames over time. For 
example, frame 5 (sanitation) is emphasized more in the initial stages: “The 
platform’s first secretary [coordinator] was part of the NWP, of the sanitation 
cluster. Aqua for All and WASTE [member NGOs] are also closely related to the 
Netherlands Water Partnership, they are also part of the ‘sanitation 
corner’.” (Senior manager at a research institute). However, at a certain point some 
partners became disgruntled with this frame:  
“One of the problems then was the waste sanitation story. That was 
approached from a very impertinent pedantic point of view that went ‘It is 
dirty in other countries and people should be washing their hands, people 
should do this, people should do that’. It did not go any further than that you 
invested money. If you invested a million, a million came out but it would 
never be more than that. Then came the start of recycling nutrients and energy 
that we considered to be a very interesting trajectory that we could help 
shape.” (Senior government advisor)  
It appears that, in the long run, the sanitation frame (frame 5) clashed with other 
frames so that maintaining frame plurality became problematic. This frame was 
later dropped from the set of active frames. However, it appears that frames that do 
not overtly clash are maintained:  
“By working well together, sharing knowledge and investing together in a 
smart way, the Netherlands can be the first country in the world to create a 
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sustainable market for recycled phosphorus. With that, Dutch businesses – 
with the perspective of growing P scarcity in the world – as first-movers will 
be able to achieve a competitive advantage in the international phosphorus 
trade [frame 6]. In addition, government [frame 7], and businesses will be able 
to cut costs substantially by valorizing waste/manure into a useful and 
valuable resource [frame 3]. For society, this means that this economic 
opportunity solves, or at least decreases, a large environmental problem [frame 
1 and 2].” (Source: Internal memo). 
Thus, a more limited number of frames were selected. 
Frame retention 
We consider frames to have reached the retention stage when there is continued 
exchange of frames inside as well as outside the Nutrient Platform. First, frames 
are formulated collectively by the XSP as the members of the platform interact in 
meetings and in small focus groups based on a common interest or project. In later 
stages of the XSP life cycle, the (planned) activities of the Nutrient Platform shift 
to reflect the elimination of the sanitation frame (frame 5). Plans for international 
sanitation activity feature prominently on meeting agendas in the early stages of 
the XSP life cycle but are appear less frequently over time. In the mandated 
maintenance stage of the life cycle, the activities outlined by the platform were 
mainly national in scope – emphasizing frames 6 and 7–, and were no longer 
aimed at changing international practices, which frame 5 would have implied. This 
highlights that there was a clear clash between frame 5 and other frames in use, 
and could be a reason why this frame was eventually removed from the set of 
active frames.  
Frame retention also occurs as the opinions of external stakeholders of the 
platform appear to be incorporated in the frames used in communication by the 
platform. For example, in the formation stage of the XSP life-cycle, intense 
cooperation with several government departments was important for members of 
the Nutrient Platform as they were trying to influence national regulation. At this 
stage, the innovative strengths of Dutch government and business (frame 7) are 
also emphasized in platform communication. For example, in a project description 
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from the formation stage of the Nutrient Platform written in 2008, there is an 
emphasis not only on the scarcity of phosphorus but also on the fact that the 
Netherlands occupies a particularly privileged position regarding this. An internal 
memo outlines four reasons why this is so: “1) Nutrient collection: The 
Netherlands can help by simply collecting nutrients; 2) Nutrient recycling: The 
Netherlands has an exceptional amount of knowledge when it comes to recycling 
nutrients from waste streams, both technologically and in terms of policy; 3) Water 
use: The Netherlands historically is a frontrunner when it comes to water 
management, including our policy constructions in relation to agriculture and 4) 
Food production: The Netherlands belongs to the global top when it comes to 
intensive farming, including lawmaking and regulations when it comes to 
environmental impact.” This demonstrates opportunistic framing by actors, where 
frame plurality allows them to pick and choose the most pertinent frame for each 
interaction. 
Lastly, frame retention also occurs when the opinions of individual members 
can be seen to be directly reflected in platform frames. Members of the steering 
group also emphasize that the platform aims to incorporate the diverse opinions 
found among members:  
“There is a significance for everyone because everyone is dependent on 
phosphorus, but there is also a difference between them. For us it is an 
environmental issue and an economic opportunity, for others it is about 
security of supply. As a result, we frame it differently for each 
stakeholder.” (Second secretary of the Nutrient Platform) 
Thus, in different phases of the platform life cycle (formation, mandated 
maintenance and open maintenance), different frames were used; some were 
selected, others were deleted, and some evolved, recombined and persisted over 
time. 
Discussion  
We have assessed which challenges occur during the different life-cycle phases of 
an XSP and how both strategic and interactional frames contribute to maintaining 
collaboration in an XSP. We have analyzed data over the first eight years of 
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existence of an XSP to identify how different frames come to exist in parallel and 
have explained the frame selection, deletion and retention mechanisms in use to 
achieve ongoing collaboration in an XSP. Our findings on the framing strategies 
for XSP maintenance correspond to the Variation–Selection–Retention model 
found in evolutionary theory (Aldrich, 1999). Having multiple sources of frames 
causes variation, then selection, deletion and retention take place, resulting in a 
dynamic set of frames being in use at different times. The process is outlined 
schematically in Figure 4.3. 
Frame selection 
Parties held different frames regarding how they viewed phosphorus. However, 
not all frames produced in interactions between platform members were selected 
for continued use. One example is the desire to extend scientific knowledge about 
the use of phosphorus, as mentioned by researcher from a knowledge institute. 
Many other frames could be traced to a few individual actors but never found their 
way into joint XSP communication. What the unselected frames had in common 
was that they were either very specific to a single party in the XSP, or they clashed 
directly with frames that were selected. An example is the desire to develop more 
international collaboration to incorporate expertise from other countries. This 
international collaboration frame clashed with frame 7, Dutch strengths in 
governance and innovation, and in the end, was not selected. As it turned out, an 
international phosphorus platform (the European Sustainable Phosphorus 
Platform) was launched some years later and became a rival of the Dutch Nutrient 
Platform in the competition for membership and funding. These examples suggest 
that the selection of frames delineates the direction and scope of an XSP and that 
selection occurs based on a desire for overall congruence around the key issue.  
In their model of how cross-sector interactions move from contrast to fusion, 
Le Ber and Branzei (2010, p. 181) include the concept of frame plasticity, a 
process which involves the “effortful cycling back-and-forth between sector-
specific, partnership-specific, and organization-specific frames that allows the 
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newly acquired understanding to fall into place for each of the partners.” Our 
results help to further clarify this process. We find that rather than moving towards 
a convergent frame, multiple frames continue to co-exist, based on the notion of 
equifinality. Organizational members may have different reasons for undertaking 
action and different interpretations of the action’s potential outcomes, but they 
nonetheless act collectively to achieve the larger goal (Donnellon et al., 1986). In 
our case, members continued to adhere to their specific frames while agreeing on 
the final aim to recycle phosphorus.  
From our coding two factors emerged that affect frame selection; a motivation to 
achieve congruence between internal characteristics, which we refer to as internal 
alignment, and a motivation for congruence between internal and external 
characteristics, which we label as external alignment. Each of these can be further 
divided into two parts. We will specify these below. 
Selection through internal alignment 
A drive to achieve internal alignment determines whether particular frames are 
selected. One aspect of internal alignment concerns the congruence between 
frames and XSP activities. Actors select frames that legitimate the platform’s 
activities. The platform was part-funded by the Dutch Ministry for Innovation and 
Environment, for example. As an active member of the XSP, the ministry 
promoted the initiation of real multi-party “business cases”, and thus the frame of 
Dutch strengths in governance and innovation (frame 7) was selected. Conversely, 
we found that frame deletion occurs when day-to-day activities within the 
collaboration are not in accordance with a frame. In this case, it appears that 
practical difficulties of carrying out sanitation activities on another continent 
overshadowed the initial idea championed by NGOs. This resulted in the frame 
becoming redundant, and eventually being discarded: 
“International Media Project: Not much progress. From now on we should put 
more effort in. The idea is to work out a broad media approach with different 
types of communication. A Terms of Reference document is ready, a partner 
should be found for co-financing.” (Internal progress report, June 2012) 
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Our findings suggest that, at times, pragmatic considerations shape discussion 
topics and the frames that are selected. However, the chronology of internal 
documents also suggests that a frame can be deleted by a process of persistent 
ignoring and disuse, rather than because of overt conflict.  
In addition to internal alignment based on XSP activities, frame selection is 
also influenced by majority member frames – i.e., the standpoint of most members. 
In the XSP’s initial years, frames relating to the scarcity and security of supply 
(frames 3 and 4) were emphasized:  
“As you know the Nutrient Platform is a network that aims to create 
possibilities for sustainable use of nutrients (…). Mainly driven by the 
impending shortage of phosphorous we aim to increase the speed of the 
transition towards sustainable nutrient use” (Letter to invite new members to 
the platform, February 2011).  
As the Nutrient Platform expanded over time, more members joined, most of 
whom were private sector (business) partners, though there were also some 
research institutes (see Figures 4.4 and 4.5).  
This meant that, as the platform’s member base changed, so did the frames agreed 
upon by most members. Simultaneously, in the later stages of the XSP’s existence, 
the two opportunity-related frames (frames 6 and 7) become more pronounced in 
platform members’ strategic choices and communication:  
“On January 21st the Nutrient Platform, together with the Dutch Embassy in 
Berlin, the Flemish Nutrient Platform and the German Phosphorus Platform, 
organized a successful symposium about the opportunities for phosphorus 
recycling in urban environments.” (Nutrient Platform newsletter, February 
2014).  
This illustrates that the frames selected by the XSP were an apparent reaction to 
changing majority member frames or dominant frames.  
On the other hand, the changing composition of the collaboration also meant 
that there was a drop in the number of NGO “focal interactants” (Gray et al., 
2015), who largely supported a sanitation objective, (see Figure 2), while the 
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number of focal interactants with a more economic objective increased. This 
second group agreed that the sanitation frame (frame 5) was not a high priority: 
“In the beginning [other partners] also asked us to become involved in urine 
recycling in the south of Africa. Then we said, Listen, let’s first formulate a 
common goal. It is already an accomplishment if we become a club in the 
Netherlands, which reaches out to each other from the foundation of the 
problem to marketing and the solution. Let’s not start making it global, with 
lots of travel and writing of big documents, then nothing will happen. Then we 
become a talking club and there are already enough of those.” (CEO of a 
fertilizer company) 
The sanitation frame originated from NGO members of the platform. In the early 
stages of the platform NGOs were in the majority, with around a quarter of the 
total membership. However, by 2014 they represented less than ten percent of the 
membership (see Figure 2), and the sanitation frame was purposefully deleted by 
most business and knowledge institute members, for whom other frames took 
precedence. 
“Our task has shifted since the first initiatives. There used to be quite a strong 
focus on sanitation, through the NGOs of course and... Well, I think there was 
a plan to do this in Africa but for now that has moved to the 
background.” (Senior policy advisor for government)  
The Nutrient Platform is a clear example of how politics and power differences 
“authorize certain actors and perspectives and neglect or exclude others” (Gray et 
al., 2015, p. 135, citing Meyer and Höllerer, 2010). Overall, the process of aligning 
internally to the frames of the majority members within the platform establishes 
patterns of frame selection and deletion. We find that deletion can be a direct result 
of two things: persistent ignoring of certain frames plus pressure from a majority 
of partnership members. 
Selection through external alignment 
External factors also influence frame selection. There are two aspects to the 
motivation for external alignment. First, the position of external stakeholders 
appears to affect framing decisions. As mentioned earlier, the Nutrient Platform 
started with international and national aims, but in 2013 a spin-off – the European 
Sustainable Phosphorus Platform – was launched following a successful European 
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Sustainable Phosphorus Conference. This organization became a partner but also 
something of a competitor as it was also seeking members:  
“I notice that I am moving more towards the European platform, because it is 
more useful for me than the Dutch Platform. Here I know most people now 
and I no longer need the platform to find them.” (Senior manager from a 
research institute).  
Since the emergence of this new stakeholder, the (Dutch) Nutrient Platform started 
placing more emphasis on the opportunity frames (frames 6 and 7) as these 
emphasize the advantages of the national platform over the pan-European version. 
Second, we observed how trends in public opinion are used in frame selection 
to achieve external congruence and legitimacy. Members of the platform have 
since its foundation been very aware of public opinion and used the resulting 
momentum: 
“One of the things we thought of was that we should write an article to tell the 
public […] which we sent to the newspaper. [...]A journalist then phoned me 
to plan a visit to interview me. [...]Then for six or seven weeks I didn’t hear 
anything but one morning – I am subscribed to the same newspaper – I opened 
the paper and found that they made a front-page article out of it, titled “Food 
crisis due to phosphorus shortage”. [...]He had used my original article but 
also interviewed other people. [...]From that moment on people started 
approaching me and we formed the Nutrient Flow Task Group.” (Senior 
university researcher).  
The scarcity frame (frame 3) became very pronounced in the media covering the 
issue. As a result, this frame was prominent during the Nutrient Platform’s early 
years of existence:  
“Next to the security of supply argument and the environmental argument 
there is also a scarcity aspect. This is used often in communication, as in ‘the 
supply of phosphorus is limited and when the mines are empty you will have a 
problem.’” (Second secretary [coordinator] of the Nutrient Platform) 
Members of the platform aim to influence certain sectors of the public but the 
platform is also dependent on wider public opinion. Trends in public opinion may 
thus be leveraged by members in selecting frames that they believe will resonate 
best with an external audience. 
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Frame retention 
After frames have been selected, actors seek to anchor them in the XSP using 
retention mechanisms. Burgelman (1991, p. 240) explains retention as “a form of 
organizational-level learning and distinctive competence, embodied in various 
ways – organizational goal definition, domain delineation, and shared views of 
organizational character.” In the Nutrient Platform, we identified several means by 
which the selected frames are retained.  
Within the platform, the nature of activities carried out and tasks agreed upon 
in meetings changed over time, and the retention of frames appears to follow this 
pattern. For example, initially internal strategic documents and meetings were 
structured using three categories: international activities, European activities and 
national activities. Plans for each category were laid out and progress was 
discussed in meetings. In the European category, plans for a conference were 
quickly expanded, and in the national category, discussions about legislation 
gathered momentum. However, in the international category initiatives were not 
advanced and deadlines were postponed multiple times. Gradually, progress in the 
international section, which included work on sanitation projects in developing 
countries initiated by NGOs, stagnated, and less space and time were allotted to 
discussing this area of work. Coding from both internal documents and 
interviewees shows that the sanitation frame (frame 5) became less prominent as 
the concrete plans to improve sanitation in developing countries were pushed 
further down the agenda. Eventually the sanitation frame was abandoned. This 
suggests that the retention of active frames is related to the portfolio of XSP 
activities. 
We identified two retention mechanisms. Frames are retained by promoting 
communication among the platform’s members, whereby selected frames are 
discussed and agreement on specific frames is emphasized. For example, notes 
from a members’ meeting (13, December 2013) included the signing of a 
Memorandum of Understanding with the Flemish and German Nutrient Platforms. 
The notes state: “the signing of this document underlines the ambition of the 
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Nutrient Platform to work with diverse actors in the value chain to create the right 
conditions for economically viable business cases around nutrient recycling.” This 
is an example of the retention of frame 6, in which the potential economic benefits 
of recycling phosphorus are emphasized. 
Also, frames are retained by being enshrined in official documents that are 
shared with external stakeholders. Internally these documents are referred to and 
archived as “important final documents.” This facilitates retention by emphasizing 
the selected frames – as happened, for example, in the Phosphorus Chain 
Agreement, where members agreed to make a concerted effort to recycle 
phosphorus. Other examples include official letters sent to the Dutch government 
stating the aims and the progress of the Nutrient Platform. For example, in the 
official note sent in 2012 by the Nutrient Platform to the Dutch Lower Chamber, 
the scarcity frame (frame 3) is emphasized, as are the frames relating to the Dutch 
phosphorus surplus (frame 6) and the lack of supply security (frame 4). This also 
exemplifies how frames are retained in combinations and how the selection and 
retention of one frame does not exclude the possibility of another frame also being 
retained. In other words, it signifies ongoing frame plurality. 
A Model for Frame Plurality in XSP’s  
Drawing on the variation, selection, deletion and retention mechanisms described 
above, we develop a model for frame evolution leading to optimal frame plurality. 
See Figure 4.6. 
Frame variation in XSPs is caused by differing member standpoints, or by 
information from external sources. The resulting frames are selected based on a 
legitimacy-driven desire for internal and external congruence as perceived by 
platform members. The selected frames are then retained through both internal 
interaction and external communication. 
We find that, in the process of selection and retention, frame plurality is 
maintained. Frames that are at odds with each other can be maintained side by 
side, because there is agreement about the collaboration’s ultimate aim. Thus, 
valuable time and resources may be saved by avoiding the need for complete 
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unanimity. However, frame plurality is not completely without bounds. Frames 
that are not (or are no longer) aligned with the majority point of view are deleted 
from the portfolio of active frames. We observed that as the sectoral composition 
of the XSP changed drastically, shifting the power equation, the sanitation frame 
was deleted. This suggests that, while maintaining frame plurality avoids the need 
for extensive discussion to enable XSP members to reach consensus over a single 
frame, the frames selected and retained in use are influenced by the power of the 
majority constituent. 
By investigating the framing process throughout the different life-cycle 
stages of an XSP, we bring a fresh perspective to the maintenance of collaboration 
in XSPs. Previous studies have suggested that collaboration efforts should be 
aimed at achieving an overall agreement through a convergence of the multiple 
frames used by different partners in a collaboration. Our case demonstrates that an 
alternative route to successful collaboration is to maintain a productive tension 
between the different frames. The result is that both internal and external 
stakeholders consider the collaboration to be acceptable, albeit for different 
motivations. Our analysis shows that sustaining collaboration in an XSP involves 
adapting frames in line with the changing institutional environment. Our model 
suggests that the constellation of frames that are actively used evolves over time, 
based on changing standpoints of members, changing demands of external 
stakeholders and changing collaborative activities.  
In the variation stage in an XSP’s evolution, different frames produce 
variations in the meaning of the issue at stake. As more actors enter the platform, 
the number of frames increases. The process of selecting and discarding frames is 
not just a competitive process but also involves learning as people adapt to each 
other’s frames and identify commonalities and complementarities without 
necessarily giving up their own espoused frames. Over time, participants may tend 
to favor certain frames and avoid or ignore others. The move from variation to 
selection requires a frame to be less partisan, so that it can then appeal to a broader 
audience. While actors may push for their own positions, some frames become 
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more comprehensible and acceptable over time, both inside and outside an 
organization (Strang and Meyer, 1993). Thus, frames may not be selected ‘blindly’ 
but through a more deliberate process based on learning and theorizing in ongoing 
interactions.  
The selection of a few frames does not mean that these frames will become 
widely legitimated or institutionalized and thus retained (Gray et al., 2015). 
Plurality may involve some frames becoming dominant, enabling other non-
dominant frames to continue if they have some evident link to these dominant 
frames. However, if a frame runs counter to the dominant frames or does not fit 
well to them (as was the case with the sanitation frame that was neither profitable 
nor seen to be in the national interest), it will then disappear. This process may be 
recursive in that the loss of a frame may in turn cause members who espouse that 
frame to look for alternatives and leave the XSP (e.g., the member who advocated 
internationalization became increasingly interested in the pan-European rather 
than the Dutch network). Thus, frames have a dynamic effect on the composition 
and recruitment of XSP members.  
Only a few frames pass the selection hurdle, and even fewer are retained when 
they develop a collective meaning that goes beyond the platform and become 
‘exteriorized’ by both internal and external stakeholders. These frames may be 
developed internally within the XSP – majority member frames (e.g., national 
interest and business frames) – or linked with master frames imported from outside 
(e.g., the fossil fuel frame and the environmental frame). These retained frames may 
generate sufficient common ground among the platform’s participants to sustain 
collaboration and maintain the XSP even beyond its mandated maintenance stage, 
as in our case. 
Our data suggest that once retention mechanisms are firmly in place, an XSP 
may remain relatively stable for a longer period of time. When all the parties 
involved can work with the plurality of frames in use, it appears that the typical 
pitfalls of an XSP (conflict and failure to create common ground) are mitigated. 
Parties may subscribe to only one or a few of the retained frames but still believe 
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that their overall cause is being served and that the bigger issue at hand is still 
being addressed. On the other hand, the absence of any directly conflicting frames 
may help avert outright clashes between members. 
In sum, maintaining optimal frame plurality can lead to and sustain 
collaboration among diverse participants because it allows multiple identities and 
interests to be accommodated simultaneously and does not force participants to 
converge around a single position. However, the plurality of frames needs to be 
manageable around an optimal number of retained frames. Excessive plurality may 
cause conflict between partners; this may potentially inhibit the emergence and 
sustenance of collaboration between diverse members and contribute to a failure to 
maintain the XSP. We find that frames are maintained in plurality when they are in 
congruence with XSP activities, majority member frames, the position of external 
stakeholders, and the prevailing public opinion. Frames that do not meet these 
criteria may be deleted to avoid conflict and a reduction in the XSP’s overall 
effectiveness’. Striking a balance between too much and too little plurality may be 
key to sustaining collaborations such as XSPs. 
Contributions 
First, while earlier studies have found that XSPs go through different 
developmental stages (Gray, 1985; 1989), we examine the process of evolution in 
an XSP and track changes in the frames used over time by the actors involved, 
looking also at the external and internal factors that coincide with these changes. 
By doing so, we add to studies that focus on the formation of an XSP and its 
developmental stages (Koschmann et al., 2012; Manning and Roessler, 2014) or 
on XSP outcomes (Clarke and MacDonald, 2016) by providing insights into the 
framing process through which collaboration may be sustained in an XSP after its 
formation.  
Second, our notion of optimal frame plurality, while related to Le Ber and 
Branzei’s (2010, p. 164.) concept of frame fusion, also extends this work. Frame 
fusion – “the construction of a new and evolving prognostic frame and that 
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motivates and disciplines partner's cross sector interactions while preserving their 
distinct contributions to value creation”, and the process of frame plasticity, where 
actors in organizations consciously select frames that fit with the partnership and 
the organizational and sector-related values. However, while Le Ber and Branzei 
(2010) focus on XSP dyads, we explain how optimal frame plurality is achieved 
among a vast array of diverse partners from different sectors in an XSP that 
changes in composition over time. In addition, we add further nuance to the notion 
of frame plurality (Gray et al., 2015) but show that plurality may have ‘finite’ 
bounds as excessive variety may be counterproductive. We suggest that the 
deletion of certain frames, and the retention of a few – a progressively ‘narrowing 
frame bandwidth’ – may be necessary for sustaining collaboration in XSPs. This is 
line with the argument by Patvardhan, Gioia and Hamilton (2015) that in complex 
inter-organizational settings (in this case an international consortium of 
“information schools”), it may be productive to seek to create “coherence” 
regarding shared problem domains, mutual interests, and practices, rather trying to 
reach absolute consensus through deliberation. 
While we cannot support this argument with a counterfactual, our findings 
suggest that progress on agreements is thwarted by too many frames (excessive 
variety) and that the deletion of certain frames, and the retention of relatively 
fewer frames may be necessary for sustaining collaboration. We would be 
reluctant to put any definitive numbers on what is truly optimal in terms of frames 
as this is likely to considerably vary from one XSP to another, depending on the 
type of issue being addressed, the number and diversity of the parties involved, 
and the external contextual influences. Thus, what is optimal may be situational 
and context-dependent. By optimal frame plurality, we refer to a level of variety in 
which diversity is neither smothered nor allowed to get out of hand, and which 
therefore allows a sufficient degree of agreement to emerge among the diverse 
constituents. Optimal frame plurality is thus not a definitive outcome but a 
continual balancing act that XSPs can consider aiming for in their efforts to reach 
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a greater degree of consensus about how to address very complex social 
challenges. 
Also, while not explicitly addressed in our study, our analysis suggests that 
framing happens in a politicized social context, and it matters both who does the 
framing and what level of power and authority they have – as was seen, for 
example, in how the changing composition of the XSP influenced the types of 
frame that became influential. Framing is thus inherently a “bidirectional” process 
(i.e., both top-down and bottom-up) (Gray et al., 2015), and the parties and the 
mechanisms available to them are both enabled and constrained by existing norms 
and power relations in any given setting.  
Third, a rich body of work on hybrid logics and on hybridism more broadly 
has addressed how actors manage institutional plurality and complexity amid 
conflicting pressures from stakeholders. Such coping has been explained in terms 
of collective identity (Battilana and Dorado, 2010; Patvardhan et al., 2015), 
identity aspirations (Kodeih and Greenwood, 2014), selective decoupling (Pache 
and Santos, 2013), selective synthesizing (Binder, 2007; Chen and O’Mahony, 
2006) and temporal reflexivity (Reinecke and Ansari, 2015). Studies have 
considered healthcare (Reay and Hinings, 2005), social enterprises (Battilana and 
Dorado, 2010), public-service partnerships (Jay, 2013), biotechnology firms 
(Powell and Sandholtz, 2012), universities (Murray, 2010) and financial 
institutions (Smets et al., 2015). While this work has addressed both organizational 
and cross-sectional settings, the focus is on how actors manage plurality and 
collaboration on an individual basis by bridging, segmenting, recombining and 
reconciling frames across divergent stakeholder groups. We add to this work by 
explaining how plurality is managed jointly and how collaboration achieved by a 
collective in a cross-sector partnership comprised of diverse constituents. It is thus 
not so much what actors can do individually to manage conflict, but rather what 
they can do together that may matter more in an XSP.  
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Limitations and Future Research Avenues  
Although our study covers an eight-year period, our interview data was collected 
at the end of this period. We thus rely partly on retrospective accounts from 
interviewees. Fortunately, we could triangulate this information with rich archival 
data from earlier years. This proved to be especially helpful when studying the 
process of frame deletion. As this transpired to be a question of inaction rather 
than action, it would have been hard to uncover from interview data alone. Our 
access to data such as minutes and agendas has allowed us to study this process in 
detail. Future framing research could shed light on the hidden process of frame 
deletion by triangulating the ‘paper trail’ of internal documents with interview 
data. 
Another question is whether our findings are confined to collaborations in 
sectors that are heavily dependent on natural resources such as water, or whether 
they have wider implications. Given that this collaboration comprised a diverse 
mix of partners from engineering firms to government partners, we would argue 
that our findings are not strictly sector-specific. What is optimal, however, is likely 
to vary between different XSPs, depending on its characteristics, such as the type 
of issue, the number and diversity of parties involved, and the external contextual 
influences. Future research could investigate these dynamics in different contexts 
to shed more light on the claims we make. One could also ask whether our 
findings will hold true for collaborations with fewer or less diverse partners. 
Comparative research designs could examine the wider applicability of our 
findings. 
Conclusion  
Based on our analysis of attempts to resolve a complex and at times controversial 
long-term social problem – namely dealing with the phosphorus challenge and 
achieving changes in both public perception and the regulatory environment – we 
offer a model of how actors in XSPs achieve ongoing collaboration by maintaining 
an optimal level of frame plurality. Continual adaptation to internal and external 
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factors results in the evolution of the set of frames used – through variation, 
selection, deletion and retention. We also find that concerted and sustained 
collaboration – a major challenge for most XSPs – does not have to result in a 
unanimous agreement around a single or convergent mega frame; it can also 
emerge through generating productive tension between diverse positions and 
achieving optimal frame plurality and managed differentiation. In this way the 
integrity of the differing positions held by the various parties can be respected but 
sufficient common ground can still be found to allow collaboration on the complex 
issue at hand to be sustained. Optimal frame plurality is not a definitive outcome 
but rather an ongoing balancing act that XSPs can consider in their effort to foster 
greater convergence among diverse parties around highly complex social 
challenges.  
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Tables and Figures 
Table 4.1. Overview of interview questions 
Semi-Structured interview questions
Why did you join the Nutrient Platform? 
What are your activities for the platform? 
What according to you is the reason that the platform exists? 
Is the platform a success? 
What are some successes of NP? 
What are some hurdles the NP has overcome or still should overcome? 
Where is NP in 5 years? 
Would you characterize the platform as a social movement? 
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Table 4.2. Overview of data 
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Type of data NP internal NGO Business Know-ledge institutes Government
Interviews Three interviews 
with current and 
past secretariat 
members
Three 
interviews
Twelve 
interviews, three 
of which were 
industry 
associations
Three 
interviews
Six interviews, 
one of which is 
with a member 
of the House of 
Representatives 
Archival data Full access was provided to all internal documents in the Nutrient Platform database, 
including meeting agendas, minutes, strategic plans, memos, presentations as well as the 
agreement signed to found the platform and several evaluations of the targets stated in that 
agreement
Obser-vations One member meeting of the Nutrient Platform was observed as well as one meeting  
of the Nutrient Platform Steering Committee
Table 4.3. Summary of main themes and verbatim examples 
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Theme Sub-theme Example
Crisis 1. Environmental 
impact- use
‘The inappropriate use of phosphorus can (…) 
encourage the erosion and pollution of 
waterways, cause coastal dead zones and impact 
fisheries’(internal document, 2009)
2. Environmental 
impact- mining
As P supplies run down, we will need to use 
dirtier sources, leading to cadmium pollution of 
soil, and potentially even radiation pollution 
(internal document, 2011)
3. Scarcity The phosphorous problem is based on the idea 
that we have mines from where we get our 
phosphorous, so like oil and gas phosphorous is 
limited. If it is used up we will have a big 
problem. (interview with Second Secretary 
Nutrient Platform).)
4. Lack of security 
of supply 
Just five countries together control 90% of the 
world’s reserves of rock phosphate. China, the 
largest producer, has already begun to safeguard 
its supplies by imposing, in mid-2008, a 135% 
tariff on exports (news article, 2009)
Crisis + 
oppor-
tunity
5. Sanitation in 
developing 
countries
Especially for developing countries it is 
interesting to create self-sustaining areas in 
terms of food security (for example by 
connecting cities (human excreta) to arable land 
for P-recycling) and energy (biogas). (internal 
document, 2010)
Oppor-
tunity
6. Dutch P 
availability
As the only phosphorus surplus country in 
Europe, the Netherlands is in a unique position  
and faces special challenges. The present cost of 
manure processing is more than 100 million 
euros. Better defined and more effective 
composting and a wider range of recycling 
products can create alternatives for chemical 
fertilizer production and industry, (internal 
document, 2009)
7. Dutch 
Governance/
Innovation 
strengths
With the Phosphorous Chain Agreement the 
Netherlands has become a frontrunner in 
Europe, based on our knowledge and expertise in 
the agro- and food business. (public document 
produced by the Nutrient Platform, 2013)  
Di
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c f
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Figure 4.1. Timeline of main events in Nutrient Platform 
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Figure 4.2. Active frames in different phases of the Nutrient Platform  
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Figure 4.3. Data structure 
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 Figure 4.4. Nutrient Platform membership development 
*one bar for each organization (a white square means no membership in a given year) 
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Figure 4.5. Nutrient Platform membership share per sector 
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Figure 4.6. Model of frame variation-selection-retention and deletion for 
maintaining frame plurality 
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Chapter 5 
Study 4. Creating and disrupting to explore: how 
different types of institutional work by actors relate 
to different firm wide innovation outcomes 
Abstract 
For this study, we use the systematic approach of innovation scholars to measure 
the very root of innovative behavior. We measure the institutional entrepreneurial 
behavior of individuals in firms and relate it to different types of innovative 
outcomes (exploration or exploitation.  
We make the case that individual institutional work within firms that is 
more radical is related to exploratory innovation, while institutional work to 
transform institutions more gradually is related to exploitation-based innovation. 
Empirical testing was performed using a random sample of 346 Dutch companies 
of different sizes, of which management team members participated in a survey. 
The most important sectors represented were business-to-business services 
construction industry and other manufacturing industries.  We find that there is a 
positive relationship between individual-level institutional work carried out to 
create institutions individual-level institutional work carried out to disrupt 
institutions and exploratory innovation at firm level. Also, we find a significant 
positive relationship between institutional work aimed at transforming institutions 
and exploitation-based innovation. With this study, we tie together the institutional 
entrepreneurship- and the innovation literature the shed light of the process that 
leads up to different types of innovation behavior.  
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Introduction  
They would not disagree over the notion that organizations change. Yet beyond 
that point, innovation scholars and researchers of neo-institutional theory have not 
been able to find much common ground. Innovation studies are commonly 
quantitative and include antecedents such as organizational specialization, 
professionalism, centralization and slack resources (Damanpour, 1991). 
Alternatively, scholars of institutional change dive into the workings of change 
often at a field rather than an organization level (Dacin et al., 2002) and pay 
attention to the process rather than the outcome of change (for example Seo and 
Creed, 2002).  
The literatures on innovation and institutional change have developed in 
parallel while they each attempt to explain the changes that take place within and 
around organizations. Aoki (2005, p. 15), as a rare exception bringing the two 
theories together, uses innovation language to describe institutional change as 
involving ‘qualitatively new (innovative), experimental choices initiated by some 
(or all) agents, and their subsequent stabilization, accompanied by strategic 
adaptations by other agents to them.’ The study of the work of these agents in neo-
institutional theory is fragmented in two main sub-fields; institutional 
entrepreneurship (a.o. Maguire et al.,2004., Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006., 
Garud et al., 2007), and institutional work (a.o. Lawrence et al, 2009., Battilana 
and D’Aunno, 2009., Zietsma and Lawrence, 2010). These two sub-fields 
supplement each other. Lawrence, Suddaby and Leca (2009, p.1.) explain that the 
theory of institutional work, which developed slightly later, is aimed at 
‘connecting, bridging, and extending work on institutional entrepreneurship, 
institutional change and innovation’. However, although institutional 
entrepreneurship can be said to have received a prominent place in the institutional 
work literature, concepts from innovation research have not made it into the core 
of the theory.  
With this paper we aim to re-assess the use of several concepts from 
innovation research for application in the field of institutional work. The 
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quantitative nature of this work may help strengthen the state of institutional work, 
which has received negative criticism regarding its largely qualitative nature.  
In doing so, we operationalize some concepts that are seminal to 
institutional entrepreneurship- and institutional work theory, and investigate their 
ties to the seminal concepts from the innovation literature. We pioneer a scale for 
the different types of institutional work (creating, transforming and disrupting) and 
we fortify it by subsequently relating these to existing and accepted measures 
(Jansen, Van den Bosch and Volberda, 2006) for exploration and exploitation 
respectively, recognized as the two different forms of innovation (March, 1991). 
The creation of a scale to measure the different types of institutional work was 
motivated by two factors. First, it has been mentioned that the body of institutional 
entrepreneurship literature is too light on quantitative studies. Pacheco et al. (2010, 
p. 993) explain that empirical research in neo-institutional theory–based 
institutional entrepreneurship tends to ‘focus more on the qualitative, historical 
interpretation of cases than on the quantitative analysis’ 
The authors of this paper’s work on the creation of a scale for institutional 
entrepreneurship is a case of institutional work in action. Porter (1995) 
demonstrated that the definition and acceptance of standard quantitative measures, 
facilitates actors in sharing common meanings. The intention of this paper is to 
contribute to the sharing of concepts and meanings between innovation scholars 
and neo-institutional theorists-more specifically, the body of research focusing on 
institutional work. The former have produced a wide range of (quantitative) 
measures for innovation, yet innovation research has in a systematic review been 
evaluated as ‘fragmented, poorly grounded theoretically, and not fully tested in all 
areas’ (Crossan & Apaydin, 2010, p. 1174).  
Smets and Jarzabkowski (2013, p.1282) state that ‘there have been 
‘repeated calls to refine theories of intentionality and effort (Lawrence et al., 2009, 
2011) and explore how institutional work is underpinned by different dimensions 
of agency (Battilana and D’Aunno, 2009)’. The authors draw on practice theory to 
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demonstrate that institutional work is not always intentional and can be carried out 
by actors in their ordinary activities.  
With this paper, we will demonstrate the complementarity of the methodological 
approach of innovation theory and the theoretical lens of institutional work theory. 
With that, we hope to lay a foundation for further joint development of both theory 
and measures.  
Institutional work and Innovation 
Institutional work 
Neo-institutionalism has strong empirical and theoretical foundations reaching 
back several decades since the publication of Selznick’s seminal paper 
conceptualizing what is retrospectively referred to as ‘old’ institutional theory 
(1949). This fundamental theory revolved around the concept that organizations 
respond to pressures in their social and symbolic environment rather than simple 
economic pressures (Meyer and Rowan, 1977).  There has been criticism that neo-
institutional theory has disregarded organizational diversity (Deephouse, 1999) as 
well as managerial agency and strategic choice (Donaldson, 1995). The theory of 
institutional entrepreneurship (DiMaggio, 1988), based on agency as well as 
isomorphism and diffusion is an answer to this. Yet institutional theory has become 
so widespread that it is ‘creaking under the weight of its own theoretical apparatus’ 
(Lawrence, Suddaby and Leca, 2011, p. 52). Lawrence et al. (2011, p. 55) 
themselves struggle with this as they are forced to clearly to distinguish 
institutional work from the seemingly similar – and slightly earlier developed- 
concept op institutional entrepreneurship. 
Garud, Hardy and Maguire (2007) in the introduction to a special issue 
about institutional entrepreneurship identify a shift in the focus of institutional 
researchers from explaining stability towards explaining institutional change, and 
the institutional work that is the stimulus of this change. They state that ‘To 
qualify as institutional entrepreneurs, individuals must break with existing rules 
and practices associated with the dominant institutional logic(s) and 
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institutionalize the alternative rules, practices or logics they are 
championing’ (Garud et al, 2007, p. 962).  
Since the publication of that special issue the conceptualization of institutional 
entrepreneurship has become more nuanced. A contribution to this has been the 
rise of interest in the theory of institutional work. Meyer (2008, p. 791) warns for 
the overemphasis on ‘realist institutionalism’, which ‘retains very strong 
assumptions about the capacities of actors, and very limited pictures of the 
institutional environment’. He points out that such realisms are unable to explain 
‘unlikely social structures’ (Meyer, 2008, p. 805) such as the human rights 
movement and environmental policies, creating many research opportunities for 
phenomenological institutional theory to develop.  Lawrence, Suddaby and Leca 
(2009, p. 5) in their book on institutional work advise caution to avoid 
overemphasis of the ‘rational and “heroic” dimension of institutional 
entrepreneurship. The authors draw the attention to the fact that actors, even 
entrepreneurs, are embedded in an institutionally defined concept, which affects 
their behavior just as they affect it. The notion of an institutional entrepreneur as 
an actor with definable features has long been upended.  
Most recently, institutional work has developed into a mature perspective 
which focuses on ‘understanding how, why and when actors work to shape sets of 
institutions, the factors that affect their ability to do so, and the experience of these 
efforts for those involved’ (Hampel, Lawrence and Tracey, 2017, p. 558) 
Types of institutional work 
Work on maintaining institutions is necessary to keep them ‘relevant and effective’ 
(Lawrence et al., 2009, p. 8). Contrary to the conception that institutions are self-
maintaining (Scott, 2001), even strong institutions require active work to remain 
solid (Zilber, 2009; Dacin, Munir and Tracey, 2010; Micelotta and Washington, 
2013).  
The counterforce of maintaining institutions is actively working to change 
them. We distinguish between three categories of work to change institutions. 
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First, institutional work to create institutions builds on the concept of institutional 
entrepreneurship (Lawrence et al, 2009, p.8). Studies that focus on work to create 
institutions are abundant (Garud, Jain and Kumaraswamy, 2002; Maguire et al, 
2004, ).  The consensus is that to be able to successfully create institutions, the 
traditionally recognized forces of institutional theory have to be actively managed 
by actors who want to change the status quo. Tracey, Phillips and Jarvis (2011) 
introduce the concept of bridging institutional entrepreneurship, which is used by 
actors to tie established, accepted institutional logics, to new logics at multiple 
levels in order to achieve legitimacy. 
Second, there is a separate category of institutional work research that 
focuses on disrupting institutions. Oliver (1992) first paid attention to the process 
of deinstitutionalization, concluding that political, functional and/or social 
pressures can give rise to deinstitutionalization. Seo and Creed (2002) later 
provide a framework to explain how incompatible institutional arrangements 
interact with agency to create institutional change. Lawrence and Suddaby (2006, 
p. 235) argue that disruptive institutional work can have three aims: "undermining 
assumptions and beliefs" about practices; "disassociating moral foundations" from 
practices; and "disconnecting sanctions" from practices through changes in legal or 
professional regulations. 
Recently, more attention is paid to the question of how work to change 
institutions is carried out. Maguire and Hardy (2009, p. 168) illustrate the 
discursive aspect of changing institutions by showing how institutional work is 
carried out by actors ‘through the authoring of texts that problematize existing 
practices in three specific ways designed to undermine each of the institutional 
pillar’.  This work signals the existence of a third category of institutional change, 
which we call transforming institutions. We define it as the more gradual work 
carried out to change institutions, as opposed to both creating entirely new 
institutions and the more abrupt disruption of institutions.  
Martí and Mair (2009, 13) argue that in the institutional work literature, 
too much attention is given to powerful actors, neglecting more marginal players. 
!134
In response, they investigate ‘how social entrepreneurs attempt to enhance and 
broaden the scope of existing institutional arrangements’ and urge future research 
to consider the role of ‘provisional institutions’, which are created by actors to 
serve their interest for a certain period of time. Pache and Santos (2013) compare 
four cases of social enterprises to investigate ‘hybridization’, where actors 
combine competing institutional logics. The authors find that rather than 
decoupling and compromising, actors in hybrid organizations use a strategy of 
selectively coupling specific elements of the two separate logics that are present in 
the hybrid.  These two studies exemplify that often institutional work to transform 
an institution is carried out without resorting to extremes such as creation and 
disruption. This new category of transformational institutional work appears to be 
less invasive than work on creating or disrupting institutions. The implications of 
this are to be analyzed further. Innovation theory may shed some light on this.  
Innovation theory 
Crossan and Apaydin (2010, p. 1155) define innovation as ‘both a process and an 
outcome’. The authors state that innovation includes ‘production or adoption, 
assimilation, and exploitation of a value-added novelty in economic and social 
spheres’. The terms "exploration" and "exploitation" have progressively led 
organizational analyses of innovation since the publication of March's (1991) 
pioneering article. The opposing terms are defined as follows: 
“Exploration includes things captured by terms such as search, variation, risk 
taking, experimentation, play, flexibility, discovery, innovation. Exploitation 
includes such things as refinement, choice, production, efficiency, selection, 
implementation, execution” (March, 1991, p. 71) 
Adapting to complex environments that are changing at an ever-increasing pace 
requires managers to be ambidextrous -to exploit existing knowledge while 
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simultaneously exploring novel avenues for knowledge development (March, 
1991, Levinthal and March, 1993, He and Wong, 2010). 
Laureiro-Martinez, Brusoni, Canessa and Zollo (2015) use fMRI images 
to demonstrate that exploration and exploitation are separate behaviors involving 
different cognitive processes. They find that exploitation relies on brain regions 
associated mainly with anticipation of rewards - which implies anticipation of the 
safe, predictable reward-, while exploration depends on regions associated mainly 
with attentional control. The authors also find that superior decision-making 
performance is derived from ‘the ability to sequence exploitation and exploration 
appropriately and to recognize when to switch to exploration’ (Laureiro-Martinez 
et al, 2015, p. 332). For future research, the authors suggest to further investigate 
the roots of how executives formulate and implement strategic visions.  
Institutional work on innovation 
Institutional work may be able to shed light on the process that underlies the 
outcome of different innovative behaviors (exploration and exploitation). One of 
the key elements of the institutional work literature is highlighting the ‘awareness, 
skill and reflexivity of individual and collective actors’ (Lawrence et al., 2009, p.
7.). We hypothesize that the three different types of institutional work are related 
to different innovative outcomes.  
First, we tie more radical forms of work to change institutions to more 
radical forms of institutions. We theorize that innovative behavior by a firm as a 
whole, is and outcome of more micro-level institutional work. As such, we 
hypothesize that institutional work to create institutions is tied to exploratory 
innovation: 
H1a: There is a positive relationship between individual-level institutional work 
carried out to create institutions and exploratory innovation at firm level 
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Similarly, we theorize that the radical nature of disruptive institutional work will 
result in radical innovative behavior. Consequently, we tie institutional work to 
disrupt institutions to firm-level exploratory innovative behavior: 
H1b: There is a positive relationship between individual-level institutional work 
carried out to disrupt institutions and exploratory innovation at firm level 
On the other hand, we argue that the more gradual transformative institutional 
work performed at the individual level, is related to exploitation-based innovative 
behavior at firm level: 
H2: There is a positive relationship between individual-level institutional work 
carried out to transform institutions and exploitation-based innovation at firm 
level 
Methods  
Research setting and data collection 
In order to test the proposed relationships empirically, we used a random sample of 
Dutch companies of different sizes. Requests to participate in the survey were sent 
to management team members. As our data concerns information about the 
regulatory standards in the organizational field, management team members were 
approached because they were expected to be in the best position to provide this 
knowledge. Survey data were collected in 2014.  
A total of 4.000 invitations were sent to managers of Dutch companies by 
post; in addition digital databases and social media were used to reach a wider 
public. 346 respondents completed the questionnaire, a response rate of 
approximately 9%. Apart from the category “others” (20,5%), the most important 
sectors represented were business-to-business services (27,2%), construction 
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industry (7,6%), other manufacturing industry (17,2%), logistics (5,2%), trade 
(10,2%) and financial services (6,3%).  
Construct measurement 
We used a seven-point Likert scale to measure the strength of a participant’s 
agreement to statements about the constructs used in this study. An overview of 
these can be found in Table. 5.1. 
Exploratory innovation. To measure exploratory innovation we adapted a 
measure used by Alexiev, Jansen, Van den Bosch and Volberda (2010), which was 
based on a more extensive measure developed by Jansen et al. (2006). It captures 
whether organizations depart from existing knowledge and pursue radical 
innovations for emerging customers or markets. The respondents were asked about 
the extent to which the organization: (1) offers new products and services the 
organization; (2) accepts demands that go beyond existing products and services; ; 
(3) they utilize new opportunities in new markets  and (4) uses new channels of 
distribution (a = 0.77). 
Exploitative innovation. We adapted the measure for exploitative 
innovation from Jansen et al (2006). The respondents were asked to rate the extent 
to which their organization: (1) works to increase the efficiency of production 
processes and services; (2) increases scale advantages by increasing the share in 
existing markets; (3) Deepens existing customer relations and (4) makes small 
adaptations to products and services  (a = 0.76). 
The three types of institutional work were each measured using a three-
item measure.  Since there was no existing measurement scale for these variables, 
we derived them from the general definition of what constitutes an institution. We 
adopt the interpretation of institutions as the ‘rules, norms, and beliefs that 
describe reality for the organization, explaining what is and is not, what can be 
acted upon and what cannot’ (Hoffman, 1999: 351). Next, realizing that rules, 
norms and beliefs each constitute a separate category of institution, we formulated 
a question. So for each type of institutional work (creative, transformative and 
!138
disruptive) we formulated a question about rules, a question about norms and a 
question about beliefs. This completed the creation of a three-item measurement 
scale for creative institutional work (α = 0,830), one for transformative 
institutional work (α = 0,847), and one for disruptive institutional work (α = 
0,911). 
We use firm size as a control variable in our model. Organizational size, 
measured as the log of the number or organization members, has a widely 
recognized moderating influence on the relationship between strategy and 
performance (Smith et al., 1989; Carroll, 2003). In addition, we control for the age 
of the organization.  
A list of questionnaire items was generated based on the operationalization 
of the constructs as outlined in Appendix 5.1.  
Reliability and validity  
A survey method allows for the collection of data from individuals about 
themselves or about the social units to which they belong (Rossi et al., 1983). This 
method has an advantage over archival data in explaining managerial behavior. 
However, the disadvantage is that the resulting data is perceptual. In order to test 
for non-response bias, we examined differences between early and late 
respondents (those who started the questionnaire in the first three months versus 
those who started it in the final three months) for our main study variables. These 
comparisons did not reveal any significant differences (p < 0.01), indicating that 
non-response bias was not a problem in this study. 
 To reduce the risk of common method bias, during the administration of 
the survey we assured respondent confidentiality. This should reduce respondent 
tendency towards providing socially desirable answers. 
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Findings  
This section first presents the findings of our univariate analysis. We find that 
respondents on average indicate a greater presence of more exploitation-based 
innovation behavior (4.92) than explorative innovation (4.16). Table 5.2 indicates 
the correlation matrix for the variables used in this study. The table indicates that 
internal- and external regulation are strongly correlated. In addition, the variables 
organization age and size correlate significantly with at least one of the dependent 
variables. This supports our decision to control the analysis for these effects.  
 We used regression analyses to test our hypotheses. Table 5.3 outlines the 
results of the regression analysis.  Model 1 and 2 in the table are used to test 
hypotheses 1a and 1b, concerning the relationship between individual-level 
institutional work carried out to respectively create institutions (hypothesis 1a) or 
to disrupt institutions (hypothesis 1b) and exploratory innovation. Model 1 in 
Table 5.3 explains the combined effect of the control variables on exploratory 
innovation as dependent variable. Model 2 explains the relationship between each 
of the three types of institutional work (to create, disrupt or transform) and 
exploratory innovation. The Durbin-Watson score of 1.980 indicates no evidence 
of autocorrelation.  
First, we use Model 2 in Table 5.3 to test hypothesis 1a. We find a 
significant positive relationship between individual-level institutional work carried 
out to create institutions and exploratory innovation. This means that hypothesis 
a1 is confirmed. Second, we used Model 2 to test hypothesis 1b. We find also a 
significant positive relationship between individual-level institutional work carried 
out to disrupt institutions and exploratory innovation. This means that hypothesis 
1b is also confirmed. Model 2 also indicates that no significant relationship exists 
between individual-level institutional work carried out to transform institutions.  
Model 3 and 4 are used to test hypothesis 2, concerning the relationship 
between individual-level institutional work carried out to transform institutions 
and exploitation-based innovation. Model 3 in Table 5.3 explains the combined 
effect of the control variables on exploitation-based innovation as dependent 
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variable. Model 4 explains the relationship between each of the three types of 
institutional work (to create, disrupt or transform) and exploitation-based 
innovation. The Durbin-Watson score of 1.921 indicates no evidence of 
autocorrelation. 
 We use model 4 to test hypothesis 2. We find a significant positive 
relationship between individual-level institutional work carried out to disrupt 
institutions and exploitation-based innovation. This confirms hypothesis 2. Model 
4 also indicates that no significant relationship exists between individual-level 
institutional work carried out to create or institutional work to disrupt institutions 
and exploitation-based innovation.  
Discussion  
Theoretical implications 
This study creates a link between the separate literatures of institutional 
entrepreneurship and innovation studies. This benefits each of the literatures. 
Institutional work literature is known for explaining the delicate balance between 
economical explanations for behavior, and more socially controlled behaviors. 
This in-depth look at behavior is used in this study to explain through which 
process different types of innovation (exploration and exploitation) materialize at 
firm level.  
In turn, the innovation literature explaining the process and the outcome of 
innovation is extensive. As opposed to institutional research -which is sometimes 
criticized for being too descriptive in nature, and relying heavily on qualitative 
work – innovation research has used a wide variety of methods, from surveys to 
brain imaging, to define and measure the processes and outcomes of innovation.  
With this study, we use the systematic approach of innovation scholars to 
measure the very root of innovative behavior. We measure the institutional 
entrepreneurial behavior of individuals in firms and relate it to different types of 
innovative outcomes (exploration or exploitation). In innovation research the 
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contingent factor of innovation trajectories is emphasized in studies taking a 
performative approach. Our findings are in line with the argument of Garud, 
Gehman and Tharchen (2017, p.5 ) that ‘strategic, entrepreneurial, and innovative 
initiatives can be considered as performative efforts during ongoing journeys’. The 
authors argue that the initiatives for changes as proposed by actors can be 
understood a s ‘performatives’. The plans and pitches that are used by actors to 
this end can be viewed as an attempt to gain support from stakeholders. The results 
of our study support this view that individual grassroots initiatives by institutional 
entrepreneurs can indeed be the beginning of the firm wide innovation profile.  
Methodological implications 
We also use this study to solidify the understanding of the concept of institutional 
entrepreneurship. Though the concept has been well-defined and studied in many 
different contexts, this study pioneers a quantitative measure of the different types 
of institutional entrepreneurship. Though the measures can always use 
enhancements or changes, we offer at least a start for making visible the small, 
individual initiatives that are connected to different types of firm-level innovation 
(exploration or exploitation).  
Managerial implications 
Our findings demonstrate that the existence of individual-level institutional 
entrepreneurship initiatives within firms is related to the type of firm-wide 
innovative behavior that is exhibited. We find that when more radical work on the 
creation and disruption of institutions is carried out by people within a certain 
firm, this firm is also more likely to display exploration-based innovative behavior. 
Alternatively, our findings show that when more gradual institutional work to 
transform institutions is carried out by individuals within firms, these firms 
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Conclusion  
For this study we used the systematic methodology of innovation scholars to 
measure the institutional entrepreneurial behavior of individuals in firms. We then 
relate this to different types of innovative outcomes (exploration or exploitation). 
We introduce a measure for each of the categories of institutional work and we 
find that that individual institutional work within firms that is more radical 
(creating or disrupting institutional work) is related to higher firm levels 
exploratory innovation, while institutional work to transform institutions more 
gradually is related to firm-level exploitation-based innovation. Managers can 
infer from this that their institutional entrepreneurial behavior at individual level 
are related to the innovative profile of their organization at firm level.  
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Tables 
Table 5.1. Operationalization of constructs  
Construct Operationalization
Exploitative 
innovation
The extent to which units build on existing knowledge and 
meet the needs of existing customers (Jansen et al., 2006)
Explorative 
innovation
The extent to which units depart from existing knowledge 
and pursue innovations for emerging customers or market 
(Jansen et al., 2006)
Creative 
institutional work
Activities of actors to create new institutions
Transformative 
institutional work
Activities of actors to transform existing institutions
Disruptive 
institutional work
Activities of actors to disrupt existing institutions
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Table 5.2. Correlation matrix 
1-tailed test * p < 0.05 ** p < 0.01; Cronbach’s alpha’s on diagonal 
Study Variable Mea
n
s.d. 0 1 2 3 4 5
Main study variables
00. Exploration 4.16
44
1.21
952
0.77
01. Exploitation 4.92
34
1.13
030
0.44
9**
0.76
02. Creating 
institutional work
3.41
03
1.33
994 
0.44
9**
0.34
5**
0.83
0
03. Transforming 
institutional work
4.04
55
1.27
650
0.38
2**
0,40
6**
0.76
2**
0.84
7
04. Disruptive 
institutional work
4.96
43
1.44
050
0,24
5**
0.09
5*
0.31
0**
0.32
6**
0.91
1
Control Variables
05. Organization age 49.5
513
77.7
9405
-0.10
1**
-0.49 -0.12
8**
-0.11
5*
0.46
06. Organization size 1.75
80
0.99
256
0.00
7
0.18
4**
0.01
2
0.12
3*
0.16
5**
0.24
6**
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Table 5.3. Linear regression results predicting exploration and exploitation 
behavior 
* p < 0.05 ** p < 0.01 
Variable Exploration 
innovation
Exploitation 
innovation
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Intercept 4.317 2.437 5.308 4.071
Control variables
Age -0.003*
*
-0.002* -0.003*
*
-0.002**
Log_Size 0.066 0.019 -0.0006
**
-0.0005**
Independent 
variables
Creating 
institutional 
work
0.344** 0.91
Transforming 
institutional 
work
0.059 0.239**
Disrupting 
institutional 
work
0.103* -0.037
R2 0.027 0.228 0.045 0.197
Adjusted R2 0.024 0.216 0.04 0.185
Durbin Watson 1.980 1.921
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Appendices  
Appendix 1. List of questionnaire items  
Variable Question
Exploratory 
innovation1
Wij zetten producten en/of diensten in de markt die 
compleet nieuw zijn voor ons
Explorative 
innovation2
Onze organisatie speelt in op vragen die verder gaan 
dan ons bestaande aanbod
Exploratory 
innovation3
We benutten veelvuldig nieuwe mogelijkheden in 
nieuwe markten
Exploratory 
innovation4
Onze organisatie gebruikt geregeld nieuwe 
distributiekanalen
Exploitative 
innovation1
Wij vergroten de efficiëntie van onze 
productieprocessen en dienstverlening
Exploitative 
innovation2
Wij vergroten schaalvoordelen door het verbeteren van 
ons marktaandeel in onze huidige markten
Exploitative 
innovation3
Onze organisatie verdiept bestaande klantrelaties
Exploitative 
innovation4
Er vinden regelmatig kleine aanpassingen plaats aan 
onze producten en diensten
Creative 
institutional work 1 
Medewerkers nemen regelmatig initiatief om nieuwe 
bedrijfsactiviteiten te introduceren 
Creative 
institutional work 2
Medewerkers nemen regelmatig initiatief om nieuwe 
protocollen voor bedrijfsactiviteiten te creëren 
Creative 
institutional work 2
Medewerkers nemen regelmatig initiatief om nieuwe 
richtlijnen voor het meten van het succes van 
bedrijfsactiviteiten te creëren 
Transformative 
institutional work 1
Medewerkers nemen regelmatig initiatief om bestaande 
bedrijfsactiviteiten te veranderen 
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Transformative 
institutional work 2
Medewerkers nemen regelmatig initiatief om bestaande 
protocollen is voor het uitvoeren van bedrijfsactiviteiten 
te veranderen 
Transformative 
institutional work 
p3
Medewerkers nemen regelmatig initiatief om bestaande 
richtlijnen voor het meten van het succes van 
bedrijfsactiviteiten te veranderen 
Disruptive 
institutional work 1
Medewerkers betwisten regelmatig het nut van 
bestaande bedrijfsactiviteiten 
Disruptive 
institutional work 2
Medewerkers betwisten regelmatig bestaande 
protocollen voor het uitvoeren van bedrijfsactiviteiten 
Disruptive 
institutional work 3
Medewerkers betwisten regelmatig bestaande richtlijnen 
voor het meten van het succes van bedrijfsactiviteiten 
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Conclusion and Discussion 
How does renewal of organizational strategies occur, while strong forces 
encourage organizations to maintain the status quo? Powerful principles such as 
fear of uncertainty and desire to be legitimate render people within organizations 
hesitant to move outside the lines of the familiar. Yet recent history is full of 
examples of people and organizations who have somehow overcome these barriers 
and have taken steps to transform institutional rules (cross-sector partnerships 
(XSP’s), online-only grocery shops), disrupt them (Uber, AirBnB), or even 
institute new rules (ISO standards in the manufacturing industry). Institutional 
entrepreneurship is the behavior aimed at changing institutions or creating new 
ones. Institutional work is the term for the actual activities carried out by actors to 
in order to create, transform and disrupt institutions, but also to maintain them.  
In this dissertation, building on institutional theory, fit, innovation and 
framing literature, I aim to increase academic and managerial understanding of the 
drivers and performance effects of institutional entrepreneurship at micro- and 
macro-levels of analysis. The studies in this book move from macro to micro-level 
and then revert back to macro-level to further delineate the phenomenon of 
institutional entrepreneurship and the institutional work carried out to achieve it.  
The first study provides a theoretical foundation for institutional 
entrepreneurship research. I provide scholars with an overview of the alternative 
points of view in order to encourage them to articulate the approach selected and 
avoid the ambiguity for the audience in understanding the theoretical basis of the 
research. This theoretical study contains a review of institutional theory, which 
results in a typology of different institutional views. The study is the result of 
rigorous analysis of the status quo of papers published that use different types of 
institutional theory. I aim to provide insight into the variation between institutional 
views when it comes to the drivers and the potential for strategic renewal, in order 
to make visible the underlying assumptions of the theoretical lens used by the 
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authors. Table 6.1. outlines the different institutional perspectives and their 
assumed potential for strategic renewal.  
Table 6.1. Institutional theories and the assumed potential for strategic renewal 
The second study is a macro-level study that contributes to the 
institutional fit literature by investigating the relationship between the fit of a firm 
with its regulatory environment and firm performance. We distinguish two 
categories of lack of regulatory fit. Firms can either deviate by keeping lower 
internal regulatory standards compared to what is externally enforced (under-
compliance) or conversely by enforcing more stringent regulations than their 
industry prescribes (over-compliance). In order to create a continuous scale of 
regulatory fit, the latter is termed negative under-compliance. We hypothesize that 
there is a U-shaped relationship between the level of under-compliance and 
substantive performance such that firms that either over-comply or under-comply 
perform better than firms that operate at regulatory fit. Using survey data from 550 
Dutch companies we indeed find that the two types of lack of regulatory fit are 
related to higher relative substantive performance than regulatory fit. Our results 
suggest that a lack of regularity fit is related to higher firm performance. We 
Unit of analysis Potential for strategic renewal
Low High
Firm Old Institutional Theory 
(Selznick, 1957)
Institutional 
entrepreneurship 
(Lounsbury and 
Crumley, 2007)
Industry New Institutional Theory 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 
1983) (Meyer and Rowan, 
1977) 
Neo-Institutional 
Theory (Greenwood and 
Hinings, 1996) 
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therefore conclude that firm regulatory structures may be most beneficial to a 
company when tailored to firm-specific requirements rather than to the more 
generic industry standard. Table 6.2. summarizes the results of Study 2.  
Table 6.2. Hypotheses in Study 2.  
The third study is a micro-level investigation of a process of institutional 
work. We examine the framing mechanisms used to maintain a cross-sector 
partnership (XSP). We study eight years of existence of an XSP that aims to create 
a market for recycled phosphorus, a nutrient that is critical to crop growth but 
whose natural reserves have significantly dwindled. Drawing on 27 interviews and 
over 3.000 internal documents, we study the evolution of different frames of 
diverse actors in an XSP. As opposed to a commonly held assumption in the XSP 
literature, we find that collaboration in a partnership does not have to result in a 
unanimous agreement around a single or convergent frame regarding an issue. 
Rather, an alternative route to successful collaboration amid diversity is the 
Hypothesis Result
H1a) At negative levels of under-compliance 
(i.e. over-compliance) we expect higher 
substantive performance than the industry 
average
Supported
H1b) At regulatory fit we expect lower 
substantive performance than the industry 
average  
Partially Supported
Hypothesis 2: There is a negative 
relationship between the level of under-
compliance and symbolic performance  
Rejected
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maintenance of a productive tension between different frames through ‘optimal’ 
frame plurality – not excessive frame variety that may inhibit the emergence of 
agreements, but the retention of a select few frames and the deletion of others in 
achieving a narrowing frame bandwidth. We conclude that managers may not need 
to focus resources on reaching unanimous agreement among all partners on a 
single mega frame, but rather be used to enkindle unity in diversity, that allows 
sufficient common ground to emerge around an issue despite the diversity of 
actors and their positions.  
For the fourth study we move back to the macro-level to contribute to the 
further theoretical and methodological delineation of the concept of institutional 
entrepreneurship. We use the systematic approach of innovation scholars to 
measure the institutional entrepreneurial behavior of individuals in firms. We then 
relate this to different types of innovative outcomes (exploration or exploitation). 
We develop a measure for different categories of institutional work and, using a 
survey among 346 managers of Dutch organizations, we find that that individual 
institutional work within firms that is more radical is related to higher firm levels 
exploratory innovation, while institutional work to transform institutions more 
gradually is related to firm-level exploitation-based innovation. We therefore 
conclude that the institutional entrepreneurial behavior of individuals within the 
firm effects the innovative outcomes at firm level.  
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Table 6.3. Hypotheses in Study 4.  
In sum, this dissertation expands the research on the topic of institutional 
entrepreneurship. We use diverse qualitative and quantitative methods to (1) 
theoretically examine the positioning of different institutional theories regarding 
strategic renewal, (2) demonstrate that organizations that execute institutional 
entrepreneurship when dealing with regulatory environments, perform 
significantly better than those that simply conform to existing standards, (3) 
describe the complexities of the institutional work performed to maintain 
institutions and (4) create a measure for the different types of institutional work 
that can be carried out to achieve institutional entrepreneurship, and demonstrating 
that more radical individual level institutional work is related to more radical 
innovation and less radical institutional work is related to more incremental 
exploitation-based innovation.  
Hypothesis Result
H1a: There is a positive relationship 
between individual-level institutional work 
carried out to create institutions and 
exploratory innovation at firm level
Supported
H1b: There is a positive relationship 
between individual-level institutional work 
carried out to disrupt institutions and 
exploratory innovation at firm level 
Supported
H2: There is a positive relationship between 
individual-level institutional work carried 
out to transform institutions and 
exploitation-based innovation at firm level 
Supported
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Our work can benefit managers by strengthening their confidence that 
individual initiatives of institutional entrepreneurship can be effective. Our work 
illustrates that institutions that managers come across in their professional 
environments can be influenced by individual institutional work carried out to 
create, maintain, transform or disrupt these institutions. Managers can inspire 
regulatory changes, they can influence the frames used in corporate 
communication and they can innovate within their respective firms.  
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Summary (English) 
In this dissertation, building on institutional theory, fit, innovation and framing 
literature, I aim to increase academic and managerial understanding of the drivers 
and performance effects of institutional entrepreneurship at micro- and macro-
levels of analysis. The studies in this book move from macro to micro-level and 
then revert back to macro-level to further delineate the phenomenon of 
institutional entrepreneurship and the institutional work carried out to achieve it.  
Institutional theory explains how organizational behaviors are responses 
not solely to market pressures, but also to institutional pressures (Greenwood and 
Hinings, 1996). Study 1 is a macro-level study containing a review and typology of 
different streams of institutional theory. Specifically, the study aims to provide 
insight into the various institutional views of strategic renewal. Strategic renewal 
is broadly defined as the strategic actions a firm undertakes to alter its path 
dependence (Volberda et al. 2001b: 160).  Institutional theory can be separated into 
at least four different perspectives. These perspectives differ in level of analysis 
and the amount of agency assumed, as well as their views on strategic renewal.  
Study 2 is also a macro-level study, which examines the conformity 
between Dutch firms’ internal and external regulatory environment to determine 
fit, and links this to firm performance. Considerable debate exists about the effect 
of conformity on a firm’s performance. We use the conformity between a firm’s 
internal and external regulatory environment to determine fit and link this to firm 
performance. The U-shaped relationship between regulatory mis-fit and 
substantive performance that is found indicates the importance of institutional 
entrepreneurship. This conjectured relationship suggests that for firms that strive 
for success, deviation may well be a more attractive path than conformation. 
Study 3 takes a micro-level approach. We examine the framing 
mechanisms used to maintain a cross-sector partnership (XSP). We carry out a 
qualitative case focusing on the use of different frames by diverse actors in an 
XSP. We demonstrate the role of framing in how actors avoid common XSP 
pitfalls such as debilitating conflict, and create sufficient common ground to 
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sustain collaboration. We find that collaboration in a partnership does not have to 
result in a unanimous agreement around a single or convergent frame regarding an 
issue. Rather, an alternative route to successful collaboration amid diversity is the 
maintenance of a productive tension between different frames through ‘optimal’ 
frame plurality via the retention of a select few frames and the deletion of others. 
This implies that in inter-organizational cooperations, resources need not be 
focused on reaching a complete or unanimous agreement among all partners on a 
single mega frame, but rather be used to enkindle unity in diversity, that allows 
sufficient common ground to emerge around an issue despite the diversity of 
actors and their positions. 
For Study 4 we zoom out to macro-level again, to use the systematic 
approach of innovation scholars to measure the institutional entrepreneurial 
behavior of individuals in firms. We then relate this to different types of innovative 
outcomes (exploration or exploitation). Our findings demonstrate that the 
existence of individual-level institutional entrepreneurship initiatives within firms 
is related to the type of firm-wide innovative behavior that is exhibited. We make 
the case that individual institutional work within firms that is more radical is 
related to exploratory innovation, while institutional work to transform institutions 
more gradually is related to exploitation-based innovation. These findings suggest 
that the institutional entrepreneurial behavior of individuals within the firm effects 
the innovative outcomes at firm level.  
In sum, our work illustrates that the institutions that managers come across 
in their professional environments can be influenced by individual institutional 
work carried out to create, maintain, transform or disrupt these institutions. 
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Samenvatting (Nederlands) 
De basis van deze dissertatie ligt bij de theoretische gebieden van institutionele 
theorie, innovatie en ‘framing’. Mijn doel is om de academische- en praktijkkennis 
van managers te verdiepen met betrekking tot de drijvende krachten achter – en de 
prestatie effecten van- institutioneel ondernemerschap. Hierbij zal ik zowel het 
micro- als het macro-niveau van dit fenomeen belichten. De studies in dit boek 
zijn geordend om van macro-naar micro niveau the verdiepen, om vervolgens 
weer terug te komen op macro-niveau. Op deze manier wordt het fenomeen van 
institutioneel ondernemerschap beschreven, alsmede het institutionele werk dat 
nodig is om dit te bereiken. 
 Institutionele theorie verklaart hoe het gedrag van organisaties niet enkel 
een respons is op invloeden vanuit de markt, maar ook op institutionele druk 
(Greenwood and Hinings, 1996). Study 1 is een studie op macro-niveau die 
theoretische review en typologie bevat, van de verschillende stromingen binnen de 
institutionele theorie. De studie besteedt specifiek aandacht aan de verschillende 
invalshoeken die binnen de institutionele theorie bestaan wanneer  het aankomt op 
strategische vernieuwing. Strategische vernieuwing kan breed gedefinieerd 
worden als de strategische acties die een bedrijf onderneemt om haar strategische 
koers aan te passen (Volberda et al. 2001b: 160). Institutionele theorie kan verder 
opgesplitst worden in ten minste vier verschillende perspectieven. Deze 
perspectieven verschillen van elkaar in het belichte analyseniveau en de 
hoeveelheid keuzevrijheid die wordt aangenomen, alsmede in hun kijk op 
strategische vernieuwing.  
Study 2 is ook een studie op macro-niveau. Hierin wordt onderzoek 
gedaan naar het conformisme van van Nederlandse bedrijven op het gebied van 
regelgeving. Er bestaan in de bedrijfswetenschappen verschillende meningen over 
het effect van conformisme op de prestaties van een organisatie. In deze studie 
wordt de strengheid van interne regelgeving van bedrijven vergeleken met de 
standaard in hun externe milieu. Daarbij meten we de ‘fit’ van een bedrijf met het 
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externe regelgevingsklimaat. Dit gebruiken we vervolgens om een link te maken 
met bedrijfsprestaties. The U-vormige relatie die we vinden tussen de mate van 
‘mis-fit’ op het gebied van regelgeving, en bedrijfsprestaties, geeft aan hoe 
belangrijk institutioneel ondernemerschap kan zijn. De suggestie die de 
uitkomsten van de studie wekken, is dat afwijken van de norm is een 
aantrekkelijker pad dan conformisme, voor bedrijven tie topprestaties nastreven.  
In study 3 wordt een micro-niveau lens gebruikt. We onderzoeken voor 
deze studie hoe ‘framing’ mechanismes gebruikt worden om intersectorale 
samenwerkingen te onderhouden. We voeren een kwalitatieve case study uit, 
waarbij we onderzoek doen naar de verschillende ‘frames’ die de diverse partners 
binnen intersectorale samenwerkingen bezigen. Met deze studie benadrukken we 
de rol van ‘framing’ in het ontwijken van bekende gevaren voor intersectorale 
samenwerkingen, zoals onoverkomelijke conflicten. ‘Framing’ zorgt dat voldoende 
overeenstemming bereikt kan worden voor het behoud van een langdurige 
samenwerking. Onze bevindingen laten zien dat dit mogelijk is doordat 
intersectorale samenwerking niet per definitie hoeft te resulteren in 
overeenstemming over een enkel specifiek ‘frame’. Sterker nog, gezien de 
diversiteit van de partners is succesvolle samenwerking mogelijk wanneer 
verschillende ‘frames’ parallel gebruikt worden, zelfs als ze op gespannen voet 
staan met elkaar. Er is echter een opmerkelijk proces te zien waarbij een aantal 
‘frames’ actief geselecteerd worden om gebruikt te worden in de samenwerking, 
terwijl andere worden weggelaten. De implicaties van deze studie zijn dat er een 
limiet gesteld zou kunnen worden aan de hoeveelheid tijd en moeite die 
geïnvesteerd wordt in het bereiken van complete overeenstemming over het 
leidende ‘frame’ van de intersectorale samenwerking. In plaats daarvan is het 
bepalen van overeenstemming over een overkoepelend doel voldoende, en kan 
diversiteit gewaarborgd worden als het aankomt op de ‘frames’ die dit doel 
motiveren.  
Voor study 4 gaan we weer terug naar een macro-niveau aanpak. We 
maken hier gebruik van de systematische aanpak die innovatie wetenschappers 
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bezigen om het niveau van institutioneel ondernemerschap bij individuen in 
bedrijven te meten. We relateren dit vervolgens weer aan een van de twee typen 
innovatieve uitkomsten (exploratie of exploitatie) van een bedrijf als geheel. Onze 
bevindingen laten zien dat het bestaan van institutioneel ondernemerschap op 
individueel niveau gerelateerd kan worden aan het type innovatie dat de overhand 
heeft op bedrijfsniveau. We argumenteren dat meer radicaal individueel werk aan 
instituties gerelateerd is aan exploratieve innovatie, terwijl meer geleidelijk werk 
aan instituties is gerelateerd aan exploitatieve innovatie gemeten voor het gehele 
bedrijf. Deze resultaten suggereren dat institutioneel ondernemerschap op 
individueel niveau effect heeft op de innovatieve uitkomsten van een bedrijf als 
geheel.  
In conclusie laat bovenstaande combinatie van studies zien dat de 
instituties die managers tegenkomen in diverse professionele milieus, beïnvloed 
kunnen worden door individueel werk aan instituties. Dit werk kan variëren in 
doel en intensiteit- van het creëren van instituties, tot het onderhouden, 
transformeren of zelfs ontwrichten ervan.  
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Presented at The Academy of Management Conference 2015,Vancouver
Klitsie, E.J. ‘Strategic renewal in institutional contexts: The influence of institutional (mis)fit on 
performance’ (working paper)
Presented at the Dutch organization for PhD researchers in Business 
Economics and Management annual conference (PREBEM) 2012, 
Amsterdam
Klitsie, E.J., Volberda, H.W., Stienstra, M. ‘To Comply or Defy: Institutional Entrepreneurship in 
Regulated Industries’ (working paper)
Presented at European Academy of Management (EURAM) and 
European Group of Organizational Studies (EGOS) in 2013
Klitsie, E.J., Volberda, H.W. ‘Being lost and alone – the best environmental circumstances to achieve 
institutional entrepreneurship?’ (working paper) 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Honours and Awards
April ’16 Nominated for the Routledge Best Paper Award in Social 
Partnerships
International Symposium on Cross-Sector Social Interactions 2016, 
Toronto
Title: Maintenance Work in Cross-Sector Partnerships: Frame Plurality 
as Key to Solving Complex Social Issues
Co-authors: Volberda, H.W, Ansari, S.
Mar ‘13 Best Track Paper Award  
13th PREBEM Conference, Amsterdam  
Title: ‘The Influence of Institutional (Mis-)Fit on Performance’
Jan '07- Jan '08 Erasmus Honours Programme  
Teaching experience
Bachelor’s Program, Rotterdam School of Management
Sept-Dec ’16 & ’17 Strategy Consulting (BSc Y3 minor) (80 students)
Student evaluation: 8,4 out of 10
July -Dec ’14 & ’15 Bachelor Internship (BSc Y3) (9 students)
Sept ’15 – Nov ‘15 Introduction to Business (BSc Y1) (+/- 700 and 350 students)
Student evaluation: 7,2 out of 10
Oct ’14 – Jan ‘15 Organization Theory and Dynamics (BSc Y2) (180 students)
Dec '12 – June ‘14 Strategic Business Plan (BSc Y1) Two consecutive years 
(64 students each)
Student evaluation 2013: 8,4 out of 10
Student evaluation 2014: 8,0 out of 10
Master’s Program, Rotterdam School of Management
Jan-Jun ’17 & ‘18 Strategic Management Consulting (3 x 50 students)
Student evaluation: 4,5 out of 5
Nov '13 - July '14 Master’s Thesis Supervision (5 students)
Student evaluation: 4,3 out of 5 
Executive Education, Rotterdam School of Management
Nov ’17 Business Model Innovation 
Component of this course: Strategic Analysis 
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The ERIM PhD Series 
The ERIM PhD Series contains PhD dissertations in the field of Research in Management 
defended at Erasmus University Rotterdam and supervised by senior researchers affiliated 
to the Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM). All dissertations in the ERIM 
PhD Series are available in full text through the ERIM Electronic Series Portal: http://
repub.eur.nl/pub. ERIM is the joint research institute of the Rotterdam School of 
Management (RSM) and the Erasmus School of Economics at the Erasmus University 
Rotterdam (EUR). 
Dissertations in the last five years 
Abbink, E.J., Crew Management in Passenger Rail Transport,  
Promotors: Prof. L.G. Kroon & Prof. A.P.M. Wagelmans, EPS-2014-325-LIS, 
http://repub.eur.nl/pub/76927 
Acar, O.A., Crowdsourcing for Innovation: Unpacking Motivational, Knowledge and   
Relational Mechanisms of Innovative Behavior in Crowdsourcing Platforms,  
Promotor: Prof. J.C.M. van den Ende, EPS-2014-321-LIS, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/76076 
Akemu, O., Corporate Responses to Social Issues: Essays in Social Entrepreneurship and 
Corporate Social Responsibility, Promotors: Prof. G.M. Whiteman & Dr S.P. Kennedy, 
EPS-2017-392-ORG, https://repub.eur.nl/pub/95768 
Akin Ates, M., Purchasing and Supply Management at the Purchase Category Level: 
Strategy, structure and performance, Promotors: Prof. J.Y.F. Wynstra & Dr E.M. 
van Raaij, EPS-2014-300-LIS, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/50283 
Alexander, L., People, Politics, and Innovation: A Process Perspective,  
Promotors: Prof. H.G. Barkema & Prof. D.L. van Knippenberg, EPS-2014-331-S&E,  
http://repub.eur.nl/pub/77209 
Alexiou, A. Management of Emerging Technologies and the Learning Organization: 
Lessons from the Cloud and Serious Games Technology, Promotors: Prof. S.J. Magala, 
Prof. M.C. Schippers and Dr I. Oshri, EPS-2016-404-ORG, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/93818 
Almeida e Santos Nogueira, R.J. de, Conditional Density Models Integrating Fuzzy and 
Probabilistic Representations of Uncertainty, Promotors: Prof. U. Kaymak &  
Prof. J.M.C. Sousa, EPS-2014-310-LIS, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/51560 
Alserda, G.A.G., Choices in Pension Management, Promotors: Prof. S.G. van der Lecq & 
Dr O.W. Steenbeek, EPS-2017-432-F&A, https://repub.eur.nl/pub/103496 
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Benschop, N, Biases in Project Escalation: Names, frames & construal levels,  
Promotors: Prof. K.I.M. Rhode, Prof. H.R. Commandeur, Prof. M. Keil & Dr A.L.P. 
Nuijten, EPS-2015-375-S&E, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/79408 
Berg, W.E. van den, Understanding Salesforce Behavior using Genetic Association 
Studies, Promotor: Prof. W.J.M.I. Verbeke, EPS-2014-311-MKT, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/
51440 
Beusichem, H.C. van, Firms and Financial Markets: Empirical Studies on the 
Informational Value of Dividends, Governance and Financial Reporting,  
Promotors: Prof. A. de Jong & Dr G. Westerhuis, EPS-2016-378-F&A, http://repub.eur.nl/
pub/93079 
Bliek, R. de, Empirical Studies on the Economic Impact of Trust,  
Promotor: Prof. J. Veenman & Prof. Ph.H.B.F. Franses, EPS-2015-324-ORG, http://
repub.eur.nl/pub/78159 
Boons, M., Working Together Alone in the Online Crowd: The Effects of Social 
Motivations and Individual Knowledge Backgrounds on the Participation and 
Performance of Members of Online Crowdsourcing Platforms,  
Promotors: Prof. H.G. Barkema & Dr D.A. Stam, EPS-2014-306-S&E, http://repub.eur.nl/
pub/50711 
Bouman, P., Passengers, Crowding and Complexity: Models for Passenger Oriented 
Public Transport, Prof. L.G. Kroon, Prof. A. Schöbel & Prof. P.H.M. Vervest,  
EPS-2017-420-LIS, https://repub.eur.nl/ 
Brazys, J., Aggregated Marcoeconomic News and Price Discovery,  
Promotor: Prof. W.F.C. Verschoor, EPS-2015-351-F&A, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/78243 
Burg, G.J.J. van den, Algorithms for Multiclass Classification and Regularized Regression, 
Promotors: Prof. P.J.F. Groenen & Dr. A. Alfons, EPS-2018-442-MKT, https://repub.eur.nl/
pub/103929 
Cancurtaran, P., Essays on Accelerated Product Development,  
Promotors: Prof. F. Langerak & Prof. G.H. van Bruggen, EPS-2014-317-MKT, http://
repub.eur.nl/pub/76074 
Chammas, G., Portfolio concentration, Promotor: Prof. J. Spronk, EPS-2017-410-F&E, 
https://repub.eur.nl/pub/94975 
Cranenburgh, K.C. van, Money or Ethics: Multinational corporations and religious 
organisations operating in an era of corporate responsibility, Prof. L.C.P.M. Meijs,  
Prof. R.J.M. van Tulder & Dr D. Arenas, EPS-2016-385-ORG, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/
93104 
Consiglio, I., Others: Essays on Interpersonal and Consumer Behavior,  
Promotor: Prof. S.M.J. van Osselaer, EPS-2016-366-MKT, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/79820 
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Darnihamedani, P. Individual Characteristics, Contextual Factors and Entrepreneurial 
Behavior, Promotors: Prof. A.R. Thurik & S.J.A. Hessels, EPS-2016-360-S&E, http://
repub.eur.nl/pub/93280 
Dennerlein, T. Empowering Leadership and Employees’ Achievement Motivations: the 
Role of Self-Efficacy and Goal Orientations in the Empowering Leadership Process, 
Promotors: Prof. D.L. van Knippenberg & Dr J. Dietz, EPS-2017-414-ORG, https://
repub.eur.nl/pub/98438 
Deng, W., Social Capital and Diversification of Cooperatives,  
Promotor: Prof. G.W.J. Hendrikse, EPS-2015-341-ORG, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/77449 
Depecik, B.E., Revitalizing brands and brand: Essays on Brand and Brand Portfolio 
Management Strategies, Promotors: Prof. G.H. van Bruggen, Dr Y.M. van Everdingen  
and Dr M.B. Ataman, EPS-2016-406-MKT, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/93507 
Duijzer, L.E., Mathematical Optimization in Vaccine Allocation,  
Promotors: Prof. R. Dekker & Dr W.L. van Jaarsveld, EPS-2017-430-LIS, https://
repub.eur.nl/pub/101487 
Duyvesteyn, J.G. Empirical Studies on Sovereign Fixed Income Markets,  
Promotors: Prof. P. Verwijmeren & Prof. M.P.E. Martens, EPS-2015-361-F&A, https://
repub.eur.nl/pub/79033 
Elemes, A., Studies on Determinants and Consequences  
of Financial Reporting Quality, Promotor: Prof. E. Peek, EPS-2015-354-F&A, https://
repub.eur.nl/pub/79037 
Ellen, S. ter, Measurement, Dynamics, and Implications of Heterogeneous Beliefs in 
Financial Markets, Promotor: Prof. W.F.C. Verschoor, EPS-2015-343-F&A, http://
repub.eur.nl/pub/78191 
Erlemann, C., Gender and Leadership Aspiration: The Impact of the Organizational 
Environment, Promotor: Prof. D.L. van Knippenberg, EPS-2016-376-ORG, http://
repub.eur.nl/pub/79409 
Eskenazi, P.I., The Accountable Animal, Promotor: Prof. F.G.H. Hartmann,  
EPS-2015-355-F&A, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/78300 
Evangelidis, I., Preference Construction under Prominence,  
Promotor: Prof. S.M.J. van Osselaer, EPS-2015-340-MKT, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/78202 
Faber, N., Structuring Warehouse Management, Promotors: Prof. M.B.M. de Koster  
& Prof. A. Smidts, EPS-2015-336-LIS, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/78603 
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Feng, Y., The Effectiveness of Corporate Governance Mechanisms and Leadership 
Structure: Impacts on strategic change and firm performance,  
Promotors: Prof. F.A.J. van den Bosch, Prof. H.W. Volberda & Dr J.S. Sidhu,  
EPS-2017-389-S&E, https://repub.eur.nl/pub/98470 
Fernald, K., The Waves of Biotechnological Innovation in Medicine: Interfirm Cooperation 
Effects and a Venture Capital Perspective, Promotors: Prof. E. Claassen, Prof. H.P.G. 
Pennings & Prof. H.R. Commandeur, EPS-2015-371-S&E,  
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/79120 
Fisch, C.O., Patents and trademarks: Motivations, antecedents, and value in industrialized 
and emerging markets, Promotors: Prof. J.H. Block, Prof. H.P.G.  Pennings &  
Prof. A.R. Thurik, EPS-2016-397-S&E, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/94036 
Fliers, P.T., Essays on Financing and Performance: The role of firms, banks and board, 
Promotors: Prof. A. de Jong & Prof. P.G.J. Roosenboom, EPS-2016-388-F&A, http://
repub.eur.nl/pub/93019 
Fourne, S.P., Managing Organizational Tensions: A Multi-Level Perspective on 
Exploration, Exploitation and Ambidexterity, Promotors: Prof. J.J.P. Jansen  
& Prof. S.J. Magala, EPS-2014-318-S&E, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/76075 
Gaast, J.P. van der, Stochastic Models for Order Picking Systems,  
Promotors: Prof. M.B.M de Koster & Prof. I.J.B.F. Adan, EPS-2016-398-LIS, http://
repub.eur.nl/pub/93222 
Giurge, L., A Test of Time; A temporal and dynamic approach to power and ethics, 
Promotors: Prof. M.H. van Dijke & Prof. D. De Cremer, EPS-2017-412-ORG, https://
repub.eur.nl/ 
Glorie, K.M., Clearing Barter Exchange Markets: Kidney Exchange and Beyond, 
Promotors: Prof. A.P.M. Wagelmans & Prof. J.J. van de Klundert, EPS-2014-329-LIS, 
http://repub.eur.nl/pub/77183 
Gobena, L., Towards Integrating Antecedents of Voluntary Tax Compliance,  
Promotors: Prof. M.H. van Dijke & Dr P. Verboon, EPS-2017-436-ORG, https://
repub.eur.nl/pub/103276 
Groot, W.A., Assessing Asset Pricing Anomalies, Promotors: Prof. M.J.C.M. Verbeek  
& Prof. J.H. van Binsbergen, EPS-2017-437-F&A, https://repub.eur.nl/pub/103490 
Hekimoglu, M., Spare Parts Management of Aging Capital Products,  
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Hengelaar, G.A., The Proactive Incumbent: Holy grail or hidden gem? Investigating 
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Hogenboom, A.C., Sentiment Analysis of Text Guided by Semantics and Structure, 
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